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 ABSTRACT 
The Effect of Education on Earnings and Employment  
in the Informal Sector in South Africa 
Izumi Yamasaki 
 
This dissertation analyzes the effects of schooling on earnings and employment in the 
informal private sector, compared with those in the public and formal private sectors, in South 
Africa. The estimations are conducted by race and gender as well to examine the difference 
between various subgroups. The research also examines the heterogeneity in returns to 
schooling.  
The returns to schooling are estimated using two-stage least squares with multinomial 
two-step selection corrections to control for both endogeneity of schooling and sector sample 
selection bias. Quantile regression and piecewise linear spline function methods were applied to 
deal with the heterogeneity of the returns to schooling. Moreover, the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition method was conducted to explore the contribution of returns to schooling and 
educational endowments to wage differentials between sectors. To analyze the effects of 
schooling on the probability of employment in different sectors of the economy, multinomial 
logit and probit models were estimated. The instrumental variable probit model was also used to 
control for the endogeneity of schooling.  
Even after controlling for both endogeneity of schooling and sample selection bias, a 
significant difference was found in returns to schooling between the formal and informal private 
sectors. Returns to schooling in the formal private sector are higher than those in the informal 
private sector in general. These findings apply across race and gender, except for Whites and 
 Asians whose sample size in the informal sector was too small. They were robust even after 
controlling for district, industry, and occupation, and using different definitions of the informal 
sector. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that formal private and informal private labor 
markets are segmented in terms of returns to schooling in South Africa.  
The study also showed a positive effect of schooling on employment in the public and 
formal private sectors versus employment in the informal private sector. The effect of schooling 
on employment in the formal private sector – when compared to that in the informal sector – was 
much stronger for females than males, except for Whites and Asians. The findings were robust 
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This dissertation analyzes the effect of education on earnings and the probability of 
working in the informal sector, compared with the formal sector, in South Africa. The informal 
sector is usually associated with a specific form of the private sector where small and medium 
enterprises operate without legal recognition in developing countries.1 Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where South Africa is located, has the largest informal sector in the world, with some estimates 
suggesting that as much a 75 percent of non-agricultural sector employment is accounted for by 
the informal sector.  
Because such a significant portion of the population forms part of this sector, it is 
essential to understand the characteristics of its employment and how it differs from the formal 
sector. At the policy level, the government also needs to have information about the labor market 
outcomes in this sector, in order to plan adequate policies, whether in relation to poverty and 
income, or in terms of seeking ways to incorporate the informal sector into the formal. This 
research intends to provide a contribution to the understanding of the informal sector in South 
Africa. 
1.1. Motivation for and Background of the Dissertation 
In developing countries, a large part of the labor force is employed informally and a 
substantial fraction of GDP is generated from the informal sector. Not many comparative 
worldwide statistics are available on the size of informal employment and the economy because 
of the nature of the informal sector and employment. However, Charmes (2000) reported 
                                                 
1Defining the informal sector has been the subject of much debate. The definition of the informal sector and 




employment in the informal sector as a percentage of non-agricultural employment2 by world 
regions in 1980-89 and in 1990-99, while Schneider (2006) calculated the size of the informal 
economy as a percentage of GDP3 by group of countries in 1999/2000, 2000/2001, and 
2001/2002 (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Both informal employment and the informal economy have a 
substantial share in developing countries, with an increasing trend. Between the 1980s and 1990s, 
the percentage of informal employment in non-agricultural employment increased from 39% to 
43% in North Africa, from 68% to 75% in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 52% to 57% in Latin 
America, and from 53% to 63% in Asia (Charmes, 2000). Between 1999/2000 and 2001/2002, 
the size of the informal economy as a percentage of GDP slightly increased from 41% to 43% in 
Africa, 41% to 43% in Central and South America, 29% to 30% in Asia, 38% to 40% in 
transition countries, 32% to 33% in the South Pacific Islands, and 20% to 22% in Communist 
countries, while remaining around 16% in OECD countries (Schneider, 2006). Although the 
informal sector accounts for a large part of total employment, its relative contribution to GDP 
seems to be much smaller. 
According to the traditional dual and segmented labor market view, the informal sector is 
seen as a disadvantaged, low-paying, and unprotected sector, as the last resort of employment for 
workers (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). Workers migrate from rural to urban areas in 
response to differences in expected earnings between the urban modern sector and the traditional 
agricultural sector (Harris & Todaro, 1970), and many of these workers enter the informal sector 
                                                 
2These statistics are in accordance with the definition of the informal sector from the 15th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993 (International Labor Office [ILO], 1993). 
 
3Schneider (2006) actually calls the informal economy a “shadow economy” instead of an informal 
economy. In his definition, the shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services 




because they fail to find jobs in the formal sector. The formal sector is thought to be overly 
regulated, leading the high unemployment rates (De Soto, 1989; Dickens & Lang, 1985;4 Fields, 
1975). Moreover, workers in the informal sector are thought to earn less than identical workers in 
the formal sector.  
Some researchers, however, have challenged this traditional view, suggesting that a 
substantial share of informal activities may be the workers’ voluntary choice, given their 
preferences, skills, and competing earnings prospects. This case has been made especially in 
reference to the self-employed in the informal sector of Latin America (Gindling, 1991; Jütting, 
Parlevliet, & Xenogiani, 2008; Maloney, 2004; Packard, 2007; Perry, Maloney, Arias, Fajnzylber, 
Mason, & Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). If labor markets are competitive, and not segmented, then 
wage convergence may be achieved in equilibrium for equivalent occupations in the two sectors 
and wage gaps would be explained by compensating differentials between the two (Bargain & 
Kwenda, 2009; Tannuri-Pianto, Pianto, & Arias, 2004).  
Fields (1990) suggests that the informal sector could feature both types of workers: 
workers who have no choice but to work in the informal sector, and workers who choose to work 
in the sector. This third view, which combines both competitive and necessity views of informal 
work, has emerged only recently. Fields (1990, 2005) and others5 claim that urban informal 
labor markets in developing countries consist of an “upper tier” and a “lower tier.” The “upper 
tier” is the competitive part, with workers who voluntarily choose the informal employment, 
while the “lower tier” consists of individuals who cannot afford to be unemployed but also 
                                                 
4Dickens and Lang (1985) suggest the presence of labor market segmentation and dual labor markets in the 
U.S.  
 




cannot find formal jobs.  
De Soto (1989, 2000) and De Soto and Litan (2001) indicate that one of the reasons for 
the huge informal sector in developing countries is because being and staying formal is too 
costly in terms of time and money. There are too many regulations and procedures to start and 
run a formal business, and bureaucrats often ask them for bribes in return for providing 
permissions.6 De Soto (1989) even points out that the possible reason why governments in 
developing countries have so many regulations is because government officials want to collect 
bribes.  
1.2. Policies on the Informal Sector 
Among policymakers, perspectives on the effect that the informal sector has on the 
economy and society have also been changing. Until the late 1980s, policymakers had usually 
ignored the informal sector, as Charmes (1990) points out. They thought the sector would 
diminish over time as countries develop. Many studies also argue that the informal sector is 
harmful. Loayza (1996) claims that the relative size of the informal economy reduces economic 
growth because of the low usage of public services by business firms and the increased number 
of activities using public services inefficiently. Also De Soto (2000, 2001) and De Soto and Litan 
(2001) suggest that the lack of legal property rights of people in the informal sector could be 
harmful on economic development. If people have no legal property rights, they cannot turn their 
assets into capital that can be used as collateral to start or invest in their businesses. A large 
informal sector has also been correlated with lower government revenues (Jütting & Laiglesia, 
2009; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2004) and higher taxes for firms in the 
                                                 




formal sector (UNDP, 2004).  
Despite views on the negative effects of the informal sector, governments in developing 
countries and international organizations began to support the informal sector in the late 1980s 
(Charmes, 1990; World Bank, 1987) because the sector continued to expand rather than diminish, 
and became an important source of employment in countries with high unemployment in the 
formal sector. Today, governments and international agencies recognize the informal sector as 
key for job creation, economic growth, and poverty reduction (Chen, 2007; Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency [SIDA], 2004). However, it should be noted that 
the ultimate goal for many governments is to expand the formal sector and diminish the role of 
the informal sector. Therefore, supporting the informal sector and its workers and encouraging 
them to become formal7 have become essential goals for the economic development of 
developing countries.  
With this background, this dissertation analyzes how education contributes to the 
earnings (productivity) of workers and the likelihoods of working in the informal sector in South 
Africa —compared to the formal sector— as a case study. In fact, education has been regarded as 
one of the most important components of labor market earnings (see the survey by Katz and 
Autor, 1999). It has also been identified as a key factor in economic growth. In their examination 
of the augmented Solow8 model using actual cross-country data,9 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
                                                 
7That is, workers in the formal sector with legal registration. 
 
8The Solow model explains economic growth as a function of physical capital and amount of labor (Solow, 
1956). Mankiw et al. (1992) expanded this model by adding human capital (education) as another explanatory 
variable of economic growth. 
 
9Mankiw et al. (1992) used secondary school enrollments from the UNESCO yearbook as human capital in 




(1992) suggest that savings, education, and population growth are the major variables which 
account for cross-country variations in income per capita. More recent work has documented the 
importance of education for growth and development (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001, Goldin and 
Katz, 2007, and Rivera-Batiz, 2008).  
1.3. Research Questions 
The main research questions of this dissertation are:  
1) To what extent does education affect the earnings of workers in the informal private 
sector? How does the effect of education on earnings differ between the formal and 
informal private sector, between the public and informal private sector, and between 
the public and formal private sector? 
2) To what extent does education affect the probability of public, formal, and informal 
private sector employment? 
For the first question, the focus is on calculating rates of return to education in the 
informal sector and to what extent they differ from those in other sectors. In developing countries, 
a large part of the labor force is employed in the informal sector, yet there is little information 
about the role education plays in determining wages. With these countries devoting much money 
to the expansion of their education system, especially for basic education, does such schooling 
pay-off in terms of higher wages in the informal sector?  Or are earnings in the informal sector 
largely unrelated to schooling? This relates to the debate mentioned earlier on whether the 
informal sector is a sector of last resort for employment or not. The second question is also 
related to this issue, as whether the probability of employment in the informal sector responds to 
                                                                                                                                                             





education or not is critical in determining what sector of the labor force it caters to.  
  
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The research in this dissertation can help policymakers 1) better understand the role 
played by education in determining labor market outcomes in the informal sector; 2) determine 
whether the sector is a supply of employment of last resort for highly unskilled and uneducated 
workers or, instead, a dynamic sector where highly-educated workers are employed in addition to 
low-educated workers; and 3) determine whether education can be a tool to mobilize workers 
from the informal sector into the formal sector, in South Africa and other developing countries. 
These policy issues are important for poverty reduction, job creation, and economic growth 
(Chen, 2007; SIDA, 2004). Finally, it is hoped that the research in this dissertation will 
contribute to the academic field of economics of education because few quantitative studies on 
the topic are available for South Africa. There are also fewer studies on this specific topic that 
involve rigorous identification strategies and econometric methods. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of 10 chapters. The first chapter explained the motivation for 
and background of the dissertation, policies on the informal sector, the research questions 
guiding the dissertation, and the significance of the study. The second chapter clarifies the 
definition of the informal sector and employment. The third chapter examines previous empirical 
studies on the impact of education on earnings of workers in the informal sector compared to the 
formal sector and on the effect of education on the probabilities of employment in both informal 
and formal sectors. The fourth chapter presents the theories on which the research is based. The 




sixth chapter presents the identification strategies utilized to estimate the returns to education in 
the informal and formal sectors and identification strategies used to estimate the effect of 
education on employment in different sectors. Then the descriptive statistics are explained in 
Chapter 7. Chapter 9 presents the estimation results of the return to education in the public, 
formal private, and informal private sectors. The policy recommendations, qualifications, and 
issues for future studies drawn from the analysis are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 10 
presents the estimation results of the effect of education on employments in different. The final 
chapter presents general conclusions, qualifications, and policy recommendations.  
 
Table 1.1  Informal Sector as % Non-agricultural Employment 
Region 1980-89 1990-99 
North Africa 38.8 43.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 68.1 74.8 
Latin America 52.3 56.9 
Asia 53.0 63.0 
 




Table 1.2  Average Size of the Informal (Shadow) Economy as % of Official GDP for 
Developing, Transition, and OECD Countries 
 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002
Africa 41.3 42.3 43.2 
 (37) (37) (37) 
Central and South America 41.1 43.1 43.4 
 (21) (21) (21) 
Asia 28.5 29.5 30.4 
 (28) (28) (28) 
Transition Countries 38.1 39.1 40.1 
 (25) (25) (25) 
OECD Countries 16.8 16.7 16.3 
 (21) (21) (21) 
South Pacific Islands 31.7 32.6 33.4 
 (10) (10) (10) 
Communist Countries 19.8 21.1 22.3 
 (3) (3) (3) 
Average Over 145 Countries 33.6 34.5 35.2 
 
Source: Schneider (2006) 





2. DEFINITIONS OF INFORMAL SECTOR AND INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT 
This chapter discusses definitions of informal sector and informal employment. Given the 
illegality and ambiguity of the informal sector and employment, no consistent and universal 
definition of the informal sector and employment is available in the literature. The concept of the 
informal sector was first posed by the Kenya Report, written by the International Labor Office 
(ILO, 1972).1 The ILO (1972) defines the informal sector as follows: (i) ease of entry, (ii) 
reliance on indigenous resources, (iii) family ownership of enterprises, (iv) small scale of 
operation, (v) labor-intensive technology, (vi) skills acquired outside the formal school system, 
and (vii) unregulated yet competitive market (p. 6).  
In practice, the definition of the informal sector and employment differs from study to 
study. Table 2.1 presents the definition of informal workers (or sector) that will be used in the 
empirical research in this study. This definition often depends on data availability, and many 
papers use an incomplete definition of the informal sector because of a poor dataset. As Cole and 
Fayissa (1991) point out, definitions of informal sector/employment in early studies were often 
based on the size of the enterprises, the occupations of the workers, and the type of technology. 
Some studies defined the informal sector solely or heavily based on the size of the firm, i.e., the 
number of employees (Banerjee, 1983; Gong & van Soest, 2002; Pisani & Pagán, 2004; 
Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004). For example, Pisani and Pagán (2004) defined informal workers as 
those who work in firms with five employees or less. Some studies used both size of firms and 
types of jobs to define informal workers (Funkhouser, 1996, 1997a, 1997b). A few studies in the 
                                                 




literature review in this study (Packard, 2007; Saavedra & Chong, 1999) regarded informal 
workers as wage earners without a contract. Recent studies often define informal workers as 
those who work in firms (or are self-employed) without formal accounts, i.e., unregistered, not 
paying tax, and/or without social security (Kuepie, Nordman, & Roubaud, 2009; Marcouiller, 
Ruiz de Casilla, & Woodruff, 1997; Pagán & Tijerina-Guajardo, 2000; Tegoum, 2009; see Table 
2.1 for more examples).  
It is also important to note that informal workers usually include both self-employed and 
wage workers. The self-employed often accounts for the majority of workers in the informal 
sector. In all developing countries, self-employment comprises a greater share of informal 
employment than wage employment.2 
There are sometimes subtle differences in terminology. Some countries make a 
distinction between “workers in the informal sector” and “informal workers”. For example, 
Statistics South Africa (2010) defines informal workers as: workers in the informal sector plus 
employees in the formal sector and people working in private households who lack entitlements 
to basic benefits such as pension or medical aid and do not have a written contract of 
employment.3 There is also the issue that some people may work in both the formal and 
informal sectors (Jütting et al., 2008). Finally, it is important to note that the informal sector and 
informal employment do not necessarily include criminal activities (SIDA, 2004). 
This dissertation uses the so-called legalistic definition of the informal sector and 
informal workers. This is partly due to the fact that the research is based on data provided by a 
                                                 
2Self-employment accounts for 70% of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 62% in North Africa, 
60% in Latin America, and 59% in Asia (SIDA 2004). 
 
3Note, however, that no clear distinction between informal sector and informal employment will be used in 




South African survey that asks respondents to identify whether they work in the informal sector 
or not, based on the legalistic definition. . If a respondent in this survey is working in the 
informal private sector, s/he is defined to be (1) working for a private company/institution whose 
employer (institution, business or private individual) is not registered for the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) to perform the activity, or (2) owns a business that is again not registered for the VAT. 
Most of domestic workers are included in the workers in the informal sector. Domestic workers 
are those who are paid to do domestic work, such as housekeepers, nannies, cooks, and gardeners. 
Their business is usually not registered. If their business is registered, they are included in the 
formal sector. If a respondent is working in the formal private sector, s/he is working for a 
private company/institution whose employer (institution, business or private individual) is 
















Table 2.1  Definition of Informal Workers in Empirical Papers in the Literature Review  
Author(s) and 
Year Published Country Definition of the Informal Workers 
Banerjee (1983) Delhi, India 
All workers working in private enterprises with less than 20 
employees. 
Gindling (1991) 
San Jose, Costa 
Rica 
Workers (i) whose occupations are not associated with government 
sponsorship;* (ii) who do not belong to a cooperative, union or 
professional organization; or (iii) who do not have post-graduate 
education. 
Griffin & Edwards 







(i) Workers in firms of four or fewer employees who are not 
professional, technical or administrative workers, and (ii) all 
self-employed workers. 
Funkhouser (1997a) Guatemala 
Those (i) who are working in firms with four or fewer employees; and 
(ii) who are not owners, professional, technical or managerial workers. 
Funkhouser (1997b) El Salvador 
(i) All self-employed, domestic, and family workers who are not 
employed in professional or technical occupations and any wage 
earners working in a firm with four or fewer employees, and (ii) 
owners who are excluded from both formal and informal sectors. 
Marcouiller, Ruiz de 




Workers who do not receive social security coverage or do not pay 
social security taxes as a condition of employment. 
Saavedra & Chong 
(1999) Peru 
Informal wage earners are those without (i) a signed contract; (ii) 
union membership; (iii) health insurance or pension entitlement; (iv) 
vacation entitlement; and (v) a job in the public sector. The informal 
self-employed are those without (i) making any tax payment; and (ii) 











Table 2.1 (continued) 
Author(s) and Year 
Published Country Definition of the Informal Workers 
Pagán & 
Tijerina-Guajardo 
(2000) Mexico Workers employed in a non-registered firm. 
Tansel (2001) Turkey 
Wage earners who are not covered by any social security program 
and are self-employed (excluding professionals and technicians).  
Gong & van Soest 
(2002) Mexico 
Workers (i) who work in firms with five or less employees or (ii) 
who work for their own account or manage a firm without 
employees.  
Pisani & Pagán (2004) Nicaragua Workers who work in firms with five or fewer employees.  
Tannuri-Pianto, Pianto 
& Arias (2004) Bolivia 
Informal salaried workers who work in establishments with 1-4 
employees plus domestic employees. 
Lassibille & Tan 
(2005) Rwanda Informal workers who work in the traditional sector. 
Ewoudou & 
Vencatachellum (2006) Cameroon 
Workers who or whose employers are self-employed or not registered 
for tax purposes.  
Packard (2007) Chile Non-contract wage earners and self-employed. 
Stifel, Rakotomanana, 
& Celada (2007) Madagascar Workers without pension or social security. 
Arias & Khamis (2008) Argentina 
Workers in a dependent employee relationship without social security 
contributions. 
Kuepie, Nordman, & 
Roubaud (2009) 
Seven urban cities 
in West Africa 
Workers who work with production units with no fiscal or statistical 
identity or with no formal accountancy. 
Tegoum (2009) Cameroon 
Informal sector workers who exercise their main job in a production 
unit and do not have a taxpayer number and/or keep formal accounts. 
 
*These occupations are medical (doctors, nurses), social science, accounting and mathematics, law, the airline 





3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Literature Review on Returns to Education in the Informal Sector Compared with 
the Formal Sector 
This section summarizes previous empirical studies examining the returns to education in 
the informal sector compared with the formal sector. It then discusses empirical issues that have 
been unresolved in the previous studies. Most empirical studies use the Mincerian equation, i.e., 
rate of return to education approach, in order to estimate returns to education. 
3.1.1. Previous empirical studies 
This section summarizes and examines the identification strategies and findings from the 
existing literature. Most relevant previous studies were conducted in countries in Latin America 
or Africa.  
3.1.1.1. Studies without correction for endogeneity 
Early studies did not correct for endogeneity of either sector or education (Banerjee, 
1983; Funkhouser, 1996, 1997b; Griffin & Edwards, 1993; Smith & Metzger, 1998). Most of this 
literature found a positive return to education in the informal sector, but one that was usually 
much smaller than that in the formal sector. Only Banerjjee (1983) found no significant 
difference in estimated returns to education between the informal and formal sectors. The results 
of these early studies, however, may be biased because they did not control for selectivity effects 
or endogeneity. 
3.1.1.2. Studies with correction for endogeneity of sector allocation  
Most previous studies on returns to education in the formal and informal sectors, and the 




allocation or sample selection bias in the sectoral allocation of workers. Many studies have used 
the Heckman or Lee type two-step model to correct for sectoral allocation bias. 
The previous empirical studies which did correct for sector selection bias also found 
substantial returns to education in the informal sector. Some studies found that the return to 
education was greater in the formal sector than in the informal sector (Argentina: Arias, & 
Khamis, 2008; Guatemala: Funkhouser, 1997a; Nicaragua: Pisani & Pagán, 2004; Peru: 
Saavedra & Chong, 1999). Others, however, suggested greater returns to education in the 
informal sector than in the formal sector (Bolivia: Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004; Cameroon: 
Ewoudou & Vencatachellum, 2006; Madagascar: Stifel, Rakotomanana, & Celada, 2007; 
Rwanda: Lassibille & Tan, 2005; Turkey: Tansel, 2001), especially for secondary and vocational 
education (Ewoudou & Vencatachellum, 2006; Stifel et al., 2007; Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004). In 
fact, Tansel (2001) and Lassibille and Tan (2005) showed greater returns to education in the 
informal sector than in the formal sector, except for tertiary education. . 
As mentioned earlier, many studies used the Heckman or Lee type two-step selection 
model to correct for sectoral allocation bias. Funkhouser (1997a) and Arias and Khamis (2008) 
employed the Heckman correction to control for selection bias of sectoral allocation in the 
formal and informal sectors. Gindling (1991), Saavedra and Chong (1999), Lassibille and Tan 
(2005), and Ewoudou and Vencatachellum (2006) utilized the Lee two-step selection model to 
correct for selection bias for more than two sectors, including the informal sector. Stifel et al. 
(2007) applied a similar selection correction using the multinomial logit model proposed by 
Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007). Pisani and Pagán (2004) conducted the switching 
regression model to estimate earnings in multiple sectors. 




decomposition method. They decomposed the earning gaps into differences in endowments of 
skills and differences in return to skills. 
3.1.1.3. Studies with corrections for endogeneity of both sector allocation and 
education 
Many studies on the returns to education, especially in developed countries, have 
corrected for the endogeneity of education. The most popular methodologies include using 
family background controls (e.g., Griliches, 1979), siblings and twins models (e.g., Ashenfelter 
& Krueger, 1994), and instrumental variables (e.g., Angrist & Krueger, 1991). In addition, as 
noted above, a large number of studies have corrected for sectoral allocation between the formal 
and informal sectors. However, few studies have corrected for endogeneity of both sectoral 
allocation and education 
The paper written by Kuepie et al. (2009) is probably the most rigorous study in this field 
because the authors attempted to correct for endogeneity of both sector allocation and education 
in the context of estimating returns to education in the formal and informal sectors while also 
taking into account the heterogeneity of returns to education. They examined returns to education 
in the public sector, the formal private sector, and the informal private sector using comparable 
labor force surveys in urban cities in West African countries. For the sector selection bias, the 
authors employed the multinomial logit model proposed by Lee (1983) to estimate the 
probability of employment in the formal versus informal sectors, the first equation in a two-stage 
method.1 To deal with the endogeneity of the education variable, they first conducted the control 
                                                 
1Kuepie et al. (2009) note that researchers such as Vijverberg (1993), Dahl (2002), and Bourguignon et al. 
(2007) have criticized Lee’s method because it is based on a strong assumption about the point distribution of error 




function (CF) method,2 using father’s schooling and main occupation as instruments. They also 
used family background information differently by introducing it directly into the earnings 
functions. Finally, the authors estimated both a piecewise linear spline function and an ordinary 
marginal returns to education function. A piecewise linear spline function enables the 
relationship between education and earnings to vary across different parts of the education 
distribution.  
Kuepie et al. (2009) found that the return to education rises once an endogenous 
education variable is corrected for. This effect was particularly true in the informal sector. In 
general, education made significant impacts on individual earnings in the informal private 
sectors of these West African cities, even at high levels of schooling. In most of the West African 
cities in their sample, the public sector had greater returns to education than the formal private 
sector, followed by the informal private sector. The public sector had the greatest marginal return 
to education, while the informal private sector had the smallest return to education in most cities. 
However, the return to schooling in the informal private sector was still substantial. The results 
showed convex returns to education in all cities and sectors, including the informal sector. While 
the return to primary schooling in the informal private sector tended to be weaker than in the 
formal private sector, the return to lycée (upper secondary education) in the informal private 
sector was greater than in the public sector in most cities and in the formal private sector in some 
cities.  
Gong and van Soest (2002) used a dynamic random effects panel data model consisting 
                                                                                                                                                             
appear any more efficient given the small size of their sectoral sub-samples; therefore, they chose Lee’s correction 
method in which the correction terms are easier to interpret. 
 
2See Garen (1984), Wooldridge (2002), and Söderbom, Teal., Wambugu, and Kahyarara (2006), as 




of separate wage equations for the two sectors to estimate wage equations in both the formal and 
informal sectors in urban Mexico. They found that returns to education were positive in both 
sectors, but much higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector for both men and women. 
They found large positive wage differentials between the formal and informal sectors for the 
higher education levels, and small or even negative differentials for the medium and low 
education levels.  
Tegoum (2009) also addressed the selection biases of both sector and education. He 
estimated rates of return to primary education completion and the first cycle of secondary 
education completion within the informal sector in Cameroon. The author used the two matching 
methods (propensity score matching and Epanechinikov kernel matching) to correct for the 
endogeneity of education and the selection correction method according to Bourguignon et al. 
(2004) to correct for sectoral allocation. The author found a significant positive impact of 
schooling on the income of informal sector workers. However, we cannot tell if the returns to 
education in the informal sector are greater or smaller than those in the formal sector because the 
author did not estimate returns to education in the formal sector. 
3.1.1.4. Studies dealing with the heterogeneity in returns to education 
To deal with heterogeneity of returns to education, Arias and Khamis (2008) employed 
the marginal treatment effects according to the recently developed models by Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2001, 2005) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006). Moreover, Kuepie et al. (2009) 
used a piecewise linear spline function in addition to controlling for the endogeneity of sector 
and education. Tannuri-Pianto et al. (2004) estimated quantile earnings equations, as originally 
proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), to analyze the heterogeneous effect of education on 




Lee’s two-step selection method: the approach similar to that proposed by Fitzenberger (2003). 
3.1.2. Summary and Methodological Issues Unresolved 
The previous empirical studies on returns to education found substantial returns to 
education in the informal sector. More than half of the studies in this review found that returns to 
education were greater in the formal sector than in the informal sector. However, a number of 
studies also found greater returns to education in the informal sector than in the formal sector for 
all or some levels of education, especially for secondary and vocational education. The mixed 
results on the relative magnitude of returns to education in the formal and informal sectors could 
be due to different labor market characteristics in each country. However, these estimates could 
be still biased because most of them did not control for the endogeneity of education. The results 
could also be biased because of some measurement errors. For example, measurement errors 
might be found in the sector variable because defining the informal employment and sector is 
complicated. Attenuation bias might also be present because of measurement errors in the 
reported years of schooling. Measurement errors may appear in reported earnings, especially for 
non-salaried workers in the informal sector, as suggested by Kuepie et al. (2009). 
Most of the reviewed studies used a log of “hourly” earnings, which is advisable (see 
Table 3.1). As Griliches (1977) suggests, wage rates per hour or week can be used as a dependent 
variable for return to schooling estimates when they are available. Griliches explains that annual 
earnings or income “confound market transactions with issues of labor-leisure choice and the 
more transitory effects of unemployment” (p. 3). 
As for the use of education as an independent variable, some of these studies used a years 
of schooling continuous variable, while others used a set of dummy variables for level of 




the wage rate. However, we have to assume constant returns to one additional year of schooling 
at any level. By contrast, including dummy variables for each level of education can estimate 
different rates of return to different levels of education, but not the marginal effect of one more 
year of schooling. Most of the empirical studies reviewed here tended to have only one of two 
different types of variables, but it would be a good idea to conduct two regressions using two 
different types of variables for schooling. Moreover, not many studies account for the 
heterogeneity of the return to education except for Kuepie et al. (2009), Arias and Khamis (2008), 
and Tannuri-Pianto et al. (2004). For future studies, it will be important to consider the 
heterogeneous returns to education by sector. 
3.2. Literature Review on the Effect of Education on Informal and Formal Employment 
The previous section reviewed the literature on the effects of education on workers’ 
earnings; however, studying the education and earnings of workers in the informal sector is not 
enough. One must also examine the determinants of the probability of employment in that sector 
relative to the formal sector. As a matter of fact, this analysis is required in order to correct for 
possible sample selection bias in the earnings equation, to ensure that estimated rates of return to 
education are not influenced by the sample of workers who chooses to be employed in the 
informal sector relative to the formal sector. 
To analyze the sectoral allocation or choice between sectors, one can use either a probit 
or a binary logit model if there are only two categories, while the multinomial logit model is used 
with more than two categories. 
3.2.1. Previous empirical studies 
As just noted, most studies examining the effects of education on the probability of 




in the informal sector because these studies employ the Heckman or Lee two-step selection 
model, using either the probit or multinomial logit model to estimate the propensities of working 
in each sector as a first stage in correcting earnings estimates for sector allocation bias. However, 
no study has controlled for the endogeneity of education in the probability equation.  
Most prior studies have found that education is positively associated with formal 
employment and negatively associated with informal employment in general (see Table 3.3). The 
more education a worker attains, the more likely he or she will work in the formal sector 
(Argentina: Arias & Khamis, 2008; Cameroon: Tegoum, 2009; 14 other studies).  
As for methodologies applied, studies considering only two categories (informal 
employment and formal employment) used either the binary logit model (Banerjee, 1983) or 
probit model (Arias & Khamis, 2008; Funkhouser, 1996, 1997b; Marcouiller et al., 1997, Pagán 
& Tijerina-Guajardo, 2000; Tansel, 2001). Studies looking at more than two categories used the 
multinomial logit model.3 More than half of the studies in this literature review analyzed the 
probabilities of working in more than two sectors, such as the public, formal private, and 
informal private sectors (Banerjee, 1983; Ewoudou & Vencatachellum, 2006; Gindling, 1991; 
Lassibille & Tan, 2005; Packard, 2007; Saavedra & Chong, 1999; Stifel et al., 2007; 
Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004; Tegoum, 2009). 
3.2.2. Summary and methodological issues unresolved 
The existing empirical studies on the effects of education on the probability of formal and 
informal employment share similar findings. The more education a worker attains, the more 
likely he or she will work in the formal sector. But the fact that these studies have ignored the 
                                                 
3Theoretically, the multinomial probit model exists, but it is virtually impossible to use it because the 




endogeneity of education raises questions about their results. It is possible that workers who had 
more education tended to have higher innate abilities or higher socio-economic status and were 
more likely to work in the formal sector because of this. Thus, future studies should include 
























Used the Lee (1983) 
selection correction at 
first but ended up not 
using it. N/A 
Positive marginal RTE in the 
informal private sector, but it is the 
highest in the public sector, followed 
by the private formal sector. 
Funkhouser 





selection correction  N/A 
Positive marginal RTE in the 
informal sector. It is greatest in the 
formal private, followed by the 
informal private. 
Saavedra & Chong 
(1999) Peru LSMS 
Formal and 
informal wage 
earners, & formal 
and informal 
self-employed 
Lee (1983) selection 
correction N/A 
Positive marginal RTEs for informal 
wage earners and self-employed. 
Marginal RTE is the highest for 
formal wage earners, followed by 
formal self-employed, and then 
informal self-employed.  
Tansel (2001) Turkey HHES 
Formal., informal 
& self- employed 
Lee (1983) and Trost & 
Lee (1984) selection 
correction N/A 
Greater RTEs for the informal wage 
earners than formal ones, except for 
university education. Much lower 
RTE for self-employed than other 
groups. 
Gong & van Soest 
(2002) Mexico UES 
Formal & 
informal Dynamic random effects panel data model 
Positive RTEs in the informal sector, 
but much greater RTEs in the formal 
sector. 
Pisani & Pagán 





Positive marginal RTE in the 
informal sector but greater marginal 













of Education Results 
Tannuri-Pianto, 
Pianto, & Arias 
(2004) Bolivia 
LFS and  
HHSs 
Formal., informal., 
& self-employed Quantile regression N/A 
Greatest RTEs to secondary and 
technical education in the 
informal sector. Similar high 
returns to university education for 
all sectors. 
Lassibille & 
Tan (2005) Rwanda HLCS 
Public, formal 
private, & informal 
Trost & Lee (1984) 
selection correction N/A 
Greatest RTEs in the informal 




(2006) Cameroon HHS 
Public, formal 
private, & informal 
Trost &d Lee (1984) 
selection correction N/A 
Positive RTEs in the informal 
private but the public sector has 
the greatest RTEs in general. 
Greater RTEs in the formal 
private compared to informal 
private except for upper 





(2007) Madagascar HHS  
Public, formal 
private, & informal 
private 
Bourguignon  
et al.’s (2007) selection 
correction N/A 
Positive RTEs in the informal 
sector but the public sector has the 
greatest RTEs. The returns to 
lower and upper secondary 
education are greater in the 
informal private sector than the 
formal private sector.  
Arias & Khamis 
(2008) Argentina 
HHS and other 
data 





selection correction N/A 
Much greater RTEs in the formal 














of education Results 
Kuepie, Nordman, 
& Roubaud (2009) 
7 urban cities 
in West Africa Urban HHSs 
Public, formal 
private, & informal 
private sector 
Lee (1983) selection 
correction 




Positive RTEs in the informal 
sector. Greater RTEs in the 
public sector, followed by the 
formal private and then the 
informal private in most cities. 














Positive RTEs for informal 
sector workers. 
 
Notes: EESI: Survey on Employment and the Informal Sector; HHES: Household Expenditure Survey; HHS: Household Survey, HLCS: Household and Living 
Conditions Survey; LSMS: Living Standards Measurement Survey; UES: Urban Employment Survey; RTE: return to education; Marginal RTE: return to an 




Table 3.2  Dependent and Education Independent Variables of Wage Equation 
Author(s) and Year Published Dependent Variable Education Independent Variable(s) 
Banerjee (1983) Log monthly earnings Level of education dummies 
Gindling (1991) Log hourly wage Years of schooling 
Griffin & Edwards (1993) Log monthly earnings 
Years of schooling 
Years of schooling dummies 
Funkhouser (1996) Log of weekly earnings Years of schooling 
Funkhouser (1997a) Log of monthly income Years of schooling 
Funkhouser (1997b) Log of monthly income Years of schooling 
Marcouiller et al. (1997) Log of hourly wage Years of schooling 
Saavedra & Chong (1999) 
Log of hourly income and 
benefits Years of schooling 
Pagán & Tijerina-Guajardo (2000) Log of hourly wage Years of schooling 
Tansel (2001) Log of hourly wage Level of education dummies 
Gong & van Soest (2002) Log of hourly wage Level of education dummies 
Pisani & Pagán (2004) Log of weekly earnings Years of schooling (no wage equation) 
Tannuri-Pianto, Pianto, & Arias 
(2004) Log of hourly earnings Level of education dummies 
Lassibille & Tan (2005) Log of hourly earnings 
Years of schooling 
Level of education dummies 
Ewoudou & Vencatachellum 
(2006) Log of hourly earnings Level of education dummies 
Stifel, Rakotomanana, & Celada 
(2007) Log of real daily earnings Level of education dummies 
Arias & Khamis (2008) 
Log of labor income per 
hour in the main 
occupation 
Level of education dummies (only 
secondary & tertiary education 
dummies) 
Kuepie, Nordman, & Roubaud 
(2009) Log of hourly earnings 
Years of each level of education times 
each level of education dummy 
Tegoum (2009) Log of hourly income  
First School Leaving Certificate 
(FSLC = primary), General Certificate 
of Education Ordinary Level (GCE-OL 








Country Data Group Methodology Results 








Matriculated education and above has positive effect on 
formal employment. Education is not a significant 
determinant on wage and nonwage employment into the 
informal sector. Education has a significant influence on 
mobility from the informal to the formal sector except for 
below middle education and graduate education and above, 
which negatively correlates with mobility from the 







Public, formal private, 
& informal private 
Multinomial 
logit 
Positive for public employment and negative for informal 






Costa Rica HHSs Formal & informal Probit Negative effect of education on informal employment. 
Funkhouser 
(1997b) El Salvador 
National 
HHS Formal & informal Probit 
Positive effect of education on the probability of formal 
employment, compared with informal employment across 
gender. 
Marcouiller, Ruiz 
de Casilla, & 
Woodruff  (1997) 
Mexico, El 
Salvador, Peru HHSs Formal & informal Probit 
Positive effect of education on the probability of formal 
employment, compared with informal employment across 








Country Data Group Methodology Results 
Saavedra & Chong 
(1999) Peru LSMS 





More schooling decreases the probability of 
informal wage employment and self-employment, 
but increases the probability of formal wage and 
self-employment. 
Pagán & Tijerina- 
Guajardo (2000) Mexico 
ENEU 
(1987, 
1993) Formal & informal Probit 
Education decreases informal employment, 
compared with formal employment. 
Tansel (2001) Turkey HHES 
Formal., informal, &  
self-employed Probit 
(Men) Any levels of education decrease the 
probability of covered and uncovered wage 
employment and self-employment, compared with 
other employment (including public sector). 
Greatest negative effect of education on the 
probability of uncovered wage employment. 
(Women) Any level of education reduces the 
probability of informal wage employment and 
increases the probability of formal wage 
employment and self-employment (except for 
university education).  
Pisani & Pagán 




Education across years is one primary determinant 
of formal sector participation, compared with the 
informal sector participation. 
Tannuri-Pianto, 
Pianto, & Arias 
(2004) Bolivia 
LFS and  
HHSs 




Primary and higher levels of education (compared 
with the excluded category less than basic) 
decrease the probability of informality. Any levels 
of education (compared with the excluded 
category) decrease the probability of 
self-employment.  
Lassibille & Tan 
(2005) Rwanda HLCS 
Public, formal and 
informal wage, & informal 
wage, self-employed, 
unpaid family worker and 
out of the labor force 
Multinomial 
logit 
More education decreases the probability of 
working in the informal sector and increases the 








Country Data Group Methodology Results 
Ewoudou & 
Vencatachellum 
(2006) Cameroon HHS 




More education decreases the probability of 
working in the informal sector and increases the 
probability of working in the public and formal 
private sectors.  
Packard (2007) Chile 
LSMS-type 
HHS 




Negative for informal employment. Any levels of 
education except for primary and incomplete 
secondary decrease the probability of working in 
the informal sector. 
Stifel, Rakotomanana, 
& Celada (2007) Madagascar HHS 2005 




The effect of education on the probability of 
informal employment is mixed. 




Formal salaried workers, 
informal salaried workers, 
& self-employed Probit 
Formal vs. informal: positive effect of secondary 
and tertiary education on the probability of 
working as formal salaried workers. Formal vs. 
self-employed: no significant differences in the 
probability of working in both groups. Informal vs. 
self-employed: negative effect of secondary and 
tertiary education on the probability of working as 
informal salaried workers. 
Tegoum (2009) Cameroon EESI 
Public, private formal., 
non-agricultural informal., 
& agricultural informal 
Multinomial 
logit (odds ratio) 
Any level of education is associated with much 
greater probability of working, compared with no 
education in the public and private formal sectors, 
compared with the informal sector. But very small 
effect of education on the probability of working in 
the formal sector.  
 
Notes: EESI: Survey on Employment and the Informal Sector; HHES: Household Expenditure Survey; HHS: Household Survey, HLCS: Household and Living 






4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This dissertation seeks to estimate whether returns to education differ between the formal 
and informal sectors. It also examines how education affects the probability of working in the 
informal and formal sectors. But what does economic theory tell us about these issues?  
This section first discusses dual and competitive market theories and draws implications 
from them in terms of the returns to education in the informal and formal sectors. It then reviews 
the Roy model and human capital theory, upon which the dissertation is primarily based. 
Analyzing returns to education in different sectors is closely connected to the endogeneity of 
education and sector sample selection. Thus, it is important to review the Roy model, which 
models occupational choice, as well as human capital theory, which models educational choice 
based on rates of return to schooling.  
4.1. Dual and Competitive Labor Market Theories and Their Implications for  
Returns to Education 
As explained in the introduction, three theories have been posed to explain wage 
differentials between the informal and formal labor markets. The first is the dual labor market 
theory, which asserts that the informal and formal sectors are segmented so that the wages for 
identical workers in both sectors are different (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). The returns 
to education in the two sectors are different, with the formal sector having higher rates of return 
to education and the informal sector remaining as an employer of last resort where rates of return 
to education are low.  
A second theory assumes that labor markets are competitive (Gindling, 1991; Jütting et 




workers are the same in the two sectors, but observed wage differentials are due to different 
characteristics and preferences of workers in the two sectors. The third theory combines both the 
competitive and segmented views on the informal labor market (e.g., Fields, 2005). The informal 
labor market consists of the competitive part which has the same returns to education as the 
formal sector, or even higher returns to education than the formal sector, and the segmented part, 
which has lower returns to education, than the formal sector. 
4.2. Roy Model 
This dissertation employed the Roy model as the theoretical underpinning for analyzing 
the inter-sectoral allocation of workers. The implications of the theory were used in the empirical 
analysis to model the selection correction equation in the estimation of the returns to schooling 
and also in the choice equation in the analysis of the effects of schooling on employment in 
different sectors.  
Roy (1951) examined the effects of self-selection in different occupations based on 
unobservable comparative advantages and preferences among individuals, and analyzed the 
effects on the distribution of earnings in different occupations.1 The following model explains 
how individuals choose a sector based on the Roy model in a general case which could have 
more than two sectors. The equations are formulated by reference to Dahl (2002), Arias and 
Khamis (2008), and Rankin, Sandefur, and Teal (2010).2 
Suppose there are several types of occupations: s . Workers choose their occupation by 
comparing the utility sW  they derive from each occupation, which is given by the sum of the 
                                                 
1Roy’s (1951) paper does not include any equation, but his theory has been applied by many researchers. 
2See Dahl (2002) and Rankin et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion on the theoretical and 




income sY  and non-pecuniary benefits in the sector se  net of costs sc  (pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary) of sector participation. Adapting a latent index formulation, we have: 
(4.1)  * 'si si si si i s siW Y e c Z         
where *siW , an individual’s utility of a particular occupational choice, depends linearly on the 
vectors of observed Z  (e.g., human capital) and unobserved characteristics   (e.g., preference 
for work and abilities) of the worker i . A worker chooses an occupation s  when the net 
benefits of working in the sector are positive.  
siY  is observed if and only if category s  is chosen. This happens when  
(4.2) max( )si jij sW W  
Given this sorting, we will observe earnings in sector s ; by definition, no earnings are 
yielded the unemployed. If we define 
(4.3)  max( ) max ( ) max( )s ji si ji ji ji si si si ji ji si sij s j s j sW W Y e c Y e c Z Z                    , 
then under this definition, condition (5.2) is equivalent to 0s   
(4.4)  s s sY X u   
where s  is the sector which the individual chooses. 
(4.5)  ( | , 1) ( | , 1)s i i iE Y X s X E u X s         




In applying the model above, if there are two types of sectors s: 1 for formal employment 
and 2 for informal sectors, we can draw the two equations below: 
(4.7)  1 1 1Y X u   
(4.8)  2 2 2Y X u   
where X  is a subset of Z  and ( 1 2,u u ) are freely correlated and independent of some 
components of Z , the ‘instruments.’ The su  can depend on s  in a general way. This model 
can be applied to the case with more than two sectors.  
4.3. Human Capital Theory 
To model the basic determinants of earnings, and possible biases arising from the role 
played by ability, this dissertation uses the traditional human capital model developed by Becker, 
Mincer and Card, among many others.. Traditional human capital theory asserts that human 
capital, i.e., skills obtained through education and training, raise the productivity of workers and 
increase wages (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958). Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) provide 
theoretical and empirical explanations for the human capital theory. This section reviews the 
basic human capital model.  
The model below is based on Card (1995, 1999), who developed a model of optimal 
schooling investments.3 He assumed that individuals (or their parents) try to maximize utility, 
which is a function of income and schooling.  
(4.9)  ( , ) ln( ) ( )U y S y f S   
ln[ ( )] ( )g S f S   
                                                 
3See Card (1995, 1999) for a more detailed discussion on the theoretical and mathematical modeling on 




where ( )y g S  represents the observable relationship between earnings ( )y  and schooling 
( )S , and ln[ ( )]g s  and ( )f S  are increasing convex functions representing the (log) benefits 
and costs of schooling. To maximize utility in equation (5.9), optimal schooling ( *)S  must 
satisfy the first-order condition, 
(4.10) '( ) / ( ) '( )g S g S f S  
where marginal benefits ( '( ) / ( ))g S g S  are equal to marginal costs ( '( ))f S . 
Implementing this model empirically requires choosing functional forms for the marginal 
benefits and costs of schooling. Here, individual heterogeneity is considered in the costs of (or 
tastes for) schooling, ( )h S , and in the economic benefits of schooling '( ) / ( )y S y S . 
The marginal benefit ( )iMB  of schooling and the marginal cost ( )iMC  are represented 
by 
(4.11) 1'( ) / ( )i i i iMB g S g S b k S    and 
(4.12) 2( ) '( )i i i iMC f S r k S    
where ib  and ir  are random variables with means b  and r , and 1k  and 2k  are 
non-negative constants. The optimal level of schooling is 




where 1 2k k k  .  
Finally, Eq. (5.11) implies a model for log earnings of the form 
(4.14) 21
1ln
2i i i i i
y b S k S    




Assuming that ib  and ir  are symmetrically distributed, the population regression coefficient is 
(4.15)  (1 )b r      
where 1k
k
    and 
2
2 2( ) ( )
b br
b br r br
     
     
With the simplest model of endogenous schooling, where individuals seek to maximize 
the discounted present value of earnings at fixed individual-specific discount rates (i.e., 2 0k  ), 
1   , conventionally estimated return to schooling is 
(4.16) (1 )b r      
Using the fact that 1b k S   , Eq. (5.15) can be written as  
(4.17) ( )b r      
Therefore, in an OLS regression of log earnings on schooling, the estimate of the average 
marginal return to schooling will be upward-biased. The bias will get bigger as 2b  (the 
variance in ability) gets larger relative to 2r  (the variance in discount rates). ( )b r   
represents an endogeneity bias created because people with higher marginal returns to education 
seek more schooling. 
4.4. Theory of Allocation of Talent 
Relevant to this dissertation is also the work of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), who 
modeled how individuals choose their occupation, and suggested that the allocation of talent 
(based on education or ability) among various sectors of the economy has significant effects on 
growth.  




sectors. According to them, the most competent people are drawn into the sector (sector 1) with 
less diminishing returns (higher elasticity of output with respect to labor). The returns to 
education are higher in this sector. But if the sector lacks dynamic externalities (such as in 
fostering innovation and technical change), then the absorption of educated workers in the sector 
will slow down economic growth. This is the case when highly educated workers are employed 
in low-productivity growth sectors, which may include government employment or, sometimes, 
informal sector employment that lacks the links to the formal sector necessary for developing 
and spreading new products or technologies. There is therefore a potentially inefficient outcome 
in their theoretical model: the competent people become employed in sector 1, where positive 
externalities are none or few, while the persons employed in sector 2, where dynamic 
externalities exist, are much less competent. As a result, the economy grows at a slower rate. 





5. CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
This chapter describes the South African context and the datasets used in the dissertation.  
5.1. Context of South Africa 
This section reviews the history, economy, employment, income, education and other 
social aspects of South Africa. It especially analyzes the history of apartheid and its impacts on 
racial inequality in employment, income and education. To sum, South Africa is upper middle 
income country with high unemployment rate and great inequality in income, employment, and 
education to name a few. Even now, Whites are privileged in any aspects while Blacks tend to be 
much more disadvantaged. These are considered to be mostly the legacies of apartheid. 
5.1.1. Demography and geography of South Africa 
South Africa is a middle size country in terms of population and surface area, with a high 
rate of urban population. It is also a multiracial country. The total population of South Africa is 
50 million (2010, see Table 5.1), which is approximately 6% of the Sub Sahara Africa region. 
From 2000 to 2010, population growth has decreased from 2.4% to 1.4% (Table 5.2). Population 
growth within this decade was lower than the Sub Saharan Africa average but greater than 
BRIC1 countries and OECD countries. The urban population as a percentage of total population 
in South Africa was 61.7% in 2010, which is much higher than the average of Sub Saharan 
Africa and slightly higher than the average of upper middle income countries (see Table 5.1). 
The South African population consists of four basic types of races: Blacks (Africans), Whites, 
Coloreds and Indians/Asians. Blacks account for 79.5% of population, Whites 9.0%, Colored 
                                                 
1 BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China and South Africa. This group of countries is slightly 




9.0% and Indians/Asians 2.5% in 20112. The term, African is sometime used instead of Black. In 
order to be consistent, Black will be used throughout this study. To note, the term, Colored is an 
established terminology in South Africa and will be used to express the people who are half 
White and half Black. 
South Africa is the southernmost country of the Sub Saharan Africa region. Its surface 
area is 1,219.1 thousand square kilometers, which accounts for 5% of the region and one tenth of 
the surface of the United States (see Table 5.1). South Africa is made of nine provinces: Western 
Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, North West, Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. South Africa has three capitals: Pretoria, the executive capital 
where the executive branch of the government is; Cape Town, the legislative capital which is the 
home to the Parliament; and Bloemfontein, the judicial capital which houses the Supreme Court.   
5.1.2. Economy and unemployment in South Africa 
South Africa is an upper middle-income country3 and the largest economy in the Sub 
Saharan Africa region albeit with a high poverty rate and economic inequality. In many ways, 
the South African economy has done well since apartheid ended in 1994. The country holds 
valuable natural resources and a relatively developed infrastructure, while efficient and modern 
financial institutions has supported economic growth (World Bank, 2012 April). Its local 
currency is the rand (sign: R). The official exchange rate (local currency per US dollar) was 7.32 
rand in 2010. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 was 187.2 billion, approximately 35% 
                                                 
2 Statistics South Africa (2011). 
 




of GDP in the Sub Saharan Africa region. Its GDP per capita was $3,746 in 20104, which is 
higher than most of other Sub Saharan African countries and also higher than other BRIC 
countries except for Brazil (see Table 5.3).  
Macroeconomic management has been creditable; the inflation rate continues to be in the 
targeted 3-6 percent range and budgetary and debt outcomes have been world class (World Bank, 
2012 April). Before the abolishment of apartheid, the GDP growth rate in South Africa stagnated, 
but since 1994 it has been decent and stable, although it is considered modest by international 
comparisons. The growth rate ranged between a healthy 3 to 6 percent except for the years of 
1997, 2009 and 2010 when the global financial crises affected its economy. Per capita GDP in 
South Africa increased by 50% between 1999 and 2008 in South Africa (World Bank, 2010). 
The GDP growth rate in South Africa in 2009 was -1.7%, due to the global financial crisis yet it 
had recovered to 2.8% by 2010. GDP growth in South Africa has been historically lower than the 
Sub Saharan Africa average and the majority of BRIC countries in the 2000s (see Table 5.4); 
however, growth spillovers to the rest of the region are amazingly large by international 
standards (World Bank, 2010). An additional percentage point of South African GDP growth is 
associated with 0.4 to 0.9 percent of GDP growth in the rest of Sub Saharan Africa, independent 
of regional shocks (World Bank, 2010).  
In spite of a positive economic performance, the country has been suffering from a high 
unemployment rate and great inequality in income, employment, and education. Table 5.5 shows 
the unemployment rate in South Africa and other selected countries. Since 2000, the 
unemployment rate in South Africa has been higher than 20%; it has been the highest in Sub 
                                                 




Saharan African region and is one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. The most 
recent unemployment rate is 23.8% (2009), which suggests the issues of unemployment is 
chronic as it has not been resolved after many years. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is very 
high especially for Black people. This issue will be examined more in detail in a later section.   
The informal sector also accounts for a substantial part of employment and economy, 
albeit it is relatively smaller than other African countries. South Africa’s informal economy as a 
percentage of total GDP was estimated to be 29.5% in 2002/03 (Schneider, 2006), while its share 
of total employment was estimated to be 22.3% in 2002 (Davies & Thurlow, 2009). Other 
studies, using alternative definitions of the informal sector, have estimated the size of the 
informal economy and employment to be even larger.  
5.1.3. History and policies of the apartheid 
South Africa once held an infamous racial discrimination policy called apartheid (1948 to 
1994). As mentioned above, South Africa still faces the negative legacies of the apartheid. It is 
important to review apartheid, its policies and its impact on South African society until now as 
this plays a prominent role on today’s effect of schooling on earnings and likelihood of working 
in the informal sector.  
Apartheid, meaning ‘apartness” or “separateness” in the Afrikaan and Dutch languages, 
is a policy of separating people by race, with regard to places of residence, schools, workplaces, 
and even cemeteries (Clark & Worger, 2004). The policy was introduced in 1948 by the National 
Party government. However, racial discrimination did exist in South Africa before 1948. It had 
existed since the beginning of Dutch colonization of the country in 1652 in the form of slavery. 
Even after the abolishment of slavery in the 1830s, racial discrimination continued as European 




African and Asian countries which were colonized until the end of the Second World War. 
However, South Africa went backward after the war and instead implemented apartheid, while 
indigenous people won their independence from Europeans in other Asian and African countries 
(Clark & Worger, 2004). 
Many scholars in the 1970s and 1980s argued that it was not history or culture, but 
economic concerns, that were the basis for apartheid. They suggested this extreme racial 
discrimination was motivated by white business owners who believed a massive low-paid 
African workforce would allow them to make exceptional profits (Clark & Worger, 2004). Other 
scholars have argued that white workers and farmers also benefited economically from racially 
discriminatory laws which protected them from competition with African workers and producers 
(Clark & Worger, 2004).  
Under apartheid, Blacks were excluded from all rights normally associated with those of 
citizens. Numerous laws were passed under the racist government in the 1950s. For example, the 
1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act imposed segregation on all public facilities, 
including post offices, beaches, stadiums, parks, toilets, cemeteries, busses and trains (South 
Africa History Online, accessed on May 4, 2012). By the 1980s, many Blacks in South Africa 
were no longer legal citizens of that country but rather categorized as foreigners (Clark & 
Worger, 2004).  
During apartheid, a large share of African population were segmented to tribal 
homelands and urban townships. At the beginning of apartheid, Blacks was removed from towns 
and white-owned farms they used to live and moved to 10 bantustans (known as the Black 
African homelands) to form the ethnically homogeneous towns. Also, Colored voters were 




Black voters lost indirect parliamentary representation as well, but later obtain franchise in 
bantustans (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005).  
There were also racial discriminations in welfare and benefits. Although the government 
developed segregated townships in the 1950s to move Blacks from their original habitation areas, 
in 1960s the government prohibited further development (Seekings & Nattras, 2005). Although 
primary education for Black children expanded rapidly in the 1960’s, the education they received 
was of poor quality and insufficiently funded. The 1953 Bantu Education Act enforced the 
control of Black education by linking tax receipts from blacks to public expenditure on their 
education: in 1975, the average expenditure on education for Whites was more than 15 times 
larger than that for Blacks (Thomas, 1996). In 1970s, the government increased social spending 
on Blacks and greatly expanded secondary education for Black children. However, according to 
Thomas (1996), Whites continued to enjoy better funded schooling. For example, education 
spending per student is R4 for Whites and R1 for Blacks. Asians and Colored received better 
schooling than Blacks although it was also worse than Whites; education spending per student 
was R3 for Asians and R2 for Coloreds. Also development was permitted in African townships 
in 1970s (Seekings & Nattras, 2005). Racial discrimination was also applied to labor market. In 
1953, the Industrial Conciliation Act removed African workers the right to strike and limited 
their representations to “workers committees”. A color bar was implemented to prevent Coloreds 
and Blacks from working in white-dominated workplaces particularly in manufacturing 
(Seekings & Nattras, 2005).  
The apartheid era has been criticized by both domestic and international communities and 
it ended in 1994 when the political party called African National Congress (ANC) won a 




Bank, 2012 April). The country had a relatively peaceful transition from racist doctrine to 
inclusive democracy, which is thought to be one of the greatest achievements in late twentieth 
century (Welsh, 2009; World Bank, 2012 April). However, the great racial inequalities due to 
apartheid still exist. The inequalities in income, employment and education are explained more 
in detail later.   
5.1.4. Tax revenue, tax system and public expenditure in South Africa 
This section looks at public revenue and expenditure. The total public expenditure in 
South Africa in 2010 was 2669.5 billion rand (in current local currency), equivalent to 202.6 
billion US dollars (constant 2000 US$) and approximately 100% of the GDP5. South Africa has 
been successful in collecting tax from upper income groups compared to other countries, 
although it has a substantial informal economy. Table 5.6 shows that tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP in South Africa is higher than the Sub Sahara African average and much higher than 
BRIC and selected OECD countries.  
South Africa’s income tax system is progressive. Let us look at the income tax rate in 
2007 when the Labor Force Survey used by this study was conducted in Table 5.7. For example, 
if a person under 65 years old earns R112,500 (categorized as the lowest income group), the 
estimated income tax is R12,510, which is 11% of total income. If a person under 65 years old 
earn R350,000 (the third income group), the estimated income tax is 27% if total income. If a 
person under 65 years old earns R700,000 (the richest income group), the estimated income tax  
is 32% of total income. For the richest group, the tax rate get closer to 40% as the income 
                                                 




increases. Considering the highest tax rate in the United States is 35%6, the income tax system in 
South Africa is more progressive than the one of the United States.  
Public spending on education in South Africa has been more than 5% of GDP which is 
higher than the average of Sub Saharan Africa, and higher than BRIC countries in the 2000s (see 
Table 5.8). Also, its public spending on education as a percentage of all government spending 
has been more than 17% since 2000; this is similar to the Sub Saharan African average and 
higher than BRIC and selected OECD countries (Table 5.9). In 2010, public spending as a 
percentage of GDP and as a percentage of government spending in 2010 was 6% and 19.2% 
respectively. These data show that South Africa also has been investing heavily in education.  
5.1.5. Unions, wages and minimum wage law in South Africa 
Next, trade unions, industrial council, and their impact on wages in South Africa are 
reviewed. It is important to explain them since the minimum wage law affects employment 
numbers in both the formal and informal sectors and trade unions have substantial power in 
determining minimum wage and wage takes. According to Butcher and Rouce (2001), unions 
were able to raise wages by 10% for Whites and 20% for Blacks in 1995. However, unions 
seemingly contribute to the inflexibility of labor market in South Africa. Union Black workers 
earn 60% more than nonunion Black workers (Schults & Mwabu, 1998). These union wage 
premiums could affect informal employment numbers.  
In South Africa, the Department of Labour sets minimum wage laws accordingly by 
sector and occupation. The sectoral determinations are retail and whole sale trade, domestic 
workers, farm workers, forestry workers, taxi operators, private security workers, hospitality 
                                                 




sector workers and contract cleaners (Development Policy Research Unit: DPRU, 2008). 
However, the real minimum wages are estimated to be lower than the minimum wage stipulated 
by the laws (DPRU, 2008). As mentioned, even the minimum wage for domestic workers who 
are categorized as workers in the informal sector exists. Dinkeleman and Ranchhod (2010) found 
that the minimum wage law for domestic workers substantially increased the wage of domestic 
workers but not their employment.  
5.1.6. Education system and basic education statistics in South Africa7 
This section overviews the basic information and statistics on the South African 
education system. South Africa has 6 years of primary education (the first cycle of general and 
compulsory education), 3 years of lower secondary education (the second cycle of general and 
compulsory education, 3 years of upper secondary education or upper secondary training, and 
tertiary education (about 4 years for Bachelors, 7 or more years for postgraduate degrees) (see 
Table 5.10).  
Early childhood education is provided by provincial Departments of Education but its 
provision is still limited and preschool education, for children aged 3, is dominated by the private 
sector. The Department of Education began to focus on providing one year of early childhood 
education prior to primary schooling for five-year-olds. The government has decided to provide 
one-year compulsory early childhood education (the reception year of compulsory education, 
called grade R) and is planning to enroll all children aged 5 in grade R by 2014.  
Primary education is from grade 1 to 6. Children start their primary education when they 
are 7 years old. Primary and lower secondary education is compulsory and called general 
                                                 




education. Lower secondary education is from grade 7 to 9. Upper secondary education is from 
grade 10 to 12. It includes either general upper secondary education or technical (upper) 
secondary education. Technical secondary education is provided by technical centers, high 
schools and vocational schools. Vocational programs requires three years in general, leading to 
the National Certificate (Vocational), NCV3. NCV1 and NCV2 are awarded if students complete 
one or two years of vocational education. 
Tertiary and higher education is provided by colleges, technikons, universities of 
technology, and universities. Colleges for educational professions, i.e. teaching, often have 
3-year diploma programs, while nursing colleges offer 4-year diploma programs. Agricultural 
colleges have 1 to 2 year certificate programs and 3 year diploma program. Universities usually 
give students bachelors after 3-4 years of study (5 years for architecture and law; 5 and a half 
years for veterinary medicine; 6 years for medicine and surgery). Master degrees require 
additional 1 to 2 years of study, while doctoral degrees require a minimum of 2 years.  
Tables 5.11 to 5.14 display the gross and net enrollment rates for primary and secondary 
education for South Africa, the Sub Saharan Africa Region and selected countries. Looking at 
the gross enrollment rate for primary education, South Africa achieved universal primary 
education more than two decades ago: it has been more than 100% since the late 1980s. However, 
net enrollment rates for primary education have been decreasing. The primary net enrollment rate 
once reached 95% in 1995, but it has continuously decreased since then: it is now smaller than 
most of other middle income countries in the region and BRIC countries. The primary net 
enrollment rate in 2009 was in fact 85%. For secondary education, both gross and net enrollment 




countries and BRIC countries. The secondary gross enrollment rate was 86% in 2000 and it was 
94% as of 2009. The net enrollment rate for secondary was 62% in 2000, and 72% in 2009.  
5.1.7. Existing segregations and inequalities 
Even after the abolishment of apartheid, Blacks were still separated from Whites to some 
extent in terms of habitation area, employment and education. For example, Capetown is the 
metropolis where Black people are not the majority, and it is still deeply divided (Polgreen, 
2012). 
5.1.7.1. Poverty, and inequalities in unemployment and income  
South Africa is considered to be one of the most unequal countries in the world. Table 
5.15 shows the Gini coefficient in South Africa, selected neighboring African countries, BRIC 
countries, and selected OECD countries. The Gini coefficient in South Africa in 2009 was 63.1, 
the highest in the world. Surprisingly, inequality in income has been increasing since apartheid 
ended. Table 5.16 shows the poverty rate (poverty headcount ratio) at the national poverty line 
for South Africa and neighboring middle income countries and BRIC countries. The poverty 
headcount ratio in South Africa has decreased from 31% in 1995 to 23% in 2006. The poverty 
rate in South Africa during the mid and late 2000s was lower than most of selected neighboring 
countries and Brazil and India. If we look at the poverty rate at $2 per day (PPP)8, the story 
changes a little bit (see Table 5.17). The poverty rate in South Africa has been decreasing but it 
is higher than those at the national poverty line. For example, the poverty rates in South Africa in 
2006 and 2009 were 35.7% and 31.3% respectively. The poverty rate at $2 a day was much 
lower than neighboring middle income countries but higher than Brazil, China and India.  
                                                 




Table 5.18 displays the poverty rate by race. Both in 1996 and 2001, the poverty rate for 
Blacks was around 35% which is much higher than those of other races, while the one for Whites 
was very small (1%). The high poverty rate for Blacks is due to the high unemployment rate for 
Blacks.  
The economy has been unable to generate sufficient jobs, especially for Blacks. Table 
5.19 shows the unemployment rate by race. The unemployment rate for the Black population is 
the highest, and three times as high as that for the Indian population and 4.5 times as high as that 
for the White population. The unemployment rate is 29.5% for Black, 22.5% for Coloreds, 
10.1% for Indian, and 6.4% for White. This trend is similar for young first-time job seekers. 
Employment rates for school-leaving first-time entrants into the labor market were 29% for 
Blacks, while it is 75% for Whites (Table 5.20). Looking at the average monthly wage by race in 
Table 5.21, Blacks again had the lowest average monthly wage, while the White population had 
the highest. The average monthly wage for Whites was more than 4 times as high as that for 
Blacks in 2008.  
Moreover, the majority of workers in the informal sector in the country are Black. 
According to Valodia, Lebani, Skinner, and Devey (2006), Blacks account for 89.3% of people 
in the informal sector, while Whites account for 4.7%. In addition, women are over-represented 
in the informal labor market. Estimates are that as much as 55.9% of workers in the informal 
sector are women, according to the South Africa Labor Force Survey in September, 2007.  
Blacks were discriminated against in employment under apartheid (Bhorat, Lundall, & 
Rospabé, 2002; Chamberlain & van der Berg, 2002) and the statistics for recent years show that 




5.1.7.2. Inequality in education 
Also, disparities between Whites and Blacks in education have continued to exist after 
apartheid was abolished (O’Gorman, 2007). It is also important to note again that the explicitly 
discriminatory policies of apartheid were applied to education prior to 1994. But the legacy of 
apartheid has also had a great impact on inequality in education between Whites and Blacks until 
the present (Oosthuizen & Bhorat, 2006).  
If we look at the percentage of the population aged 20 and older by race and by level of 
education (Table 5.22), Blacks have the highest percentage of population with no schooling; they 
represent the lowest percentage of people with grade 7 completed and higher. In 2006, the 
percentage of people with no schooling was 13.1% for Blacks, 4.4% for Colored, 2.9% for 
Indian, and 0.1% for Whites. The percentage of people with some form of primary schooling in 
2006 was 16.9% for Blacks, 15.9% for Coloreds, 5.1% for Indian, and 0.6% for Whites. The 
percentage of people who completed grade 7 and higher was 70% for Blacks, 79.7% for 
Coloreds, 92% for Indian and 99.2% for Whites. 
Table 5.23 shows the gross enrollment rate in public higher education institutions 
according to race. Although, enrollment rates in primary and secondary education is now closer 
to those of Indians and Whites, and the enrollment rate in higher education has been rapidly 
improving for Blacks and Coloreds, the enrollment rate in higher education for them is still very 
low compared to Indians and Whites. The gross enrollment rate in public higher education 
institution was recorded at 12% for Blacks and Coloreds, 51% for Indian and 59% for Whites in 
2006.  
Inequality in the quality of schooling also continues to be an issue. For example, 




schools were occupied by students from a single population group. It is important to note that the 
average teacher-student ratio of schools with Black students is 35.1 while it is 25.6 in schools 
with White students. Also, the percentage of qualified teachers for Blacks and Coloreds were 
93.9% and 92.2%; lower than those for Indians and Whites (98.1% and 99.5%), in 2008 (See 
Table 5.24). However, the percentage of qualified teachers has been dramatically improving last 
two decades for Blacks and Coloreds.  
5.1.8. Other human development challenges 
There are some other significant human development challenges in South Africa. First, 
gender discrimination has been persistent. For example, the female homicide rate is six times as 
high as the world average; 50% of women are killed by their partners (Lancet, Health in South 
Africa, 2009 cited in World Bank, 2010). Second, South Africa has serious health issues. South 
Africa has 0.7% of world’s population, but 17% of the world’s HIV/AIDS cases and 24% of the 
global burden of HIV-related TB (World Bank, 2010). Life expectancy at birth has continued to 
decrease, 59.9 years in 1995 to 52 years in 20109. Third, South Africa has substantial urban/rural 
disparities (Leibbrand, Woolard, & Woolard). This is connected to racial disparities because the 
large share of the rural population is Black.  
5.2. Data Description 
This dissertation uses South African labor force surveys that were conducted twice a year 
between 2000 and 2007 (in February and September from 2000 to 2002, and in March and 
September from 2003 to 2007) by Statistics South Africa. According to Statistics South Africa 
                                                 




Labor Force Survey Reports,10 all nine provinces of South Africa were included. The data were 
collected by survey questionnaire. The number of those who were of working age in the sample 
population ranged from 67,000 to 74,000 for these surveys. The number of households covered 
in the surveys was over 30,000. 
The survey was designed to be a nationally representative sample. For example, for the 
Labor Force Survey of September 2007, the survey randomly drew the sample of Primary 
Sample Units (PSUs) for the Master Sample. The Master Sample is a multi-stage stratified 
sample. Enumeration Areas (EAs) with a household count of less than 25 were omitted from the 
census frame that was used to get the sample of PSUs. Other omissions from the Master Sample 
frame are all institutional EAs except workers’ hostels, convents, and monasteries. EAs in the 
census database that were found to have less than 60 dwelling units were pooled together. The 
sample size of PSUs was 3,000. The explicit strata were the 53 district councils (DCs). The 3,000 
PSUs were allocated to these using the power allocation method. The PSUs were sampled using 
probability proportional to size principles. The measure of size used was the number of 
households in a PSU based on census 2001 (Statistics South Africa, 2007b).  
The datasets have a sector variable which indicates whether an individual was working in 
formal or informal sectors. This variable was created based on questions asked of individuals 
about “What type of occupation and job task are” and “In which sector the 
organization/business/enterprise/branch where a respondent works is”. For the latter question, 
sector means either formal sector or informal sector (including domestic work). Also, 
respondents are told that the “formal sector employment is where the employer (institution, 
                                                 




business or private individual) is registered to perform the activity,” whereas the “informal sector 
employment is where the employer is not registered” (Statistics South Africa, 2007c, p. 24).  
The survey also asked additional questions which could be used to create other variables 
on informal employment. For example, the September 2007 survey asked whether a respondent’s 
employer contributed to any pension or retirement fund, and how many employees there were in 
an organization, business, enterprise or branch where a respondent worked. The survey also 
asked whether the respondent’s organization, business, enterprise or branch was a registered 
organization, paid for medical aid, was registered for VAT, and paid income tax (Statistics South 
Africa, 2007b). 
As we can expect, the dataset has some missing values of variables of interest. For 
example, 28.3% of workers do not have their earnings information. However, the author could 
not find a significant difference in the distributions of education variables between those who 
report earnings and those who did not report earnings. Therefore, it is still possible to conduct the 













Table 5.1  Population Indicators and Surface Area for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa Region 
and Upper Middle Income Countries: 2007 and 2010 
2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
Population (millions) 48.3 50.0 793.3 854.1 2,402.1 2,452.1
Urban population (% of total population) 60.3 61.7 36.0 37.4 55.4 57.4
Population growth (%) 1.1 1.4 2.5 2.5 0.7 0.7







Source: World Bank World Development (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF) database (accessed on May 
4, 2012). 
 
Table 5.2  Population Growth for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa Region and Selected 
Countries: 1990-2010 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
South Africa 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4
Sub Saharan Africa 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8
Botwaqna 3.0 2.5 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
Ghana 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Namibia 3.9 2.9 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8
Nigeria 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
China 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
India 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
Russia 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
(selected OECD countries)
USA 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8
UK 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Japan 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  




Table 5.3  GDP, GDP per capita and Their Growth Rate for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa 
Region and Selected Countries: 2007 and 2010 
2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
GDP (constant 2000 US$) (billions) 178.8 187.2 488.3 550.0 6,839.8 7,968.2
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 3,704.8 3,745.6 615.5 644.0 2,847.4 3,249.5
GDP growth (%) 5.6 2.8 6.6 5.1 8.9 7.8







Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012). 
 
Table 5.4  GDP Growth Rate for South Africa, Sub Sahara Africa Region and Selected 
Countries: 1965-2010 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
South Africa 8.9 5.2 1.7 6.6 -1.2 -0.3 3.1 2.6 4.2 5.3 5.6 3.6 -1.7 2.8
Sub Saharan Africa 6.4 7.8 1.1 4.0 1.3 1.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 5.7 6.6 5.1 2.0 5.1
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola -0.3 10.4 7.9 3.0 20.6 22.7 13.8 0.7 5.9
Botwaqna 5.8 17.1 8.4 12.0 7.1 6.8 4.4 10.2 5.9 1.6 4.8 2.9 -4.9 7.2
Ghana 1.4 9.7 -12.4 0.5 5.1 3.3 4.1 4.2 3.7 5.9 6.5 8.4 4.0 7.7
Namibia 0.5 2.5 4.1 4.2 3.5 2.5 5.4 4.3 -0.7 4.8
Nigeria 4.9 25.0 -5.2 4.2 9.7 8.2 2.5 2.7 5.4 5.4 6.4 6.0 7.0 8.7
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 3.1 8.8 5.2 9.1 7.9 -4.3 4.4 3.4 4.3 3.2 6.1 5.2 -0.6 7.5
China 16.4 19.4 8.7 7.8 13.5 3.8 10.9 9.3 8.4 11.3 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4
India 21.6 5.2 9.1 6.7 5.2 5.5 7.6 4.1 4.0 9.3 9.8 4.9 9.1 8.8
Russia -3.0 -4.1 1.4 10.0 6.4 8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.0
(selected OECD countries)
USA 6.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 4.1 1.9 2.5 4.5 4.2 3.1 1.9 0.0 -3.5 3.0
UK 2.8 2.5 -0.6 -2.1 3.6 0.8 3.1 6.2 4.5 2.1 3.5 -1.1 -4.4 2.1
Japan 5.8 4.3 3.1 2.8 5.1 5.2 1.9 1.6 2.9 1.9 2.4 -1.2 -6.3 4.0  




Table 5.5  Unemployment Rate for South Africa, Sub Sahara 
Africa Region and Selected Countries: 1995-2009 
1995 2000 2005 2007 2009
South Africa 16.9 26.7 26.7 23 23.8




Namibia 20.3 21.9 37.6
Nigeria
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 6 9.3 8.1 8.3
China 2.9 3.1 4.2 4 4.3
India 2.2 4.3 4.4
Russia 9.4 10.6 7.2 6.1 8.4
(Selected OECD countries)
USA 5.6 4 5.1 4.6 9.3
UK 8.6 5.5 4.6 5.2 7.7
Japan 3.2 4.8 4.4 3.9 5  




Table 5.6  Total Revenue (% of GDP): 2000-2009 
2000 2005 2007 2008 2009
South Africa 24.0 26.9 28.9 27.9 25.5
Sub Saharan Africa 17.5 17.8
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Ghana 17.2 21.3 13.9 13.9 12.6
Namibia 27.5 25.8 27.3
Nigeria 0.2 0.2 0.3
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 14.0 16.7 16.8 16.7 15.6
China 6.8 8.7 9.9 10.3 10.5
India 9.0 9.9 11.9 10.8 9.7
Russia 16.6 16.6 15.8 13.0
(Selected OECD countries)
USA 11.2 11.9 10.3 8.5
UK 28.4 27.2 27.6 28.8 26.0
Japan 10.9 10.4 9.2 8.7  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012).  
Notes: The number for Ghana 2000 is actually in 2001. The number for Japan 
2005 is actually in 2006. Data for Angola and Botswana was already checked 





Table 5.7  Income Tax Rates in 2007/2008 
R0 - R112 500 18% of each R1 R112 500
R112 500 - R180 000 R20 250 + 25% of the amount over R112 500
R180 000 - R250 000 R37 125 + 30% of the amount over R180 000
R250 000 - R350 000 R58 125 + 35% of the amount over R250 000
R350 000 - R450 000 R93 125 + 38% of the amount over R350 000
R450 000 - and over R131 125 + 40% of the amount over R450 000
Rebates Primary rebate R7 740
Additional rebate (persons of 65 years of age or older) R4 680
Tax thresholds The tax thresholds at which liability for normal tax commences, are:
• Persons under 65 years of age R43 000
• Persons 65 years of age or older R69 000
Interest exemptions
• Persons under 65 years of age R18 000
• Persons 65 years of age or older R26 000
Rates of TaxTaxable Income (in rand)
 













Table 5.8  Public Spending on Education (% of GDP) for South 
African and Selected Countries: 2000-2010 
2000 2005 2007 2010
South Africa 5.6 5.3 5.2 6.0
Sub Saharan Africa 3.5 4.1 5.0
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola 2.6 2.6
Botwaqna 9.5 8.0










UK 4.5 5.4 5.5
Japan 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.8  




Table 5.9  Public Spending on Education (% of GDP) for South 
African and Selected Countries: 2000-2010 
2000 2005 2007 2010
South Africa 18.1 17.9 17.1 19.2
Sub Saharan Africa 15.8 18.9














Japan 10.5 9.5  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012). 
Notes: The numbers for Sub Sahara Africa 2000 and 2007 are actually in 
1999 and 2008. The numbers for Angola 2000 and 2005 are in 1999 and 2006. 





Table 5.10  South Africa Structure of Education System, 2008 
 









Table 5.11  Primary Education Gross Enrollment Rate for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa 
Region and Selected Countries: 1980-2009 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009
South Africa 81.3 106.9 117.7 105.9 105.1 104.8 101.7
Sub Saharan Africa 80.5 93.1 96.8 99.9
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola 163.8 83.1 82.2 81.4 114.8 121.5
Botwaqna 88.1 98.9 105.4 104.3 104.0 107.2 107.7
Ghana 74.2 72.3 69.7 77.8 85.2 90.3 101.4 106.3
Namibia 117.9 124.1 114.8 109.3 109.3 107.5
Nigeria 93.8 104.4 84.2 86.6 97.9 101.8 94.2 83.1
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 136.7 133.4 140.9 150.7 136.7 127.4
China 113.7 122.8 128.9 113.2 110.2 111.1
India 83.6 88.4 93.0 96.7 93.8 112.5 113.7
Russia 104.2 106.8 106.6 103.1 96.6 96.6 98.6  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012). 
Notes: The number in South Africa 1980 is in 1981. The number in Angola 1995 is in 1998.  
 
Table 5.12  Primary Education Net Enrollment Rate for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa 
Region and Selected Countries: 1990-2009 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009
South Africa 90.0 95.2 89.7 87.9 87.7 85.1
Sub Saharan Africa 59.2 69.1 72.6 75.1
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola 86.3
Botwaqna 86.9 78.5 80.9 84.5 85.6
Ghana 64.2 66.5 72.3 76.7
Namibia 79.1 85.7 88.1 87.1 86.6 85.4
Nigeria 64.5 67.2 62.1
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 91.7 94.4 94.1
China 97.1 92.5
India 79.1 89.1 90.3
Russia 92.2 91.3 93.4  




Table 5.13  Secondary Education Gross Enrollment Rate for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa 
Region and Selected Countries: 1980-2009 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009
South Africa 66.0 79.7 85.3 92.4 95.7 93.8
Sub Saharan Africa 25.0 31.1 33.3 36.0
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola 10.9 14.9 23.8 27.1
Botwaqna 40.1 57.8 74.6 76.9 80.0
Ghana 35.2 40.5 47.2 53.7 59.1
Namibia 37.9 55.9 60.1 63.1 64.0
Nigeria 24.3 24.3 34.4 31.5 39.0
(BRIC countries)
Brazil 104.4 105.8 101.3
China 38.5 51.6 62.1 76.1 80.1
India 45.9 45.3 53.9 57.0
Russia 94.8 86.8 92.3 83.1 84.7 88.6  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012). 
Notes: The number in South Africa 1995 is in 1994. The number for Brazil 2009 is in 2008. The numbers for Russia 
1995 and 2000 are in 1994 and 1999. 
 
Table 5.14  Secondary Education Net Enrollment Rate for South Africa, Sub Saharan Africa 
Region and Selected Countries: 1990-2009 
2000 2005 2007 2009
South Africa 61.9 72.0
Sub Saharan Africa 19.5 23.8 25.8
(Neighboring middle income countries)
Angola
Botwaqna 53.4 55.8 58.8 11.5
Ghana 34.5 40.1 48.4
Namibia 42.7 49.6 50.7 47.3
Nigeria 27.6 25.8
Brazil 68.6 78.9  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May 4, 2012) for all data except for the number for South  




Table 5.15  Gini Index1, 1995-2009 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2009
South Africa 56.6 57.8 67.4 63.1







Brazil 60.2 60.1* 56.8 54.7
China 35.7* 39.2* 42.5 42.5
India 33.4 40.1




Japan 27.8* 37.6*  
Sources: WDI & GDF database, US 2009: US Cencus Breau, Japan 2004: Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Statistics Buerau, Japan 2009: CIA World Factbook, UK 2005: CIA World Factbook. 
Notes: The numbers with * are in years close to the indicated years. Botswana in 1995 is actually in 1993. Ghana in 
2000 is in 1998. Namibia 2005 is in 2004. Nigeria 1995 and 2005 are in 1996 and 2004. Brazil 2000 is in 2001. 
China 1995 and 2000 are in 1996 and 1999. Russia 1995 and 2000 are in 1996 and 2001. UK 2000 is in 1999. Japan 






                                                 
1 “Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption 
expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A 
Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, 
starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini 





Table 5.16  Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Line (% of population): 1995-2009 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2009
South Africa 31 38 33 23







Brazil 35.1 35.2 26.8 21.4
China 6
India 37.2 29.8
Russia 11.1  
Sources: World Bank, 2007 (South Africa 2005). WDI & GDF database (all other numbers).  
Notes: The number in Sotuh Africa 2005 is in 2004. The number for Ghana 2000 is in 1998. The number for 
Namibia 2005 is in 2004. The number for Nigeria 1995 is in1996. The number for Brazil 2000 is in 2001. The 
















Table 5.17  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population): 1995-2009 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2009
South Africa 39.9 42.9 35.74 31.33





Nigeria 86.44 83.08 84.49
(BRICs)
Brazil 20.81 21.71 16.63 14.42 10.82
China 74.13 61.44 36.94 29.79
India 75.62 68.72
Russia 9.01 5.97 1.49 1.22 0.05  
Source: World Bank WDI & GDF database.  
Notes: The number for Ghana 2000 is for 1998. The number for Namibia 2005 is in 2004. The numbers for Nigeria 
1995, 2005, 2010 are in 1996, 2004, and 2009. The number for Brazil 2000 is in 2001. The numbers for China 2000 
and 2009 are in 1999 and 2008. The number for India 2009 is in 2010. The numbers for Russia 1995 and 2000 are 
for 1996 and 2001. 
 






White 0.01 0.01  






Table 5.19  Unemployment Rate By Race: 1993-2010 
1993 1997 2001 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Black 17 27.1 35.1 31.1 27 27.9 29.5
Colored 15.7 15.2 21.1 22.3 17.3 19.5 22.5
Indian 8.3 9.8 18.7 15.6 6.6 11.3 10.1
White 3.2 3.9 5.6 4.9 10.3 4.6 6.4
Total 22.9 29.5 26.7 25.5 23 22.9 23.6 25.3  
Source: PSLSD (1993), OHS (1997), LFS (2001, 2005), NIDS (2008) cited in Leibbrandt et al. (2010). QLFS (2009 
& 2010). World Bank WDI & GDF database (accessed on May4, 2012) (Total 1993-2008). 
 
Table 5.20  Estimated Number of School Leavers Entering the Labor Market for the First-Time 
Job Seekers: 2002 
% distribution of 
South African 
population
Total number of 
school-leaving first-
time entrants into the 
labor market
Employment rate of 
school-leaving first-
time entrants into the 
labour market 
Blacks 77 636020 29
Colored 9 74340 50
Indian 3 24780 70
White 11 90860 75
Average 100 826000 37  
Source: UNESCO (2011, August). 
 
Table 5.21  Average Monthly Wage By Race: 1993-2010 
1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2008
Black 2,104 2,969 2,588 3,118 2,576
Colored 3,382 3,017 3,834 4,381 3,362
Indian 5,421 5,270 6,315 6,940 7,350
White 10,803 9,508 11,162 12,026 11,240  




Table 5.22  Percentage of the Population Aged 20 and Older, by Race and by Level of 
Education: 1995 to 2006 
Year None







Black 1995 17.1 21.1 61.9 100
1997 17.5 19.8 62.7 100
1998 17.8 20.5 61.7 100
1999 15 22.4 62.6 100
2002 14.4 20.4 65.3 100
2003 13.6 19.3 67.1 100
2004 13.3 18.7 68 100
2005 13 18.1 68.9 100
2006 13.1 16.9 70 100
Coloured 1995 8.8 21.9 69.3 100
1997 8.7 19 72.3 100
1998 7.9 18.2 73.9 100
1999 7.6 20.3 72 100
2002 7.5 18.5 73.9 100
2003 7.1 16.8 76.1 100
2004 6.8 16.5 76.8 100
2005 5 15 80 100
2006 4.4 15.9 79.7 100
Indian 1995 5.3 7.8 86.9 100
1997 5.5 4.6 89.9 100
1998 4.1 4.7 91.2 100
1999 3.4 4.7 91.9 100
2002 3.7 8 88.3 100
2003 2.9 5.5 91.6 100
2004 2.4 6.3 91.3 100
2005 2.6 6.6 90.9 100
2006 2.9 5.1 92 100
White 1995 0.2 0.6 99.2 100
1997 0.6 0 99.4 100
1998 0.5 0 99.5 100
1999 0.2 0 99.8 100
2002 0.2 0.4 99.5 100
2003 0 0 100 100
2004 0 0 100 100
2005 0 0 100 100
2006 0.1 0.6 99.2 100  
Sources: Central Statistical Services (undated); and Statistics South Africa (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2003b, 2004b, 2005, 
2006).  




Table 5.23  Gross Enrollment Rate in Public Higher Education Institutions by Race: 1986, 1995, 
2006 
1986 1995 2006
African 5% 9% 12%
Colored 9% 10% 12%
Indian 32% 35% 51%
White 61% 61% 59%
Average 11% 14% 16%  
Source: South Africa Department of Education, 2009 
 
Table 5.24  Percentage of Qualified Educators by Race, 1990-2008 
1990 1994 2005 2006 2007 2008
Black 37 54 90.5 92.1 93 93.9
Coloured 59 71 89.9 92.1 93.2 92.2
Indian 98 93 97.5 97.2 96.6 98.1
White 98 99 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.5
Total 53 64 91.6 92.9 93.8 94.4  
Sources: 1990 data from Arnott & Bot, 1993; 1994 data from EduSource Data News No. 10/October 1995; 2005 
data from Persal, July 2005; 2006 data from Persal, December 2006; 2007 data from Persal, 2007; and 2008 data 









6. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGIES 
This chapter presents the baseline equation and the various methodologies that are used 
to estimate returns to schooling in the informal and formal sectors.  
6.1. Identification Strategies of Return to Education in the Informal and Formal Sectors 
6.1.1. Baseline equation 
Most empirical studies use the Mincerian approach to estimate rates of return to 
education. The baseline Mincerian equation used in this dissertation is:  
 
(6.1)  iiiii uXSYy   'ln  
 
where Y  is a measure of income such as earnings; S  is a measure of schooling such as years 
of schooling completed; X  is a set of other variables thought to affect income; u  is a 
disturbance representing omitted variables, assumed to be distributed independently of X  and 
possibly of S ; and i  is an index for a specific individual in the sample (Griliches, 1977; 
Mincer, 1974). If we use the natural logarithm of hourly wage as Yln  and years of schooling 
completed as S , we can estimate the percentage of hourly wage that one additional year of 
schooling would increase after controlling for background variables X .  
It should be noted that the above approach does not take into account the direct and 
indirect cost of education in calculating rates of return to education. Becker (1962) presented a 
more comprehensive way to calculate rates of return to education, which included not only the 




their present discounted values. Although this is a more comprehensive way to estimate returns 
to schooling for each level of education, the Mincerian equation has been the most popular 
method used to estimate returns to schooling because it does not have the data requirements 
involved in estimating current and future streams of costs and benefits. Also, in this study, 
returns to education always means “private” returns to schooling, not social returns. 
As discussed in the literature review on returns to education in different sectors, the 
analysis faces the endogeneity of education and sample selection bias from sector choice. Also 
the heterogeneity of the impact of education on wage is important to factor in. 
6.1.2. Dependent, independent, control variables, categorization of 
sectors/workers, and subgroups of interest 
In the rate of return to education regression analysis, the log of “hourly” earnings is used 
as the dependent variable. The original dataset includes only annual earnings, but this could be 
divided by number of weeks in a year to calculate weekly earnings. Then hourly earnings could 
be obtained by dividing weekly earnings by hours of work per week. The wages are before-tax 
wages, as asked by the survey questionnaire. Although there may be differences in income tax 
avoidance between workers in the formal and informal sectors, the survey does not provide 
information on this. However, to test for whether the analysis could change if after-tax earnings 
were calculated, the empirical analysis below also was carried out on the assumption that only 
formal workers paid taxes, and the appropriate tax rates were deducted from their survey-based 
earnings. No significant differences in results were obtained. 
The dissertation basically used two types of education-independent variables: years of 
schooling and a set of dummy variables by level of education. It also employed methods to 




The basic set of control variables are experience, experience squared, female, race, 
marital status, permanent work status,1 and union participation. Models with more variables 
were also used, when sample size allowed it, such as language, type of industry, type of 
occupations, and district dummies.  
The dissertation mainly used the informal sector variable already defined by the survey. 
This definition follows what was called earlier the legalistic definition, which defines someone 
as working in the informal sector if the employer (institution, business or private individual) is 
not officially (legally) registered to perform the activity. The informal sector here includes 
domestic workers as well. Domestic workers are those who are paid to do domestic work, such 
as housekeepers, nannies, cooks, and gardeners. Note that the research also used different 
definitions of the informal sector (employment) for a robustness check on the results.  
The dissertation divided the formal sector into the public sector and the formal private 
sector. The main focus is on the comparison of the formal and informal private sector, but the 
estimations of the public sector are also reported to compare with other sectors. Both wage 
earners and the self-employed were included in the analysis. Although the analysis couild have 
been carried out separately for wage earners and the self-employed, sample sizes were greatly 
reduced when this split was carried out and, instead, the dissertation included all in the same 
equation, with dummy variables added for the self-employed and head of company (and for any 
interaction effects) to control for the differences among wage earners and the self-employed in 
                                                 
1The available categories of work status in the dataset are permanent, a fixed period contract, temporary, 
casual, and seasonal. However, the study used only the permanent dummy variable: permanent=1 if a worker has a 
permanent job, and 0 if a worker has a fixed period contract, temporary, casual or seasonal. This is because the 
estimation of the return to schooling is not very different between the model with only the permanent dummy and 
the model with all work status dummies, and putting in a lot of independent variables brought about a 




the analysis. In addition, the dissertation closely looked at the impact by race and gender since 
inequality by race, ethnicity, and gender is a major issue in South Africa.  
6.1.3. Dealing with the endogeneity of education and sector sample selection bias 
6.1.3.1. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
This dissertation employed two-stage least squares to control for the endogeneity of 
education. The model is estimated separately for each sector j.  
The first stage equation is  
(6.2)  'ij i i iS Z X e     
where S  is schooling, Z  is a instrument (or instruments), X  is the set of covariates, and  
e  is error term. Then, the second state equation will be 
(6.3) 1ln 'ij ij ij ijY S X u       
where S  is schooling, X  is a set of covariates, and u  is error term. The instrumental 
variable affects schooling choices, but is uncorrelated with the ability or error term in the wage 
equation: ( | ) 0i iE Z   (Card, 1999).  
It is usually difficult to find a good instrument (or instruments) in datasets from 
developing countries. Valid instrumental variables often used in the developed countries, where 
rich datasets are available, are quarter of birth, change in education law, distance to school, 
parents’ education or other family background (Card, 1999). However, it is not easy to obtain 
these data from surveys in many developing countries. The most popular instruments used for 
studies on developing countries are parents’ education because only that is available (e.g., Barro 
& Lee, 2010).  




available. Even father’s education and mother’s education are not available; there is no direct 
information on parents’ education. Also, information on the relationships between family 
members except for spouse relationship is not available. Thus, it is impossible to construct 
parents’ education variables using the information in the dataset. The only possible instrumental 
variable from the dataset is spouse’s education (years of schooling). The dataset has information 
on years of schooling in each household member and information on spouse (household member 
number is assigned if an individual has a spouse living together inside the household). Based on 
the information, a spouse’s education variable can be constructed. It seems spouse’s education is 
a valid instrument, according to Trostel, Walker, and Woolley (2002). The intuition behind this 
variable is that years of schooling of husbands as well as of wives are positively correlated. 
Individuals with comparable levels of education tend to get together as they are likely to share 
similar experiences and/or similar interests. This hypothesis is called assortative mating and is 
supported by a number of empirical works (see, for instance, Pencavel, 1998). On the other hand, 
it is not obvious that spouse’s education directly affects individual’s earnings. 
6.1.3.2. Two-step selection model  
As pointed out earlier, we have both endogeneity of education and sector sample 
selection bias in the analysis of returns to education in the informal private, formal private, and 
public sectors. However, it is usually difficult to control for both of them at the same time. Most 
studies actually control for only sector sample selection bias. This section first discusses how to 
control for sample selection bias and later how to control for both endogenous variables and 
sample selection bias.  
This dissertation uses a two-step selection model to control for sample selection into 




binary two-step model (1979) to correct for selection bias for more than two groups. The study at 
first used the following Lee two-step model, based on Trost and Lee (1984).  
The wage in the sector j  is given by 
(6.4)  ,ij j i jiZW         1, 2,...,j M  
where i  refers to the thi  individual., iZ  is a vector of exogenous variables, and ji  is a 
disturbance term. 
In the first stage, one estimates a polychotomous model of the choice of employment 
sector using the logit maximum likelihood method and generate the following selection term for 
the alternative j . 
(6.5)     ' 'ˆ ˆ ˆj j j jJ z F z        
where   is the standard normal density function, F  is the logistic marginal distribution,  
J  is 1F , and   denotes the standard normal distribution function. In the second stage ˆj , 
which is called inverse Mill’s ratio, is introduced into the earnings function with other 
explanatory variables and we can estimate the following equations by OLS. 
(6.6)  ' ˆln  for j=1,2,...,Mj j j j jw x        
Employing this method, the dissertation could deal with selection bias for more than two sectors, 
such as when individual workers select the informal private, formal private, and public sectors. 
For more detail on this method, see Lee (1983) and Trost and Lee (1984).  
Lee’s method has been criticized because it relies on a strong assumption about the joint 
distribution of error terms of the equations of interest (Bourguignon et al., 2007; Dahl, 2002; 




small samples. Therefore, alternative methods such as those of Dubin and McFadden (1984) or 
Dahl (2002) were used as well in this study. Bourguignon et al. (2007) also suggest that Dubin 
and McFadden variant 1 (DMF variant 1), Dubin and McFadden variant 2 (DMF variant 2), and 
the second model of Dahl (Dahl 2) perform better in general. The DMF variant 1 and variant 2 
corrections were developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) based on the original DMF selection 
correction. In the present study, Dahl 2 seems to cause multicoliniearities between the selection 
terms and explanatory variables in the 2SLS due to the large number of selection terms used in 
the relatively small samples. Also, Bourguignon et al. (2007) state DMF variant 2, which allows 
for normal error terms in the outcome function, is less robust than original DMF and DMF 
variant 1. Therefore, the variant one of the Dubin and McFadden selection term developed by 
Bourguignon et al. (2007) was mainly used in this study.2 
Another potential problem pointed out by Kuepie et al. (2009) is that the multinomial 
logit may suffer from the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumptions (IIA). 
Hausman-type tests for each sector are also employed when the analysis is conducted to examine 
IIA. Finally, in order to strengthen the methodology, instrumental variables are needed in the first 
stage equation. In general, exclusion restrictions need to be held to make the estimates credible, 
which means instruments are required. This study used spouse formal private sector dummy, 
spouse informal private sector dummy, family formal private sector dummy, and family informal 
private sector dummy as instruments. 
Utilizing this method, the dissertation used the following groups in the sample selection 
analysis: 1) working in the public sector, 2) working in the formal private sector, 3) working in 
                                                 
2See Bourguignon et al. (2007) for details of the formula for the selection terms of DMF, DMF variant 1, 




the informal private sector, and 4) unemployed or out of labor force.  
As shown in the literature review, most previous studies used the Heckman or Lee type 
two-step selection methods to control for sectoral allocation. This method was a major tool to 
control for selection bias of sectoral allocation in this dissertation as well.  
The basic set of explanatory variables used for the choice model include: level of 
education dummies (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, certificate with grade 12 and 
diploma with grade 12, and bachelor’s degree and above), age, female, races, marital status, and 
dependent ratio. Also, spouse public sector, spouse formal private sector, household public sector, 
and household formal private sector dummies were included as the “instruments” which were not 
in the wage equation and likely to affect sector choice but did not directly affect wage.  
6.1.3.3. Two-stage least squares with two-step selection correction 
The two-stage least squares and two-step selection correction models correct only for the 
endogeneity of education or sector sample selection bias, respectively. Therefore, this study 
combined these two methods to correct for both of them at the same time. Wooldridge (2002b, p. 
567)3 actually suggests a similar method when there are both endogeneity and sample selection 
issues, using the Heckman selection correction for two categories. Wooldridge (2002b) suggests 
that this procedure gives a consistent estimate of the coefficients. The method should be applied 
to more than two categories using the two-step selection correction for multiple choices.  
In this dissertation, the first stage equation was  
(6.7)  'ij ij ij iS Z X e     
where S  is schooling, Z  is instrument, X  is the set of covariates, and e  is error term.  
                                                 




j stands for a certain sector. The choice equation was  
(6.8)  Pr( 1| , ) ( )i i i j i i jJ W X W X      
where J  is being in a certain sector, W  is instrument, X  is a set of covariates, and   is an 
error term. The equation 7.6 is estimated by the multinomial logit covering four categories 
(public, formal private, informal private, and unemployed/out of labor force). Based on the 
estimation of the choice model, the Lee’s inverse Mill’s ratio, Dubin and McFadden selection 
terms, and Dahl selection terms, and variants of Dubin and McFadden selection terms were 
calculated. 
Then the second stage equation for sector j was 
(6.9) ˆln 'ij j j ij ij j j ij ijY S X u          
where S  is schooling, X  is a set of covariates, ˆ j  is inverse Mill’s ratio or other selection 
terms, and u  is error term.  
6.1.3.4. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method 
A popular method of comparing wage differentials between groups is the wage 
decomposition methodology of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Some studies researching the 
topic of this dissertation, such as Lassible and Tan (2005) and Pagán and Tijerina-Guajardo 
(2000), used the wage decomposition method. This dissertation used the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition for the 2SLS model that controls for the endogeneity of education with the 
Heckman selectivity correction.  
First, the basic Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method developed by Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) is discussed, using two categories: the formal and informal sectors. Let ln( )Fw  




( I ).4 When the standard log wage model is estimated separately for workers in the formal sector 
and in the informal sector, the following equation holds since regression lines pass through the 
means of the variables.  
(6.10)  ) ( )ln( F I F F I Iw ln w X b X b
     
where FX  and IX  are vectors containing the means of the variables for males and females, 
respectively, and Fb  and Ib  are the estimated coefficients.  
Given these results, the log wage differential can be decomposed in two ways. Letting 
  F IX X X
     and  F Ib b b   , (6.10) can be written as  
(6.11) ln( ) )(F I F Iw ln w X b X b
       
or  
(6.12) (n( ) )  l F I I Fw ln w X X bb
       
The first term of either Eq. (6.11) or Eq. (6.12) is the part of the log wage differential due to 
different (average) characteristics of workers in the formal and informal sectors, and the second 
term is the part of the differential due to different coefficients or different wage structures. If 
workers in two sectors receive identical returns for the same characteristics in the absence of 
discrimination, this second term can be interpreted as the part of the log wage differential due to 
discrimination. A critical assumption here is that labor supply and individual characteristics are 
fixed, and will not respond to changes in wages caused by the elimination of discrimination 
(Butler, 1982).  
To control for selection bias, Newman and Oaxaca (2004) and others (e.g., Idson & 
                                                 
4 We could also compare the public and formal private sector or the public and informal private sector but 




Feaster, 1990) employed the Heckman or Lee two-step model, which estimates the probability of 
falling in a certain category.  
If the dissertation employed this method, the wage decomposition equation would be 
(6.13)  (  + ln( () ) )F I F I F F I Iw ln w X b X b             
or  
(6.14)  (  + ln( () ) )F I I F F I F Iw ln w X b X b             
As well, the original wage equations are estimated by two-stage least squares to control for the 
endogeneity of education.  
Another issue to deal with concerns computing wage decomposition. One has to choose 
either Eq. (6.11)/Eq. (6.13) or Eq. (6.12)/Eq. (6.14) in the empirical work, and either of the two 
equations could lead to a substantial difference in results. For example, in Oaxaca’s (1973) study 
which used data on Whites, Eq. (6.12) estimated that 52.9% of the male-female log wage 
differential was due to discrimination, while Eq. (6.13) yielded an estimate of 63.9%. A much 
larger difference occurred in Ferber and Green (1982), in a study of pay discrimination for a 
sample of university professors, where Eq. (6.12) yielded an estimate of 2% of the wage 
differential due to discrimination, while Eq. (6.13) gave an estimate of 70%. To tackle this 
problem, Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988) used weighted averages.  
Reimers (1983) developed the Oaxaca wage decomposition equation into the following 
equation: 
(6.15) ) ln )ln( ( [ ( )' ] [ ( ) ]F F F I F IDb Iw w X X X bD b I D D        
( )F F I I     




obtain different measures of the impact of discrimination, depending on the choice of weights in 
matrix D. Reimers claimed that the non-discrimination wage function lies somewhere between 
them; therefore, he chose D = (0.5)I. By contrast, Cotton (1988) chose the weighting matrix 
c wl I  , where wl  is the fraction of the sample made up by a majority group, claiming that the 
nondiscriminatory structure should be more similar to the structure that holds for the larger group. 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) pointed out that neither of these solutions is completely satisfactory 
since each researcher cited above chose the weight arbitrarily. They proposed another weighting 
method, which is  
(6.16)  1 ')( ( )o FF XXX X
    
where X  is the observations matrix for the pooled sample and FX  is the observation matrix 
for the majority sample (for the present study, it was workers in the formal sector). Another 
alternative is three-fold decomposition which uses the same reference group for both effects, but 
adds a third interaction term  
(6.17) { ( ) ( )}'( )F I F II E X E X      
(Jann, 2008). The three-fold decomposition was used for the analysis in the dissertation.  
6.1.4. Dealing with the heterogeneity of return to schooling 
In addition to selection bias, heterogeneity of returns to education is important to consider. 
This dissertation employed the quantile regression approach and a piecewise linear spline 
function that was employed by Kuepie et al. (2009) to consider the heterogeneity of the impact 
of education on earnings.  
6.1.4.1. Quantile regression 




Bassertt, 1978). One can use quantile regression to estimate earnings and return to schooling 
gaps between formal and informal workers at different points along the conditional earnings 
distribution. As least squares models the mean of the distribution of the dependent variable Y  
conditional on regressors Z , quantile regressions give models for different percentiles of this 
distribution. The  -th quantile of Y  conditional on Z  is given by: 
(6.17)  ( | ) ( )i i iY Z ZQ    
where coefficient ( )   is the slope of the quantile line giving the effect of changes in Z  on 
the  -th conditional quantile of Y . Estimation for different quantiles (  from 0 to 1) produces 
regression lines for the various percentiles of the conditional distribution of Y  such that at least 
a   proportion of the regression residuals are below the estimated regression line and 
approximately a (1 )  fraction is above it. For example, median regression ( 0.5)   splits 
the sample in half (half of the residuals are above and half are below the regression line) and 
gives the same results as ordinary least squares when the distribution is symmetric. Using 
quantile regression, this dissertation computed the years of schooling coefficients at different 
quantiles for each sector.  
According to Koenker and Bassertt (1978), quantile regression is defined as the 
minimization problem shown below. Letting { :1,..., }tx T  denote a sequence of (row) K-vectors 
of a known design matrix, suppose { : 1,..., }ty t T  is a random sample on the regression 
process t t tu y x    having distribution function F. The  th regression quantile, 0 1  , is 
defined as any solution to the minimization problem: 
{ : } { : }
min | (| ) |1 |
K
t t t t
b t t y x b t t y
t t t
x b
y byb x 
    




In the location model ( 1, 1tK x  , for all t ), the two minimization problems coincide. The 
least absolute error estimator is the regression median, i.e., the regression quantile for  =1/2. 
For multiple-choice sample selection models, one can use a similar approach proposed by 
Fitzenberger (2003) for multiple-choice sample selection models and quantile regression. The 
probability of participation in different sectors is determined in the first stage using the 
multinomial logit model. In the  second-stage quantile wage equations, one then puts the DMF 
variant 1 selection correction term to correct for selectivity.  
In addition, this study conducted the instrumental variable quantile regression with the 
DMF variant 1 selection correction to correct for both the endogeneity of schooling and sample 
selection bias. The instrumental variable quantile regression was developed by Chernozhukov 
and Hansen (2004). 
6.1.4.2. Piecewise linear spline function 
This dissertation used a piecewise linear spline function employed by Kuepie et al. 
(2009) as well. The piecewise linear splice function allows the relationship between schooling 
and earnings to vary across different levels of education. More specifically, the return to 
schooling is allowed to be different at four levels of education: primary, lower secondary, upper 
secondary, and higher education. The education variables introduced have the form ( )ks e  with 
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6.2. Identification Strategies of the Estimation of the Effect of Schooling on Informal 
and Formal Sector Employment 
In this section, the empirical strategies used to estimate the effect of schooling on the 
likelihood of working in formal and informal employment are discussed.  
6.2.1. Baseline equation 
To analyze the sectoral allocation or choice between sectors, either the probit or the 
binary logit model is used when there are only two categories, while the multinomial logit model 
is used with more than two categories. The baseline probit model is: 
(6.20)  )()|1Pr( ' tititit XXI   
where   is the cumulative density function of a standard normal random variable. itX  is a 
vector of explanatory variables affecting the employment decision, including education 
variable(s), and it  is a parameter vector of the alternative chosen. t  is either 0 or 1; one 
number often refers to the formal sector, while the other refers to the informal sector. 
























education variable(s), and j  is a parameter vector of the alternative chosen. j  refers to each 
type of employment. In a binary logit, j =0 or 1, and one number usually refers to the formal 
sector while the other refers to the informal sector. With a multinomial logit, there are more than 
two categories to study. In this study, j =0 is unemployed or out of the labor force (an omitted 
category), j =1 is working in the public sector, j =2 is working in the formal private sector, and 
j =3 is working in the informal private sector. This study used the probit and multinomial logit 
models.  
6.2.2. Dependent, independent, and control variables 
The dependent variable in the probit equation to estimate the effect of schooling on the 
probability of working in the informal and formal private sectors is a binary variable on whether 
a worker is in the informal sector or in the formal sector.  A multinomial model was also 
estimated, where the emoployment probability is a discrete variable with more than two 
categories. As noted earlier, in defining the informal versus the formal sector of employment, this 
study first used the sector variable defined by the survey and then used other sector variables 
defined differently by the author.  
The key independent variables of interest are the education variables, which were either  
continuous, years of schooling variable or a set of level of education variables. The covariates 
included in the basic model are: age, female, races, languages, marital status, dependent ratio, 
training received, participation in government job creation program, spouse public sector 
participation, spouse formal private sector participation, household public sector participation, 




6.2.3. Dealing with the endogeneity of education 
The analysis of the effects of schooling on the probability of working in the formal and 
informal sectors is usually conducted as part of the selection bias correction for the analysis of 
the rate of return to schooling. Since most studies utilize the Heckman or Lee type of selection 
correction method, these studies have estimated the probability of working in these sectors in 
order to adjust the wage equations for selectivity bias. Therefore, the probability analysis was 
secondary and few studies have corrected for the endogeneity of schooling in estimating the 
probabilities of employment among sectors.  
This dissertation estimated the multinomial logit and probit models without controlling 
for the endogeneity of schooling first, and then the instrumental variable probit model was 






7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLES 
This chapter provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. The 
summary statistics on workers in different sectors are shown in Tables 7.1-7.9.  
Table 7.1 reports the number of workers by sector, gender, and race. It shows that the 
majority of workers belong to the formal private sector across race and gender except for Black 
females. However, the proportion of workers in the informal sectors is not small, especially for 
Blacks and Coloreds. The proportion of workers in the informal private sector is smaller than the 
one in the formal private sector, but larger than the one in the public sector in general, except for 
Whites and Asians. More workers work in the public sector than in the informal private sector 
for Whites and Asians.  
The proportion of workers who are employed in the public sector ranges from 14.3% to 
21.5% across race and gender groups. Females are more likely to work in the public sector 
compared to males, while the trend is opposite for the private formal sector. The share of workers 
in the public sector ranges from 16.5% to 21.5% across race groups for females, while the share 
of workers in the public sector ranges from 14.3% to 16.6% for males. The proportion of workers 
in the formal private sector vary are from 58.2% to 78.9% for males, while the proportions of 
workers in the formal private sector are from 35.5% to 77.5% for females. Differences in the 
participation on the informal sector by race and gender are mixed. While males are more likely to 
work in the informal private sector than Whites and Asians, females are much more likely to 
work in the informal private sector than males for Blacks. The proportion of workers in the 
informal private sector for males is 5.8% for White and 19.4% for Asian, compared to 4.2% for 




Table 7.2 is slightly different from Table 7.1. It displays the number of workers by sector, 
gender, and race with the proportions of workers by race in each sector. We can see that the 
majority of workers in the informal private sector are Black, while only a small number of 
Whites and Asians work in the informal private sector. The proportion of Colored workers in the 
informal private sector lies in between Whites/Asians and Blacks. Disproportionately more 
Blacks work in the informal private sector, while disproportionately more Whites, Colored, and 
Asians work in the formal private sector. The public sector reflects the proportions of races in the 
country. The distribution of the types of job for different races are not exactly the same, but at 
least the numbers in Table 7.2 show that the public sector hires workers from different population 
groups equally. In contrast, the proportion of Blacks in the formal private sector is a bit lower 
than the overall proportions of Blacks in the whole labor market. In addition, the proportions of 
Whites, Asians, and Colored in the formal private sector are a little disproportionately higher 
than the overall proportions of races in the whole labor market. Also, the proportion of Blacks in 
the informal private sector is disproportionately high, while the proportions of Whites, Colored, 
and Asians in the informal sector are disproportionately low.5 
Column 1 in Table 7.2 shows the proportion of workers by race in the overall labor 
market: 10.1% of workers in the labor market are White, 70% are Black, 16.9% are Colored, 
2.7% are Asian, and 0.2% are of other races. These figures differ by sector. In the public sector, 
10.3% of workers are White, 71.1% are Black, 16.2% are Colored, 2.3% are Asian. In the formal 
private sector, 14.2% are White, 61.3% are Black, 20.4% are Colored, and 3.8% are Asian; in the 
informal private sector, 1.9% are White, 86.3% are Black, 10.7% are Colored, and 0.8% is Asian. 
                                                 




These differences are similar for the male and female samples.  
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 7.3 show the sample means for various 
variables by sector and gender. Workers in the public sector are characterized by the highest 
wage, highest years of education completed, most experienced, most training experience, and 
highest rate of trade union participation. The situation of workers in the formal private sector is 
the second best in general. The compensation and qualifications of workers in the informal 
private sector are the worst. Finally, the compensation and qualifications of males are better than 
females in general, except that years of schooling for females are higher than for males in the 
public and formal private sectors. 
Let us look at the statistics in more detail. The average hourly wage for the public sector 
is 30.97, the highest among all three sectors. The average hourly wages for the formal private 
sector is 15.53 rand, about half of that for the public sector. The figure for the informal private 
sector is half of that for the formal private sector, which is 8.37 rand. The difference in average 
hourly wages between sectors is smaller for males, but the differences for males and females are 
similar. The average hourly wages for females is lower than that for males. The average years of 
schooling is also the highest for the public sector, and the lowest for the informal private sector 
for total, male and female. Average years of schooling are equal to 11.63 for the public sector, 
9.48 for the formal private sector, and 6.90 for the informal private sector for total. The average 
of years of schooling for the public and formal private sectors is approximately one year higher 
for females than males.  
The ratio of males to females is about 50:50 for the public sector. In contrast, the 
proportion of female is much smaller in the formal private sector, 36%. The proportion of 




The proportion of married people is the largest in the public sector for both males and 
females. The proportions of married workers for male and female in the public sector are 69% 
and 50%. Male informal private sector workers have the lowest proportion of married people, 
equal to 49%. The proportion of female married workers in the formal and informal private 
sectors is similar and smaller than in the public sector (45% and 46%, respectively).  
Looking at the work status of workers across sectors, the public sector has the largest 
proportion of workers with permanent status: 88% for males and 83% for females. The 
proportion of permanent workers in the formal private sector is a bit lower than in the public 
sector: 72% for males and 68% for females. The proportion of permanent workers in the 
informal private sector is much lower than in the other sectors: 28% for males and 48% for 
females. As one can expect, the proportion of temporary or casual workers is much higher in the 
informal private sector than in the other sectors. The proportions of temporary workers for males 
and females are 37% and 30% in the informal sector. In contrast, they are 12% for both males 
and females in the formal private sector and 7% and 5% for males and females in the public 
sector. The proportions of casual workers in the informal private sector are 29% for males and 
18% for females, and 7% for male and 9% for females in the formal private sector. The 
proportion of casual workers in the public sector is 2% for both male and female. 
Workers in the public sector are more experienced, followed by workers in the formal 
private sector. The years of experience in the current main occupation are 11.44 years for males 
and 9.73 for females in the public sector. The years of experience in the current main occupation 
in the formal private and informal private sectors are 6.37 for males and 5.13 for females, and 
3.55 for males and 4.98 for females, respectively.  




other sectors, while the proportion of workers with training experience is the lowest in the 
informal private sector. The proportion of workers who receive some kind of training in the 
public sector is equal to17% and 15% for males and females, respectively. They are 14% for 
males and 12% for females in the formal private sector, while they are 8% for males and 6% for 
females in the informal private sector.  
The union participation rate is very high in the public sector, while it is much lower in the 
formal private sector and remarkably low in the informal private sector. The union participation 
rates are 74% and 69% for males and females in the public sector, 30% for males and 25% for 
females in the formal private sector, and 2% for both males and females in the informal private 
sector. 
Tables 7.4 to 7.7 show descriptive statistics by race. The differences across variables are 
very similar to those in Table 7.3, but the compensation and qualifications for Whites are much 
higher than for other population groups. Asians are less well off than Whites, but still much 
better than Blacks and Colored. Compensation and qualifications for Blacks and Colored are 
much worse than for Whites and Asians, but the worst are for the Colored population. For 
example, average hourly wages in rand in the public, formal private, and informal private sectors 
are, respectively, 51.25, 49.99, and 42.85 for Whites, while they are 29.30, 12.21, and 7.69 for 
Blacks. The average years of schooling in the public, formal private, and informal private sectors 
are, respectively, 13.02, 12.50, and 11.51 for Whites, while they are 11.53, 8.92, and 6.78 for 
Blacks.  
The number of workers by industry, sector, and gender is displayed in Table 7.8. In 
addition, Table 7.9 displays the number of workers by occupation, sector, and gender. 




by sector, respectively. In Figure 7.1, all distributions are close to normal distribution, but the 
means are different. The mean of the wage in the public sector is the largest, as expected, 
followed by the formal private and then the informal private. Figure 7.2 indicates many zero 
schooling observations (the largest number across different years of schooling) in the informal 
sector. The distribution for the public and formal private is skewed toward the right.  
Figure 7.3 displays years of schooling vs. log hourly wage by sector. These figures imply 
that years of schooling and log hourly wage are positively correlated in all sectors. The 
correlation is the strongest for the public sector, followed by the formal public sector. The 
correlation is the smallest for the informal sector.  
Finally, as noted before, 28.3% of workers did not report their earnings. However, Figure 
7.4 shows that the distributions of education variables between those who report earnings and 
those who did not report earnings are not substantially different. Thus, the study conducted the 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total 25,474 4,495 13,906 7,073 14,024 2,200 8,838 2,986 11,450 2,295 5,068 4,087
100.0% 17.6% 54.6% 27.8% 100.0% 15.7% 63.0% 21.3% 100.0% 20.0% 44.3% 35.7%
White 2,575 463 1,981 131 1,475 226 1,164 85 1,100 237 817 46
100.0% 18.0% 76.9% 5.1% 100.0% 15.3% 78.9% 5.8% 100.0% 21.5% 74.3% 4.2%
Black 17,824 3,194 8,526 6,104 9,673 1,512 5,633 2,528 8,151 1,682 2,893 3,576
100.0% 17.9% 47.8% 34.2% 100.0% 15.6% 58.2% 26.1% 100.0% 20.6% 35.5% 43.9%
Colored 4,317 727 2,835 755 2,369 393 1,667 309 1,948 334 1,168 446
100.0% 16.8% 65.7% 17.5% 100.0% 16.6% 70.4% 13.0% 100.0% 17.1% 60.0% 22.9%
Asian 698 105 535 58 467 67 356 44 231 38 179 14
100.0% 15.0% 76.6% 8.3% 100.0% 14.3% 76.2% 9.4% 100.0% 16.5% 77.5% 6.1%
Other 60 6 29 25 40 2 18 20 20 4 11 5
100.0% 10.0% 48.3% 41.7% 100.0% 5.0% 45.0% 50.0% 100.0% 20.0% 55.0% 25.0%
Total Male Female
 
Note: Proportions shown are the proportions of workers in each sector by race. 
 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total 25,474 4,495 13,906 7,073 14,024 2,200 8,838 2,986 11,450 2,295 5,068 4,087
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
White 2,575 463 1,981 131 1,475 226 1,164 85 1,100 237 817 46
10.1% 10.3% 14.2% 1.9% 10.5% 10.3% 13.2% 2.8% 9.6% 10.3% 16.1% 1.1%
Black 17,824 3,194 8,526 6,104 9,673 1,512 5,633 2,528 8,151 1,682 2,893 3,576
70.0% 71.1% 61.3% 86.3% 69.0% 68.7% 63.7% 84.7% 71.2% 73.3% 57.1% 87.5%
Colored 4,317 727 2,835 755 2,369 393 1,667 309 1,948 334 1,168 446
16.9% 16.2% 20.4% 10.7% 16.9% 17.9% 18.9% 10.3% 17.0% 14.6% 23.0% 10.9%
Asian 698 105 535 58 467 67 356 44 231 38 179 14
2.7% 2.3% 3.8% 0.8% 3.3% 3.0% 4.0% 1.5% 2.0% 1.7% 3.5% 0.3%
Other 60 6 29 25 40 2 18 20 20 4 11 5
0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
Total Male Female
 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hourly wage 30.97 15.53 8.37 31.35 16.65 10.53 30.24 13.51 6.88
(28.35) (29.05) (19.34) (27.58) (28.42) (25.58) (29.10) (30.06) (13.20)
Years of schooling 11.63 9.48 6.90 11.05 9.17 7.19 12.09 10.03 6.69
(3.67) (3.68) (3.95) (3.89) (3.80) (3.91) (3.47) (3.39) (3.96)
Age 40.64 36.85 40.08 40.88 37.39 38.30 40.42 35.91 41.38
(9.98) (11.13) (12.05) (10.12) (11.39) (12.89) (9.84) (10.60) (11.22)
Female 0.51 0.36 0.58
(0.50) (0.481) (0.494)
White 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.01
(0.31) (0.350) (0.135) (0.305) (0.34) (0.17) (0.30) (0.37) (0.11)
Black 0.71 0.61 0.87 0.68 0.64 0.85 0.73 0.57 0.88
(0.46) (0.49) (0.34) (0.47) (0.48) (0.35) (0.44) (0.49) (0.33)
Colored 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.11
(0.37) (0.40) (0.31) (0.39) (0.39) (0.31) (0.35) (0.42) (0.31)
Asian 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.15) (0.19) (0.09) (0.17) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.06)
Married 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.69 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.46


















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Permanent 0.86 0.71 0.40 0.88 0.72 0.28 0.83 0.68 0.48
(0.35) (0.46) (0.49) (0.32) (0.45) (0.45) (0.37) (0.47) (0.50)
Fixed 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18)
Temporary 0.07 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.37 0.09 0.12 0.30
(0.25) (0.32) (0.47) (0.21) (0.32) (0.48) (0.28) (0.32) (0.46)
Casual 0.02 0.08 0.22 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.02 0.09 0.18
(0.13) (0.271) (0.42) (0.13) (0.26) (0.45) (0.13) (0.29) (0.38)
10.60 5.91 4.43 11.44 6.37 3.55 9.73 5.13 4.98
(9.39) (7.49) (6.36) (9.63) (7.98) (5.54) (9.03) (6.48) (6.78)
Training 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.06
(0.37) (0.34) (0.25) (0.38) (0.35) (0.27) (0.35) (0.33) (0.23)
Union 0.72 0.28 0.02 0.74 0.30 0.02 0.69 0.25 0.02


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hourly wage 51.25 49.99 42.85 55.32 57.54 42.93 47.27 39.59 42.72
(44.71) (68.08) (53.77) (49.28) (72.42) (46.73) (39.61) (60.19) (65.64)
Years of schooling 13.02 12.50 11.51 12.69 12.47 11.27 13.27 12.55 11.93
(2.11) (2.19) (2.72) (2.29) (2.29) (2.38) (1.82) (2.04) (3.23)
Age 43.50 40.80 43.58 43.25 41.74 43.87 43.71 39.48 43.04
(9.77) (11.88) (11.90) (9.48) (12.04) (12.40) (9.94) (11.51) (11.04)
Female 0.51 0.41 0.35
(0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
Married 0.76 0.76 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.59 0.75 0.73 0.76


















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Permanent 0.95 0.93 0.74 0.96 0.94 0.73 0.94 0.92 0.75
(0.21) (0.25) (0.45) (0.19) (0.23) (0.46) (0.24) (0.28) (0.45)
Fixed 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.00)
Temporary 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.17
(0.14) (0.17) (0.36) (0.12) (0.15) (0.35) (0.16) (0.19) (0.39)
Casual 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.08
(0.00) (0.11) (0.27) (0.00) (0.08) (0.26) (0.00) (0.13) (0.29)
14.14 7.47 6.67 16.06 8.14 7.60 12.43 6.68 5.50
(9.60) (8.44) (7.40) (10.35) (9.02) (7.95) (8.49) (7.61) (6.80)
Training 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.27
(0.39) (0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38) (0.45)
Union 0.72 0.24 0.11 0.74 0.27 0.13 0.72 0.20 0.08

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hourly wage 29.30 12.21 7.69 28.75 13.17 9.47 29.82 10.35 6.50
(26.65) (21.36) (18.74) (23.59) (17.87) (25.52) (29.14) (26.75) (12.08)
Years of schooling 11.53 8.92 6.78 10.88 8.62 6.98 12.11 9.49 6.64
(3.91) (3.70) (3.95) (4.11) (3.77) (3.90) (3.62) (3.51) (3.99)
Age 40.51 36.21 39.97 40.75 36.63 38.03 40.29 35.39 41.33
(9.89) (10.75) (12.18) (10.16) (10.96) (13.03) (9.63) (10.29) (11.35)
Female 0.53 0.34 0.59
(0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
Married 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.66 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.35 0.44


















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Permanent 0.84 0.65 0.38 0.87 0.68 0.26 0.82 0.60 0.45
(0.37) (0.48) (0.48) (0.34) (0.47) (0.44) (0.39) (0.49) (0.50)
Fixed 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04
(0.23) (0.27) (0.19) (0.23) (0.27) (0.20) (0.24) (0.28) (0.19)
Temporary 0.08 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.15 0.43 0.10 0.17 0.34
(0.27) (0.36) (0.48) (0.23) (0.36) (0.49) (0.30) (0.38) (0.47)
Casual 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.10 0.16
(0.13) (0.28) (0.40) (0.14) (0.26) (0.43) (0.13) (0.30) (0.37)
9.89 5.51 4.32 10.66 6.02 3.62 9.20 4.50 4.76
(9.10) (7.24) (6.17) (9.27) (7.78) (5.56) (8.88) (5.93) (6.50)
Training 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.06
(0.36) (0.34) (0.25) (0.38) (0.35) (0.27) (0.34) (0.33) (0.23)
Union 0.72 0.29 0.02 0.73 0.31 0.01 0.70 0.25 0.02

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hourly wage 26.97 11.73 8.80 28.69 12.16 11.15 25.09 11.09 7.20
(22.98) (14.40) (11.43) (24.40) (15.43) (15.55) (21.21) (12.68) (6.97)
Years of schooling 10.63 8.63 6.80 10.32 8.18 7.32 10.99 9.28 6.44
(3.54) (3.43) (3.59) (3.64) (3.61) (3.68) (3.39) (3.04) (3.43)
Age 39.67 35.77 40.80 40.01 36.61 39.42 39.28 34.57 41.76
(10.49) (11.15) (10.95) (10.51) (11.70) (11.93) (10.47) (10.20) (10.12)
Female 0.46 0.41 0.59
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Married 0.63 0.53 0.58 0.71 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.45 0.57


















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Permanent 0.83 0.72 0.51 0.85 0.73 0.33 0.81 0.69 0.61
(0.37) (0.45) (0.50) (0.36) (0.44) (0.47) (0.39) (0.46) (0.49)
Fixed 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.02
(0.26) (0.22) (0.16) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.12)
Temporary 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.11
(0.22) (0.23) (0.32) (0.20) (0.26) (0.33) (0.24) (0.20) (0.31)
Casual 0.04 0.11 0.34 0.04 0.11 0.47 0.04 0.12 0.26
(0.19) (0.32) (0.47) (0.19) (0.31) (0.50) (0.19) (0.33) (0.44)
11.11 6.08 4.84 11.53 6.47 2.94 10.62 5.52 5.90
(9.90) (7.49) (7.10) (9.87) (7.95) (5.21) (9.93) (6.76) (7.78)
Training 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.05
(0.37) (0.27) (0.22) (0.35) (0.27) (0.22) (0.39) (0.28) (0.22)
Union 0.69 0.25 0.04 0.71 0.24 0.02 0.66 0.27 0.05

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hourly wage 42.89 29.91 20.57 46.14 32.92 23.17 35.70 23.70 12.31
(35.84) (33.19) (25.66) (40.50) (37.41) (27.97) (21.59) (20.87) (14.28)
Years of schooling 13.01 11.71 10.10 12.85 11.59 10.16 13.29 11.94 9.93
(2.30) (2.17) (2.76) (2.44) (2.15) (2.86) (2.03) (2.20) (2.50)
Age 38.38 38.09 38.60 39.85 38.87 38.57 35.79 36.54 38.71
(9.49) (10.96) (10.81) (9.77) (11.31) (10.76) (8.49) (10.07) (11.38)
Female 0.36 0.33 0.24
(0.48) (0.47) (0.43)
Married 0.72 0.71 0.62 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.50


















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Permanent 0.97 0.86 0.47 0.97 0.86 0.45 0.97 0.86 0.50
(0.17) (0.35) (0.51) (0.17) (0.35) (0.52) (0.16) (0.35) (0.55)
Fixed 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.17
(0.00) (0.25) (0.33) (0.00) (0.26) (0.30) (0.00) (0.23) (0.41)
Temporary 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00
(0.14) (0.19) (0.24) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)
Casual 0.01 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.05 0.33
(0.10) (0.19) (0.47) (0.00) (0.18) (0.47) (0.16) (0.22) (0.52)
9.54 7.32 6.06 10.51 7.57 3.64 7.84 6.89 10.50
(8.15) (7.74) (7.77) (8.44) (8.06) (4.84) (7.43) (7.17) (10.46)
Training 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.07
(0.33) (0.33) (0.26) (0.35) (0.33) (0.26) (0.31) (0.34) (0.27)
Union 0.66 0.37 0.06 0.73 0.37 0.10 0.53 0.36 0.00


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 54 2,551 1,053 35 1,769 576 19 782 477
Mining and quarrying 21 872 5 20 794 4 1 76 1
Manufacturing 92 2,404 458 72 1,625 209 19 779 249
Electricity, gas and water supply 82 72 7 64 59 7 18 13 0
Construction 133 1,153 707 67 1,010 634 66 142 73
Wholesale and retail trade 92 3,599 1,882 50 1,838 705 42 1,760 1,176
Transport, storage and communication 201 543 199 154 450 174 47 93 24
Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and
business services
166 1,486 108 94 846 67 71 639 41
Community, social and personal services 3,642 1,107 298 1,638 413 117 2,002 693 181
Private households 12 108 2,350 4 24 487 8 84 1,862
Exterior organisations and foreign government 3 5 0 1 4 0 2 1 0
Unspecified 1 12 9 1 6 6 0 6 3























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Legislators, senior officials and managers 218 1,016 161 151 706 105 67 310 56
Professionals 784 482 37 297 265 18 484 217 19
Technical and associate professionals 1,128 854 154 376 459 78 752 395 76
Clerks 565 1,505 47 204 435 16 361 1,067 31
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 672 1,687 636 415 922 204 256 764 432
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 23 323 757 18 253 360 5 70 397
Craft and related trades workers 232 2,000 1,123 209 1,696 837 23 304 286
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 183 1,951 206 161 1,633 183 22 317 22
Elementary Occupation 683 3,994 1,976 366 2,453 1,050 317 1,540 925
Domestic workers 9 87 1,969 1 8 129 8 79 1,839
Unspecified 2 13 10 2 8 6 0 5 4
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8. RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF MARGINAL RETURN TO SCHOOLING 
This section presents the results of the estimation of the marginal returns to schooling. 
The following analysis was conducted: 1) ordinary least squares (OLS); 2) two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) to control for endogeneity of schooling; 3) two-step selection correction models; 
and 4) the combination of 2SLS and two-step selection correction model controlling for both 
endogeneity of education and sample selection bias from sector choice and labor force 
participation. The regressions were conducted for the three sectors identified before: public, 
formal private and informal private sectors, and was disaggregated for males and females, and 
for different races. Although the results are presented for all four models examined, for 
comparability and robustness purposes, the fourth model is the most sophisticated one because it 
corrects for both the endogeneity of education and sector sample selection bias.  
8.1. OLS Results 
The simplest method used was ordinary least squares (OLS), carried out by sector, gender, 
and race. Table 8.1 shows the coefficient of years of schooling, its robust standard error, and the 
number of observations in each OLS regression.1 The coefficients of years of schooling are all 
significant at the 1% or 5% level, except for a few cases where sample sizes were small. (the 
results for the informal private sector for male and female Asians are not reported because of the 
very small sample size).  
Columns (1), (2), and (3) display the results for the total sample. The marginal return to 
schooling in the public sector is 13.7%, the highest among the three sectors. The marginal return 
                                                 





to schooling in the formal private sector is 9.6%, which is approximately 4% points lower than 
the one in the public sector. The marginal return to schooling in the informal private is 4.4%, a 
third of the one in the public sector and less than half of the one in the formal private sector. 
These results thus show positive returns to schooling in the informal private sector, but much 
lower than the ones in other sectors.  
The results are similar for males and females. The marginal returns to schooling in the 
public, formal private, and informal private sectors are, respectively, 11.4%, 9.5%, and 5.3% for 
males and 16%, 10%, and 3.9% for females. Therefore, the difference in the marginal return to 
schooling between the public and formal private sectors is 4.1% overall, 1.9% for males, and 6% 
for females; the difference between the public and informal private sectors is 9.3% overall, 6.2% 
for male, and 12.1% for female; the difference between the formal and informal private sectors is 
5.2% for total, 4.2% for males, and 6.1% for females. Therefore, the gaps in rates of return to 
education between sectors are greater for females. 
The patterns in marginal returns to schooling among different sectors by race are very 
similar to those for the total, male and female, samples, although there are some differences for 
specific population groups. Also, we cannot make good inferences about male and female Whites 
and male and female Asians because of the very small sample sizes available for these groups. 
The difference in marginal returns to schooling between the public and formal private sectors 
(the marginal return to schooling in the public sector minus the one in the formal private sector) 
is generally positive and ranges from -1.7% to 17.2%. The differential in marginal returns to 
schooling between the public and informal private sectors varies from 5.8% to 12.3% in 




and informal private sectors is between 3.4% to 5.7% in subgroups by race and gender. 2 
The returns to schooling in the public sector are the highest among Whites, followed by 
Asians. The marginal return to schooling in the public sector is 18.5% for Whites, 13.6% for 
Blacks, 13.8% for Coloreds, and 17.1% for Asians. The returns to schooling in the formal private 
sector are also highest for Whites, followed by Asians,.and then Blacks and Colored. The 
marginal returns to schooling in the formal private sector are 16.4% for Whites, 8.8% for Blacks, 
10.7% for Coloreds, and 14.7% for Asians. The marginal returns to schooling in the informal 
private sector are 4.2% for Blacks and 5.7% for Colored. The marginal returns to schooling for 
Whites and Asians are 9.4% and 4%, but these are statistically insignificant partly because the 
sample sizes for White and Asian workers in the informal sector are very small. 
When disaggregated by gender, the results for males and females are very similar to the 
overall results just reported. There are, however, some differences. The marginal return to 
schooling in the public sector is higher for males than females for Whites, while it is lower for 
Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians.  
8.2. Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares Controlling for Endogeneity of Education 
Next, the results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis are reported, conducted to 
control for the endogeneity of education. First, tests to check the validity of the instrument are 
shown. Then, the 2SLS estimation results are presented.  
8.2.1. Tests for the instrument 
Table 8.3 shows the statistics to test the endogeneity of years of schooling for the overall 
sample. Specifically, it presents the results of the Wu-Hausman F test, and the test of excluded 
                                                 
2White and Asian samples were excluded from the analysis of the difference in marginal return to schooling 




instrument (or weak identification test). 
The Wu-Hausman test examines the endogeneity of years of schooling. It checks whether 
the coefficient of the residual is statistically different from zero. It also examines the null 
hypothesis that that education is exogenous (i.e., there is no statistically significant difference 
between the OLS and IV estimates). The ordinary least squares estimator fails if there is 
correlation between an explanatory variable and the error term. The instrumental variables 
estimator can be used when the ordinary least squares estimator has this problem. Hausman 
(1978) suggested comparing the OLS and 2SLS estimators of the coefficient of a variable of 
interest as a formal test of endogeneity: if the y2 is uncorrelated with u1, the OLS and 2SLS 
estimators should differ only by sampling error. 
The test of excluded instruments is the test of weak instrument. It calculates the 
F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates of the instrumental variable in 
the first-stage regression are not different from zero. This test is important because when the 
partial correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable is weak, 
instrumental-variables regression is biased in the direction of the OLS estimator (e.g., Staiger & 
Stock, 1997). Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that F-statistics (or the corresponding 
p-values) from the first-stage regression be routinely reported in the studies using instrumental 
variables. The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments should be excluded from the 
first-stage regressions (i.e., the relevance of the instruments). The logic is that when the 
F-statistic is small (or the p-value is large), the instrumental variable estimations and the 
corresponding standard errors are unreliable (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995; Staiger & Stock, 
1997; Stock & Yogo, 2004). 




recommended when one estimates the General Moment Method (GMM). For example, if one 
calculates the robust standard error, one needs to use the weak identification test instead of the 
test of excluded instrument. The weak identification test uses the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F-statistic and evaluates its statistical significance based on the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values. In this analysis, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is the same as the F-statistics for 
the test of excluded instrument.  
It should be noted that the model has one instrument for one endogenous variable, and 
therefore the model is just identified. This means one cannot conduct the overidentification test 
because overidentification tests can be conducted only when there are more instruments than 
endogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2002b).  
As indicated in Table 8.3, the Wu-Hausman test shows that there are statistically 
significant differences between OLS and 2SLS estimates and that years of schooling is the 
endogenous variable for the public, formal private, and informal private sectors, respectively, for 
the samples including gender and all races, as well as the male sample and female sample at less 
than the 2.5% level. Also, according to Table 8.4 and Table 8.5, statistically significant 
differences between OLS and 2SLS estimates exist for most of the estimation by sector, race, and 
gender at the 5% level, with some minor exceptions due to small sample sizes.  
The tests for excluded instrument show strong correlations between the instrument 
(spouse’s years of schooling) and years of schooling for the total sample, male sample, and 
female sample for all races and most of the sub-samples by race and gender. The F-statistics 
range from 7.92 to 939.69, most of which are well above the critical value, 10, which was 
suggested by Stock and Watson (2003, p348-372) as being a critical value. Spouse’s years of 




females working in the public sector. The F-statistics are 7.92 for Asian males working in the 
public sector and 8.35 for Asian females working in the public sector. Also the F-statistics are 
above the critical values for weak instruments, as recommended by Stock, Wright, and Yogo 
(2002). Therefore, the instrument used is strong enough to make an inference for the finite 
sample, except for some specific sub-samples by race and gender. 
8.2.2. Two-stage least square estimations 
Next, the results of the estimation using 2SLS are reviewed. Table 8.5 shows the 
coefficients on years of schooling, with robust standard errors, and the number of observations in 
each 2SLS regression.. As explained in the methods section, the model uses the spouse’s years of 
schooling as the instrumental variable. Therefore, the sample covered in the model is only the 
group of married people.  
For comparison, the results of OLS estimation by sector, gender, and race for married 
people are shown in the Table 8.2. The OLS results for married people are not much different 
from those for both single and married. Again, the coefficients for the years of schooling variable 
are mostly significant at the 1% level, with just a few exceptions for sub-groups with small 
observations.  
The 2SLS coefficients for the rate of return to education are several percentage points 
higher than the OLS estimates across different sectors, gender, and race. This suggests that in this 
South African sample, there is a downward bias in the return to schooling because of unobserved 
individual characteristics such as ability, which is the opposite of the theory developed by Card 
(1995, 1999), as presented in Chapter 5. Also, the marginal return to schooling in the formal 
private sector is now greater than that in the public sector, both for total sample and many 




gender and race, and this result remains the same as in the OLS estimations.  
These are the specific results obtained for the total sample, which includes all races. The 
marginal return to schooling in the public sector is now 17.0%, while it is 12.3% for the OLS 
estimation for married people and 13.7% for the OLS estimation for both single and married 
people. The 2SLS estimate is 4.7 percentage points higher than the OLS estimates for the 
married sample, and 3.3 percentage points higher than the OLS estimates for the total sample. 
The marginal return to schooling in the formal private sector is 19.5% for the 2SLS, compared to 
10.2% for the OLS for married people and 9.6% in the OLS for the total sample. Therefore, the 
2SLS estimate is 9.3% higher than the OLS estimates for married and 9.9% higher than the OLS 
estimates for total. The rate of return in the informal private sector for 2SLS is 12.3%, which is 
also much larger than OLS estimations (5.2% for the sample of married people and 4.4% for the 
total sample). The 2SLS estimate is 7.1% higher than the OLS estimates for married and 7.9% 
higher than the OLS estimates for total. The downward bias in the OLS estimate is the largest in 
the formal private sector, followed by the informal private sector. Also, the marginal returns 
increased for the sub-samples by gender and race as well. The marginal return to schooling in the 
formal private sector becomes greater than the one in the public sector. 
8.3. Two-Step Selection Correction Model 
Next, the results of the two-step selection correction models are discussed. As reviewed 
in Chapter 7, several selection correction methods are available. The general finding is that the 
marginal return to schooling in the formal private sector is higher than the one in the informal 
private sector, although the difference tends to be smaller compared to 2SLS and OLS in some of 
the two-step selection correction models (DMF variant 1, DMF variant 1, and Dahl 2). This is 




insufficient observations. Also, the marginal return to schooling in the public sector becomes 
smaller after controlling for sample selection bias, compared to the OLS and 2SLS. In the choice 
equation here, the level of education dummies are used instead of the years of schooling 
continuous variable. This is because multicollinearities seem to occur between the selection 
correction terms and 2SLS, which is the next model. To compare with the next model, the 
two-step selection correction model uses the level of education dummies.  
8.3.1. Tests for the validity of the exclusion restriction 
In order to meet the exclusion restriction, spouse formal private sector, spouse informal 
private sector, household formal private sector, and household informal private sector dummies 
were added in the choice model.3 The assumption is that the types of sector of employment for 
spouse and household members would affect the choice of the sector of workers, but would not 
directly affect the earnings of workers. There is no established method to test the exclusion 
restriction in the two-step selection correction model, but McEwan (2001) used informal 
specification tests. McEwan (2001) checked whether the coefficients of (possible) instruments in 
the choice model were large enough and statistically significant; and added the instruments in the 
second stage equation to see if they had effects on the dependent variable. 
Table 8.6 shows the marginal effects and standard errors of spouse formal private sector, 
spouse informal private sector, household formal private sector, and household informal private 
sector dummies. These indicate that the sector of employment for spouse and household 
members do affect the sectoral choice of workers. The correlation between spouse informal 
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also considered. However, they caused a conformability error. Therefore, spouse public sector and household public 




private, household formal private, household informal private, and sector choice was statistically 
significant across sector, with the exception of household formal private and household informal 
private for the formal private sector choice. Also, the joint effect of these dummies was 
statistically significant. Therefore, one can assume that the sector of employment for spouse and 
household members affect the sectoral choice of workers.  
Next, wage equations were estimated, including spouse and household dummies as 
additional explanatory variables. The significant correlations between these dummies and 
earnings suggest that the exclusion restriction is not valid. Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 show the 
coefficients of spouse and household sector dummies and the joint significance of their effects in 
wage equations. Most of the coefficients are not statistically significant across sector, race, and 
gender. Also, the joint significance tests indicate that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of spouse and household sector dummies were jointly equal to 0 for most of the 
groups. The results show that correcting for selection bias could be less appropriate for total in 
the public sector, total in the formal private sector, males in the formal private sector, females in 
the public sector, total Blacks in the public and formal private sectors, male Blacks in the formal 
private sector, female Blacks in the informal private sector, total Coloreds in the public sector, 
and Colored females in the public sector.  
8.3.2. Results 
Table 8.9 shows the estimation results of the two-step selection model using different 
selection terms for total, male, and female. Also, Figure 8.1 shows the coefficients of marginal 
return to schooling in different sectors in different models. The two-step selection correction 
models estimated here only include married people in order to compare with the 2SLS, which 




with the OLS results.  
After controlling for sample selection bias, the magnitudes of coefficients became much 
smaller in the public sector across models, compared to the OLS estimations. The estimated 
marginal returns to schooling were unchanged in the formal private sector for Lee, DMF, and 
Dahl selection correction models, while they became much smaller for DMF variant 1, DMF 
variant 2, and Dahl 2, compared to the OLS results. The coefficients for the informal sector did 
not change or slightly changed for Lee, DMF, and Dahl 1. However, they decreased by 0.2 to 
1.7% points. 
After correcting for sector selection bias, the difference in the marginal return to 
schooling between the public and formal private sectors became much larger for the Lee, DMF, 
and Dahl 1 model, while it became smaller for the DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2, and Dahl 2, 
compared to the OLS. The gap ranged from 3.6% to 5.2% for the former models, and from 0.8% 
to 2.7%. The difference in the marginal return to schooling between the public and informal 
private sectors became much smaller across models, and the gap ranged from 0.3% to 2.6% 
across models. The difference between formal and informal private remained unchanged for Lee, 
DMF, and Dahl 1 models, with the gap ranging from 4.3% to 6.3%. It became smaller for DMF 
variant 1, DMF variant 2, and Dahl2; the difference was between 2% to 4.7% for the three 
models. In any event, the difference in return to schooling between the formal and informal 
private sectors still existed after controlling for the sample selection bias.  
The marginal return to schooling in the formal sector remains the highest among all 
sectors in the two-step selection models, except for the female sample where the marginal return 
to schooling in the public sector was the highest. To sum, the effect of the endogeneity of 




contrast, the effect of the endogeneity of schooling was much stronger than the effect of sector 
sample selection bias in the formal private sector, especially when we used Lee, DMF, and Dahl 
1 selection correction. The endogeneity of schooling affected the return to schooling to a greater 
degree in the informal sector, while the sample selection bias did not affect it very much.  
Tables 8.10-8.15 display the marginal return to schooling by race and gender estimated 
by the Lee, DMF, DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2, Dahl 1, and Dahl 2 two-step selection 
correction methods. The findings for Blacks were the same as the sample of all races. The 
changes between the OLS/2SLS and the two-step selection correction for Coloreds were also 
similar to the estimations for the sample of all races, except that the marginal return to schooling 
in the informal sector became lower in DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2, and Dahl 2 models, 
compared to the OLS. In contrast, the results for Whites and Asians were very different. For 
example, the marginal return to schooling in the public sector was not much different from the 
OLS and 2SLS for the total White sample across models, while it usually had the opposite trend 
for the total sample and other groups. For the White male sample, the marginal return to 
schooling in the public sector was also similar to the OLS and 2SLS, but was much lower in the 
model with the Dahl 2 selection correction. The marginal returns to schooling in the public sector 
in the two-step selection correction models were similar to OLS, but much lower than the 2SLS 
for White females. Although the trends of change for total and male Asians were similar to the 
sample of all races, female Asians had different trends. The marginal return to schooling in the 
public sector in the two-step selection correction for female Asians was similar to that in the OLS 
and 2SLS, except for the DMF variant 1 estimation, which was much lower than the OLS and 
2SLS, and the Dahl 1, Dahl 2, and DMF variant 2 estimations, which were much higher than the 




As we have seen, the rates of return to schooling in the formal sector were usually very 
different between the Lee/DMF/Dahl 1 and DMF variant 1/DMF variant 2/Dahl 2. Based on 
discussions by Bourguignon et al. (2007) and the observed multicollinearity between some 
selection correction terms and the two-stage least square, the study used the DMF variant 1 
selection correction as the main selection correction term. Although the next section shows the 
results of 2SLS with all selection corrections, only the DMF variant 1 was used for the quantile 
regression, the piecewise linear spline function, and a robustness check. 
8.4. Results of the 2SLS with Selection Correction Estimation 
Table 8.16 displays the results of the 2SLS/two-step selection estimation model. This 
model controls for both endogeneity of education and sector sample selection bias. Therefore, 
this model provides the most comprehensive estimate of the marginal rate of return to schooling 
in different sectors obtained in this dissertation. As pointed out earlier, several sample selection 
correction methods are available. For this analysis, different models with different selection 
corrections were estimated. It should be noted that the level of education dummies were used 
instead of the years of schooling continuous variable in the choice equation because 
multicollinearities seem to occur between the selection correction terms and 2SLS. Figure 8.6 
shows the results of different models including the OLS and 2SLS. 
The estimated marginal returns to schooling may vary from method to method used. As 
indicated by Bourguignon et al. (2007), the Lee selection correction works for only small 
samples, and the Dubin and McFadden variant 1, Dubin and McFadden variant 2, and Dahl 2 
work better. However, the Dahl 2 correction method seems to lead to multicollinearity in smaller 
samples such as sub-samples by race and gender because the selection correction consists of 




correction. Bourguignon et al. (2007) also mentions that the DMF variant 2 is less robust than the 
DMF and DMF variant 1. 
Table 8.16 and Figure 8.6 indicate that, overall, the marginal returns to schooling does 
not change much in the public sector for the total sample and for males across the various models, 
when compared to the 2SLS, while it became even higher than 2SLS estimations (i.e., also 
higher than OLS estimations) for females across all models. The marginal return to schooling in 
the formal private sector does not change for the total sample, for the male and female samples in 
the 2SLS models with the Lee, DMF and Dah1 selection corrections. However, it is much higher 
for the total, male and female in the 2SLS models with the DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2 and 
Dahl 2 selection correction. The marginal return to schooling in the informal private sector does 
not change significantly for the total, male and female samples in the 2SLS with the Lee, DMF, 
and Dahl 1; it did became higher for the three samples in the DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2 and 
Dahl 2.  
Tables 8.17-8.22 display the marginal returns to schooling estimated by the 2SLS with 
different selection correction methods by race and gender. Also, Figures 8.7-10 show the 
estimated marginal return to schooling in different models including the OLS and 2SLS for 
different race groups and by gender. The changes in the estimates of the return to schooling 
between the OLS and 2SLS, and the 2SLS with selection correction for Blacks are similar to the 
changes observed for samples of all races except that the marginal return to schooling in the 
public sector is higher in the 2SLS with any selection correction compared to 2SLS for total 
Black and that the increase in the marginal return to schooling in the public sector is much 
sharper across different models with different selection correction.  




DMF, and Dahl 1 selection correction becomes lower than the one estimated by the 2SLS and 
slightly higher than the OLS estimates for total Colored; they get a few percentage point higher 
than the 2SLS for male Colored; and they became negative but statistically insignificant for 
Colored female. The marginal returns in the public sector estimated by the 2SLS with DMF 
variant 1, DMF variant 2, and Dahl 2 selection corrections is lower than the 2SLS estimate and 
similar to the OLS estimate for total Colored, while they are even higher than the 2SLS estimate 
for male Colored. They are again negative and statistically insignificant for female Colored. The 
estimations in other sectors for Colored are similar to the ones for the overall sample.  
The estimated marginal returns to schooling in the public sector in the 2SLS with 
different selection corrections are much higher than the 2SLS estimation for total Whites. Also 
the marginal returns to schooling estimated by the 2SLS with DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2 and 
Dahl 2 selection corrections are lower than the 2SLS and OLS estimates for White male, 
especially the one estimated by the 2SLS/Dahl 2 is much lower than other estimates for White 
male. The marginal returns to schooling in the public and formal private sector in the 2SLS/DMF 
variant 1, 2SLS/DMF variant 2, and 2SLS/Dahl 2 are much greater than the ones estimated by 
the 2SLS and OLS.  
Asians have very different rates of return when compared to other groups. First of all, the 
marginal returns to schooling in the public sector for Asians are all statistically insignificant 
when estimated by the 2SLS with selection corrections. Although they are statistically 
insignificant, the changes in the magnitude between models are explained here. The marginal 
returns to schooling in the public sector estimated by the 2SLS with selection corrections are 
similar to the OLS and 2SLS estimates for Asian total; they are lower than the OLS and 2SLS 




2SLS with the Lee and DMF are lower than the OLS and 2SLS estimates for Asian female, while 
the ones estimated by the 2SLS with DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2, Dahl 1 and Dahl 2 is much 
greater than the OLS and 2SLS estimates for Asian female. The marginal returns to schooling in 
the formal sector for Asians estimated by the 2SLS with Lee, DMF and Dahl 1 are statistically 
significant while the ones estimated by the 2SLS with DMF variant 1, DMF variant 2 and Dahl 2 
are not statistically significant.   
The marginal return to schooling is higher in the formal private sector than the one in the 
public sector for most of subgroups as we also observe in the 2SLS estimations except for the 
one in for female estimated by the 2SLS with Lee, DMF, DMF variant, DMF variant 2 and Dahl 
selection correction, White total, White female, Black total estimated by the 2SLS with Lee, 
DMF and Dahl 1, Black female and Asian female estimated by the 2SLS with all selection 
corrections. Also the marginal return to schooling in the informal private sector is still lower than 
the one in the public sector even both endogeneity of education and sample selection bias are 
taken into account. Furthermore the return to schooling in the informal sector is the lowest across 
different groups except for most of the 2SLS/selection correction models for Colored total, male 
and female.         
Table 8.19 displays the 2SLS estimates with the DMF variant 1 selection correction 
model in more detail. The marginal return to schooling in the public sector for the total samplel 
is now 18.1%; one percentage point higher than the 2SLS estimate, and 4.4 percentage points 
higher than the OLS estimate. The marginal return to schooling in the formal private sector is 
25.1%; 5.6% points higher than the 2SLS, and 15.5% higher than the OLS. The marginal return 
to schooling is now 16.8%, which is 4.5% points higher than the 2SLS, and 12.4% points higher 




selection correction is much greater for Whites in the public and formal private sector, and Black 
females in the public sector. The marginal return to schooling in the public sector for the overall 
White sample is now 31.3%, compared to 22.4% in the 2SLS and 18.5% in the OLS. The one in 
the formal private sector for Whites is 49.2%, compared to 26.0% in the 2SLS and 16.4% in the 
OLS. The marginal return to schooling in the public sector for Black females is 40.4%, 16.3% 
points greater than the one in the 2SLS, and 24.6% points greater than the one in the OLS.  
The difference in the marginal return to schooling between the public and formal private 
sector is -7.0% for total, -9.7% for males, and 1.8% for females; the gap is greater than the 2SLS 
estimate for the total and male samples. The difference in the marginal return to schooling 
between the public and informal private sector is 1.3% for total, 0.2% for male, and 8.4% for 
female, which is smaller than the 2SLS estimates. The differential in the marginal return to 
schooling between the formal and informal private sector is now 8.3% for total, 9.9% for male, 
and 6.6% for female in the sample including all races. Looking the results by race, the difference 
in returns to schooling between the formal and informal private sectors is 7.3% for Black total, 
11.1% for Black male, 3.4% for Black female, 13.2% for Colored total, 10.9% for Colored male, 
and 16.1% for Colored female. The difference is especially large for Colored female.    
The findings in the 2SLS with the selection correction model above confirm the 
substantial difference in the rate of return to schooling between the formal and informal private 
sectors, as well as the differences between the public and formal private sector. The difference in 
return to schooling between the public and informal private sector also exist but it is much 





8.5. Robustness Check  
We have already found that the lower return to schooling in the informal sector compared 
to the public and formal sectors was robust across gender and race in the models employed above. 
This section pursues a further robustness check on the relative size of returns to schooling by 
sector. First, the 2SLS estimation with the DMF variant 1 selection correction was conducted 
using different definitions of the informal sector. Second, the researcher conducted the 2SLS 
estimations with DMF variant 1 selection correction model with district dummies, occupation 
dummies, and industry dummies. 
First, the definition of the informal sector was changed based on the definition of the 
informal employment by Statistics South Africa (2010), introduced in Chapter 2. This 
newly-used definition focuses more on informal employment, not on working in the informal 
sector. According to Statistics South Africa (2010), informal workers (not workers in the 
informal sector) are workers in the informal sector, employees in the formal sector, and 
individuals working in private households who lack entitlements to basic benefits such as 
pension or medical aid and do not have a written contract of employment. We used three 
variations of the dependent variable based on this definition. The first definition is “working in 
the informal private sector and/or working without a written contract in the private sector.” 
Because the nature of the public sector is different from that of the private sector, workers 
without written contracts in the public sector were not included in the category above. Instead, a 
new category, the public informal employment, was introduced. The second definition of 
informal employment in the private sector is “working in the informal private sector, without any 
of medical aid/health insurance and pension/retirement fund” in the private sector. The third 




written contract, medical aid/health insurance, and retirement fund.” 
Table 8.23 presents the results of the 2SLS estimation with DMF variant 1 selection 
correction using the definition of the informal employment as those who work in the informal 
sector and/or without written contract. Using this definition, the difference in returns to schooling 
between the formal private and informal private sectors becomes smaller but is still significant, 
except for Black females where the difference is only 0.8%.  
Table 8.24 presents the results of the 2SLS estimation with DMF variant 1 selection 
correction using the definition of informal employment as those who are working in the informal 
sector and/or without any written contract, medical aid/health insurance or pension/retirement 
fund. The difference in returns to schooling between the formal private and informal private 
sectors is still substantial.  
Further analysis was carried out using yet another definition of informal employment. 
These results are reported in Table 8.25. The definition of the informal employment is now those 
who lack any of the following: written contract, medical aid/health insurance, and 
pension/retirement fund. Again the difference in returns to schooling between the formal and 
informal sector is significant.      
Table 8.26 displays the coefficient of the schooling variable in the 2SLS model with the 
DMF variant 1 with additional explanatory variables. The patterns in the return to schooling were 
similar to those reported earlier even after controlling for district, industry, and occupation. There 
is still a significant difference in return to schooling between the formal private and informal 
sectors. The findings are robust across race and gender (See Tables 8.26-30). 
In additional analysis carried out, self-employed, head of company dummies were 




Self-employed and head of company are highly correlated with other variables (such as trade 
union participation and permanent status) already in the equation.  
8.6. Results of the Wage Decomposition Analysis 
The results in the previous sections showed the gap between returns to schooling in the 
informal private sector and the formal private sector and/or the public sector. Even controlling 
for the endogeneity of education and sample selection into sectors, we find a significant gap 
between the informal and formal sectors across gender and race. This seems to validate the dual 
market theory stated earlier: there appear to be two labor markets with different structures and 
mechanisms, including the compensation they provide to the educational attainment of workers. 
However, which variables explain the most the wage gaps between the formal and informal 
sectors? Is it possible that the wage gap is not due to differences in the characteristics of workers 
employed in each sector and is mostly responsive to the rewards that are offered to education or 
other characteristics in the two sectors? 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was employed with the 2SLS and Heckman selection 
correction models used to control for the endogeneity of education and sample selection into 
sectors. To summarize: the results show that the lower coefficients on the education variable in 
the informal sector played a more important role in explaining wage differentials between the 
formal and informal sector than the differences in average schooling endowments between 
workers in the two sectors. On the other hand, differences in average schooling tended to 
contribute much more to wage differentials between the public and private sectors.  
Table 8.30 shows the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition, indicating the 
contribution of differences in worker’s average educational endowment relative to the 




the 2SLS with the Heckman selection correction for the sample of all races. The role of 
differences in the workers’ average education endowment was greater than the role of differences 
in the return to schooling, when comparing workers in the public and formal private sectors and 
workers in the public and informal private sectors. In contrast, the differences in the returns to 
schooling had a greater impact on the wage differentials between the formal and informal private 
sectors, compared to differences in workers’ average education endowment. This result also 
generally held  for the male and female samples. except for the wage differentials between the 
public and formal private sectors for male workers. The differences in returns to schooling 
affected the wage differentials between the formal and informal sectors than the differences in 
average education endowment.  
Tables 8.31 presents the contribution of differences in workers’ average educational 
endowments relative to the contribution of differences in the returns to education to the earnings 
differentials in the 2SLS with the Heckman selection correction derived from of the 
Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition for the samples of different races. The estimation of wage 
differentials between the public and informal private sectors and between the formal private and 
informal private sectors are not available for Whites and Asians because of insufficient 
observations. Despite some exceptions, the trends for Blacks and Coloreds were similar, 
especially for wage differentials between the formal private and informal private sectors: the role 
of differences in the return to schooling was more important for wage differentials between the 
formal private and informal private sectors, compared to the role of differences in average 




8.7. Heterogeneity of Returns to Schooling 
8.7.1. Results of the estimation of quantile regressions 
This section presents the results obtained from the quantile regressions model. Table 8.32 
and Figure 8.1 show the marginal returns to schooling across different points of the (conditional) 
wage distribution in different sectors, estimated by ordinary quantile regression, instrumental 
variable quantile regression, and instrumental variable quantile regression with selection 
correction of sector choice. To summarize: these results show that the conditional distributions of 
earnings given years of schooling were significantly different between the formal private and 
informal private sectors and do not often overlap in the model controlling both endogeneity of 
schooling and sample selection bias. The conditional distributions of earnings given years of 
schooling were similar between the public and informal private sector for the total sample and 
for males, while they are different for females across racial groups. The conditional distribution 
of earnings given years of schooling was very different between the public and formal private 
sectors across gender and race. 
The results of the ordinary quantile regression equations are presented in Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) in Table 8.32 and the first figure in Figure 8.1. Returns to schooling in the public 
sector were the highest at the 10th quantile, and then became lower as the quantile became higher. 
The marginal return to schooling at the 10th quantile was 15.8% while the one at the 90th 
conditional quantile was 12.8%. Returns to schooling in the formal private sector was the highest 
at the highest point of the wage distribution, and then became lower as the quantile decreased. 
The marginal return to schooling at the 10% quantile was 6.6% while the one at the 90% quantile 
was 11.6%. The marginal return to schooling in the informal private sector was the lowest at the 




(5.2%). The difference between the highest and lowest marginal return to schooling across 
quantiles in the formal private was the largest. The difference between the highest and lowest 
marginal return to schooling across quantiles in the informal private sector was the lowest: the 
distribution was much flatter than the distributions of other sectors. The differences in rates of 
return to education among the extreme quintiles in the public, formal private, and informal 
private sectors were 3 percentage points, 4.9 percentage points, and 1.5% percentage points, 
respectively.  
When the quantile regression equation was run with an instrumental variable to control 
for the endogeneity of education, the marginal return to schooling became higher in general (see 
columns (4), (5), and (6) in Table 8.32 and the first and second figures in Figure 8.1), as was seen 
in the two-stage least square model in the previous section. Also, the quantiles with the highest 
and lowest coefficients also slightly changed. The results for the public sector were still the same. 
Returns to schooling in the public sector were the highest at the lowest point of the wage 
distribution, and then became lower as the point of wage distribution gets lower. However, the 
lowest marginal return to schooling was not at the 90th quantile but the 75th quantile. Also, the 
marginal return to schooling at the 10th quantile was 5.5% point higher than that from the 
ordinary quantile regression, which was 21.3%. The marginal return to schooling at the 75th 
conditional quantile was 16.2%. Return to schooling in the formal private sector was the highest 
at the 50th quantile and the lowest at the 10th quantile. The marginal return to schooling in the 
formal private sector increased as the quantile became larger and then decreased after the 50th 
quantile. The marginal return to schooling in the informal private sector was the lowest at the 
90th conditional quantile and the highest at the 25th quantile. The marginal returns to schooling in 




marginal return to schooling became lower as the quantile increased between the 25th and 90th 
quantiles. The difference between the highest and lowest marginal returns to schooling across 
quantiles in three sectors was similar (around 1% point) in this model. The differences in the 
public, formal private, and informal private sectors were 5.1% point, 4.1% point, and 3.9% point, 
respectively. 
Next, a quantile regression with instrumental variable and selection correction was 
conducted to control for the endogeneity of both education and inter-sectoral allocation. 
Estimation results are presented in columns (7), (8), and (9) and the third figure in Figure 8.1. In 
this model, the Dubin and McFadden variant 1 selection correction term, suggested by 
Bourguignon et al. (2007), was used. In this model, the marginal return to schooling became 
higher than the two other models in general, as seen in the two-stage least square with selection 
correction model in the previous section. Also, the quantiles with the highest and lowest values 
were also slightly different from the two other models. Return to schooling in the public sector 
was the largest at the lowest point of the wage distribution (10th quantile here), then decreased as 
the point of wage distribution became lower. Thus, the lowest marginal return to schooling was 
at the 90th quantile. In addition, the marginal return to schooling at the 10th quantile was 22.7% 
while that at the 90th quartile was 17.0%. Return to schooling in the formal private sector was the 
highest at the 10th quantile and the lowest at the 90th quantile. The marginal return to schooling in 
the formal private sector decreased as the quantile became larger. The marginal return to 
schooling in the informal private sector was the lowest at the 90th conditional quantile (13.2%) 
and the highest at the 90th quantile (21.4%). The marginal returns to schooling in the informal 
private sector across quantiles were much larger than those of the other two models. The 




three sectors was higher than in the other two models as well, especially for the formal and 
informal private sectors. The differences between quantiles with the highest and lowest values 
were 5.8 percentage points in the public sector, 7.6 percentage points in the formal private sector, 
and 8.2 percentage points in the informal private sector.  
Looking at the results of the instrumental variable quantile regression with selection 
correction, the patterns in the returns to schooling in the three sectors were quite different and did 
not overlap at most of the quantiles. They were especially different between formal private and 
informal private sectors and public and informal private sectors. Marginal returns to schooling 
were the highest at the 10th quantile, which was the lowest quantile, and the lowest at the 90th 
quantile, the highest quantile, across sectors.  
Marginal returns to schooling at different quantiles by sector and gender are shown in 
Table 8.33 and Figure 8.2. The distributions of coefficients at different quantiles for female and 
male workers were quite different. The coefficient of years of schooling at different quantiles for 
the public sector continued to have a decreasing trend for males, but the highest value at the 10th 
quantile was much higher than that for the total sample. The value at the 10th quantile for the 
public sector was 33.4% for males and 22.7% for the total sample. Also, the distribution of 
coefficients for females in the public sector tended to increase—the opposite for the total sample 
and males. The distribution of the coefficients of years of schooling for males in the formal 
private sector was similar to that for total, but with a steeper curve. In contrast, the distribution of 
the coefficients for females in the formal private sector was very different: the curve is concave 
and the middle parts are lower than the 10th and 90th quantiles. The coefficient of years of 
schooling at different quantiles for the informal private sector had a slightly increasing trend for 




three sectors tended to overlap at lower quantiles for females but not for males. The return to 
schooling in the formal private sector was the highest at most quantiles for male. Return to 
schooling in the public sector was the highest at most quantiles for female. 
Tables 8.34-8.37 and Figures 8.7-8.10 display the marginal return to schooling at 
different quantiles by sector and gender for each population group, estimated by the instrumental 
variable quantile regression with DMF variant 1 selection correction. We observed the difference 
in trends by gender and race in the instrumental variable quantile regression. Again, the 
estimations in the informal sector for Whites and Asians are not available. Estimation by race 
shows that the formal private sectors had the greatest return to schooling at any quantiles except 
for Black female and Asians but the distributions of return to schooling in the public and 
informal private sectors were similar and/or sometimes overlapped for Black total, Black males, 
Colored males. Black females and Colored females had different trends: the public sector had the 
highest return to schooling at most quantiles for Blacks, and the public sector has the lowest 
return to schooling at most quantiles for Coloreds. 
8.7.2. Results of the estimation of piecewise spline function 
Table 8.38 shows the estimated marginal return to schooling, using the piecewise linear 
spline function. This model controls only for sample selection into sectors (by DMF variant 1 
selection correction), not endogeneity of education. This is because the model has several 
variables for education and it is difficult to control for the endogeneity of different levels of 
education. In general, convex marginal returns to schoolings were observed, suggesting that 
schooling has more impact on earnings as the level of education increases. This is especially true 
for the formal private and informal private sectors.  




the public, formal private, and informal private sectors. The marginal return to schooling was the 
highest for upper secondary education, followed by that for higher education, in the public sector. 
The marginal return to schooling was the lowest for lower secondary education in the public 
sector. The marginal returns to upper secondary and higher education were much higher than the 
marginal returns to primary and lower secondary education. The marginal returns to primary, 
lower secondary, upper secondary, and higher education in the public sector were 3.8%, 2.0%, 
18.2%, and 14.1%, respectively. The marginal return to schooling was the highest for higher 
education in the formal and informal private sectors, followed by that for upper secondary 
education. The marginal returns to schooling were the lowest for primary education, followed by 
that for lower secondary education, in the formal and informal private sectors. In both the formal 
and informal private sectors, the marginal returns to higher education were much higher than 
those for other levels of education. The marginal returns to schooling in the formal private sector 
were 5.5% for primary, 7.1% for lower secondary, 10.4% for upper secondary, and 35.2% for 
higher education. The marginal returns to primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and higher 
education in the informal private sector were 2.8%, 7.9%, 9.2%, and 40.8%, respectively. It is 
interesting to see that the marginal returns to higher education were the highest in the informal 
sector. 
The marginal returns to different levels of education had similar characteristics for both 
male and female, with some exceptions. For example, the marginal return to primary education 
in the public sector was lower than that to lower secondary for males. The marginal return to 
upper secondary education in the public sector was lower than that to higher education for males. 
Also, the marginal return to lower secondary education in the informal sector was higher than 




returns to lower secondary and higher education in the public sector were higher for males than 
for females, while the marginal returns to primary and upper secondary education in the public 
sector were higher for females than for males. The marginal returns to different level of 
education in the formal private sector were higher for females than for males, except for primary 
education. In contrast, the marginal returns to primary and upper secondary education in the 
informal private sector were higher for males, while the marginal returns to lower secondary and 
higher education were higher for females. 
Table 8.30 show the estimated marginal returns to schooling using the piecewise linear 
spline function by sector and gender for different population groups. The results for Blacks are 
similar to the sample of all races. For Coloreds, the marginal return to higher education is the 
highest in the public sector for Colored total, and Colored females, while the marginal return to 
upper secondary is the highest in the public sector for Colored males. Also the marginal return to 
primary schooling is the highest in the informal private sector for Colored total and Colored 
female while the marginal return to upper secondary is the highest for the Colored male. The 
trends for Whites and Asians are very different. The marginal return to schooling is the highest 
for higher education in the public sector for total and female Whites, while it is the highest for 
lower secondary for male Whites4. The marginal return to schooling is the highest for lower 
secondary education in the formal private sector for total and male Whites; it is the highest for 
higher education for female Whites. The most of coefficients are not statistically significant for 
Asians but the marginal return to higher education is the highest in the formal private sector for 
total Asians, while the marginal return to primary education is the highest in the formal private 
                                                 




sector for female Asians.  
8.8. Interpretation and Policy Recommendations 
The analyses above show the substantial differential in returns to schooling between the 
formal and informal private sectors.  
Three concrete possible reasons can explain the difference in return to schooling between 
the formal and the informal private sectors (these reasons are also partly discussed in Nakamuro 
& Yamasaki, 2012). First, the quality of education that the workers in the informal private sector 
received could be lower than that which the workers in the formal private sector attained. The 
second possible reason is that the schooling is being rewarded differently in each sector, perhaps 
because education is not being fully considered in the informal sector (due to, for example, 
discrimination) or because education has a lower productivity in the informal sector. If valid, this 
reason would prove the dual labor market theory. Third, return to schooling in the informal sector 
is lower because workers do not have to pay tax.  
The first reason is related to the education policy in South Africa. In South Africa, access 
to and quality of education are different by race.5 Blacks and Coloreds tend to be excluded from 
the formal private sector and are much more likely to work in the informal private sector. The 
researcher first thought the difference in returns to schooling between the formal and informal 
private sectors could be due to the difference in the quality of education between races. However, 
considering there was still a return to schooling differential among workers of a single race across 
sectors, this could not fully explain the difference in return to schooling. Another possible reason 
is that one population group is also grouped into elites and non-elites. The two groups go to 
                                                 
5As mentioned in Chapter 5, many schools with students from a single race remained even after the 




different types of schools with different quality education. One possible policy implication is that 
the government should provide training and non-formal schooling for workers in the informal 
sector to complement the low quality of education they may have attained so that they will be 
become more productive. However, it is also important to investigate further the quality of 
education received by informal workers, specifically their exact reading and numeracy ability, 
problem-solving skills, and professional knowledge and skills. 
The second possible reason for the differences in return to schooling between the formal 
and informal private sectors concerns the labor market policy in South Africa. Trade unions are 
powerful and assertive in the formal private sector in South Africa. Many point out that the 
formal private sector labor market is distorted because of strong trade unions. The wage is set 
higher than actual productivity (e.g., Kingdon & Knight, 2007). Therefore, returns to schooling 
could be high without reflecting productivity. However, it is also possible that the informal 
private sector, which is thought to be an imperfect labor market, does not properly appreciate 
schooling or does not efficiently utilize schooling for productivity purposes. Insofar as moving 
from the informal to the formal sector may allow informal sectgor firms to upgrade their 
technology and to have access to public infracstructure and to public programs supporting 
private sector development, efforts to provide incentives to informal sector firms to become 
formal may pay off in the form of greater productivity, for both the firms themselves as well as 
the government. Moreover, the government should remove excessively complicated regulations 
on the labor market and business that lead some firms to move to the informal sector. 
Policymakers should consider drastically reforming labor market policies and regulations in 
South Africa. 




taxes. With this assumption, net earnings could be similar between formal and informal sectors. 
This, however, is not necessarily the case in South Africa, where even formal sector workers tend 
to avoid income taxes. Although it may apply to the issue of business or sales taxes, it may not 
be as significant in the case of income taxes. Still, the research in this dissertation sought to 
ascertain the role of this issue. Although the survey upon which this dissertation is based does 
not have data on taxes and relies on pre-tax earnings, a preliminary analysis was done, adjusting 
the wages of the formal sector by the actual tax rates prevailing in South Africa. However, the 
wage differentials among sectors still were significant and there was no major difference in the 
results in terms of rates of returns to education.  
Lastly, there is the issue of how public sector wages and employment may distort wages 
and employment in other sectors, including the absorption of highly-educated workers. The issue 
of the public sector could be analyzed in greater detail in future studies. 
8.9. Qualifications and Implications for Future Studies 
Conducting this research revealed some concerns about data and methodologies. First, it 
is possible that workers underreport their earnings and this could be more prevalent in a certain 
sector. Kuepie et al. (2009) suggest that measurement errors might appear in reported earnings, 
especially for non-salaried workers in the informal sector. Second, there could be measurement 
errors in reported years of schooling as well. Third, it is possible that some workers with specific 
characteristics do not report their earnings at all. Fourth, the validity of the instrument, spouse 
years of schooling is still a contentious question although it has been used by labor economists 
many times. Future studies should analyze the validity of the instrument as well as looking for 
better identification strategies. 




public sector could be analyzed in greater detail in future studies. It is also important to investigate 
further the details of the quality of education for workers in the formal and informal sectors to find 
out the reason for the difference in return to schooling between the two sectors.  
8.10. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to clarify the impact of education on earnings and the probability 
of employment for workers in the formal and informal sectors in South Africa, using the Labor 
Force Survey in 2007. The study controlled for endogeneity of education and sector sample 
selection bias and considered the heterogeneity in returns to schooling. It conducted careful 
analyses using different kinds of methodologies such as ordinary least square, two-stage least 
square, two-step selection model, and two-stages least squares (2SLS) with the two-step 
selection model. It also used the wage decomposition method to look at the effect of returns to 
schooling and workers’ average education endowment on the wage difference between different 
sectors using 2SLS. Also, the quantile regression and piecewise linear spline function were used 
to explore the heterogeneity in returns to schooling. In the quantile regression analyses, the 
instrumental variable quantile regression with selection correction was also used. 
After controlling for the endogeneity of schooling and sector and labor participation 
sample selection bias by the 2SLS with Durbin and Mcfadden selection correction, the marginal 
return to schooling in the informal sector is 16.8% for total, 14.3% for males and 18.7% for 
females, while that in the public sector is 18.1% for total, 14.5% for males and 27.1% for 
females and that in the formal private sector is 25.1% for total, 24.2% for males, and 25.35% for 
females. The significant difference in return to schooling between the formal and informal 
private sectors is observed across race and gender except for Whites and Asians.  




regressions which also corrected for the endogeneity of schooling and sample selection bias as 
well as 2SLS/selection correction models with additional dummies and with different definition 
of informal sector.  
The study confirmed the dual labor market theory: the formal and informal labor markets 
appear to be segmented. The possible policy implications drawn from the analysis are 1) 
improving the quality of schools from which informal sector workers graduate, 2) providing 
training and non-formal schooling for workers in the informal sector, 3) removing complicated 
regulations in the labor market and seeking to provide incentives for informal sector firms to 
become formal. 
Lastly, future studies should consider dealing with measurement errors in reported 
earnings and reported schooling. Also the issue of the return to schooling in the public sector and 




Table 8.1  OLS Estimation of the Effect of Years of Schooling on Earnings by Sector, Gender, 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.137*** 0.096*** 0.044*** 0.114*** 0.095*** 0.053*** 0.160*** 0.100*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.094 0.184*** 0.156*** 0.055 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.193
(0.023) (0.018) (0.116) (0.034) (0.023) (0.185) (0.028) (0.029) (0.018)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.136*** 0.088*** 0.042*** 0.111*** 0.087*** 0.053*** 0.158*** 0.092*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.138*** 0.107*** 0.057*** 0.116*** 0.106*** 0.054** 0.160*** 0.109*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014)

















(46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54)
years of schooling 0.171*** 0.147*** 0.048 0.148*** 0.165*** 0.246 0.278 0.106*** -
(0.038) (0.026) (0.131) (0.036) (0.036) - (0.139) (0.030) -







Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Highlighted estimates are better 




Table 8.2  OLS Estimation of the Effect of Years of Schooling on Earnings by Sector, Gender 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.052*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.052*** 0.148*** 0.112*** 0.051***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.170*** 0.168*** -0.071 0.179*** 0.166*** -0.20 0.155*** 0.170*** 0.733
(0.026) (0.022) (0.090) (0.039) (0.028) . (0.032) (0.035) .

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.119*** 0.092*** 0.049*** 0.100*** 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.144*** 0.107*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.130*** 0.118*** 0.059*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.051* 0.153*** 0.112*** 0.059***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.019) (0.009) (0.025) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.12 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.12 0.268 0.170*** -
(0.043) (0.033) - (0.038) (0.044) - (0.160) (0.034) -




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Test of endogeneity) F=22.59 F=170.01 F=23.12 F=12.09 F=114.75 F=5.06 F=10.74 F=45.86 F=19.54
Wu-Hausman F test p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0053 p=0.0000 p=0.0250 p=0.0011 p=0.0000 p=0.0000
(Test of weak instrument ) F=329.07 F=939.69 F=203.86 F=217.51 F=653.21 F=72.52 F=121.68 F=428.84 F=130.38
Test of excluded instrument p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000
N 1312 3963 1140 792 2805 454 520 1158 686
Total Male Female
 
Notes: The Wu-Hausman F-test is based on the estimation with normal standard errors, not robust standard errors. The F-statistics for the test of excluded 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Test of endogeneity) F=2.77 F=13.52 - F=0.03 F=4.66 - F=5.88 F=11.24 -
Wu-Hausman F test p=0.0986 p=0.0003 - p=0.8725 p=0.0320 - p=0.0185 p=0.0010 -
(Test of weak instrument ) F=66.83 F=106.34 - F=41.23 F=77.57 - F=28.48 F=34.81 -
Test of excluded instrument p=0.0000 p=0.0000 - p=0.0000 p=0.0000 - p=0.0000 p=0.0000 -

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(Test of endogeneity) F=14.58 F=94.92 F=16.03 F=4.73 F=73.86 F=3.10 F=9.33 F=18.57 F=14.22
Wu-Hausman F test p=0.0001 p=0.0000 p=0.0001 p=0.0302 p=0.0000 p=0.0793 p=0.0024 p=0.0000 p=0.0002
(Test of weak instrument ) F=186.99 F=533.56 F=158.39 F=129.82 F=399.71 F=59.22 F=61.05 F=133.14 F=98.90
Test of excluded instrument p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000




Notes: The Wu-Hausman F test is based on the estimation with normal standard errors not robust standard errors. The F-statistics for the test of excluded 






















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
(Test of endogeneity) F=8.28 F=61.39 F=7.96 F=12.05 F=40.75 F=3.02 F=0.0076 F=17.94 F=4.86
Wu-Hausman F test p=0.0043 p=0.0000 p=0.0052 p=0.0007 p=0.0000 p=0.0858 p=0.9309 p=0.0000 p=0.0289
(Test of weak instrument ) F=98.11 F=229.79 F=41.96 F=54.44 F=137.77 F=10.16 F=55.50 F=91.62 F=33.46
Test of excluded instrument p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0020 p=0.0000 p=0.0000 p=0.0000

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
(Test of endogeneity) F=0.03 F=4.08 - F=0.004 F=1.51 - F=0.04 F=2.63 -
Wu-Hausman F test p=0.8598 p=0.0449 - p=0.9530 p=0.2212 - p=0.8534 p=0.1110 -
(Test of weak instrument ) F=10.97 F=24.51 - F=7.92 F=10.96 - F=8.35 F=16.61 -
Test of excluded instrument p=0.0021 p=0.0000 - p=0.0094 p=0.0013 - p=0.0202 p=0.0002 -




Notes: The Wu-Hausman F test is based on the estimation with normal standard errors not robust standard errors. The F-statistics for the test of excluded 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.170*** 0.195*** 0.123*** 0.143*** 0.190*** 0.117*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.125***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.028) (0.023) (0.016) (0.021)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.224*** 0.260*** -0.118 0.183** 0.238*** -0.199 0.275** 0.299*** 0.733
(0.054) (0.037) (0.099) (0.062) (0.044) - (0.088) (0.066) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.172*** 0.183*** 0.115*** 0.129*** 0.178*** 0.109*** 0.241*** 0.193*** 0.116***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.174*** 0.225*** 0.158*** 0.181*** 0.233*** 0.185* 0.152*** 0.199*** 0.144***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.037) (0.037) (0.024) (0.077) (0.038) (0.032) (0.043)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.183** 0.280*** - 0.158* 0.271*** - 0.241 0.273*** -
(0.062) (0.056) - (0.057) (0.076) - (0.178) (0.078) -







Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates in the 













out of labor 
force 
spouse formal private -0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
spouse informal private -0.011*** -0.111*** 0.010*** 0.111***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015)
household formal private -0.016*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
household informal private 0.005*** -0.011 0.041*** -0.036***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Joint significance test chi2( 12) = 1724.05
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 8.7  Coefficients and Joint Significance of Spouse and Household Sector Dummies in the 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
spouse formal private 0.119 0.003 0.065 0.072 -0.019 0.143 0.149 0.037 0.067
(0.080) (0.038) (0.079) (0.105) (0.046) (0.172) (0.126) (0.062) (0.096)
spouse informal pri. -0.183** -0.039 0.024 -0.177* -0.033 0.043 -0.232* -0.061 0.048
(0.060) (0.036) (0.050) (0.074) (0.040) (0.079) (0.099) (0.079) (0.065)
household formal pri. -0.088 0.056 0.049 -0.033 0.076 0.022 -0.134 0.019 0.057
(0.075) (0.035) (0.072) (0.098) (0.040) (0.123) (0.118) (0.064) (0.090)
household informal pri. -0.024 -0.044* -0.044 -0.002 -0.065* -0.112 -0.04 0.021 -0.011
(0.036) (0.022) (0.042) (0.048) (0.026) (0.076) (0.054) (0.039) (0.049)
joint significance test F=3.64 F= 3.73 F= 1.93 F= 1.86 F= 3.61 F= 0.89 F= 2.20 F=0.87 F=1.58
p=0.0058 p=0.0049 p=0.1024 p= 0.1159p= 0.0061p= 0.4718 p=0.0675 p= 0.4806 p=0.1778
N 1583 4716 1326 907 3371 521 676 1345 805
Total Male Female
 






















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
spouse formal private 0.551* 0.339* 0.842 0.356 0.483* - 1.128** 0.092 -
(0.233) (0.168) (1.024) (0.260) (0.224) - (0.363) (0.155) -
spouse informal pri. 0.109 0.294 1.404 0.072 0.361 - 0.483 0.115 -
(0.246) (0.260) (0.620) (0.352) (0.328) - (0.278) (0.265) -
household formal pri. -0.446 -0.183 - -0.221 -0.288 - -1.103** 0.023 -
(0.229) (0.171) - (0.265) (0.222) - (0.367) (0.165) -
household informal pri. 0.127 0.065 0.861 0.231 0.097 - -0.049 0.01 -
(0.114) (0.089) (1.146) (0.165) (0.133) - (0.162) (0.118) -
joint significance F= 1.48 F=1.86 F=1.85 F=0.94 F= 1.70 - F=2.73 F=0.32 -
p=0.2139 p=0.1164 p=0.4848 p=0.4460 p=0.1521 - p=0.0375 p=0.8646 -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
spouse formal private 0.151 -0.047 0.126 0.021 -0.099 0.161 0.23 0.056 0.149
(0.110) (0.050) (0.093) (0.156) (0.061) (0.219) (0.152) (0.090) (0.111)
spouse informal pri. -0.150* -0.014 0.045 -0.174* -0.004 0.063 -0.158 -0.072 0.084
(0.067) (0.043) (0.056) (0.083) (0.047) (0.090) (0.116) (0.104) (0.072)
household formal pri. -0.113 0.112* 0.003 0.01 0.140** -0.04 -0.195 0.048 0.018
(0.101) (0.044) (0.084) (0.139) (0.050) (0.145) (0.145) (0.091) (0.103)
household informal pri. -0.042 -0.076** -0.069 -0.027 -0.111*** -0.173* -0.03 0.046 0
(0.043) (0.026) (0.048) (0.057) (0.030) (0.085) (0.065) (0.052) (0.056)
joint significance F= 2.46 F=4.73 F=1.95 F=1.50 F= 5.67 F=1.19 F=1.17 F=1.42 F=1.98
p= 0.0438 p=0.0008 p=0.1000 p=0.2000 p=0.0002 p=0.3136 p=0.3247 p= 0.2239 p=0.0958




























(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
spouse formal private -0.065 -0.053 -0.161 0.052 -0.035 -0.039 -0.34 -0.024 -0.16
(0.148) (0.066) (0.147) (0.204) (0.082) (0.304) (0.209) (0.107) (0.180)
spouse informal pri. -0.394** -0.167* -0.083 -0.219 -0.164* -0.116 -0.477* -0.111 -0.112
(0.137) (0.066) (0.115) (0.186) (0.074) (0.176) (0.200) (0.147) (0.160)
household formal pri. 0.057 0.046 0.206 -0.035 0.06 0.236 0.308 -0.077 0.163
(0.138) (0.064) (0.137) (0.195) (0.075) (0.224) (0.171) (0.114) (0.178)
household informal pri. 0 0.049 -0.072 0.056 0.086 -0.004 -0.107 -0.038 -0.105
(0.102) (0.051) (0.085) (0.132) (0.065) (0.161) (0.146) (0.079) (0.099)
joint significance F=2.27 F=1.79 F=0.97 F=0.40 F=1.85 F=0.63 F= 2.79 F=0.57 F= 0.66
p=0.0623 p=0.1294 p=0.4228 p=0.8058 p=0.1177 p=0.6397 p=0.0301 p= 0.6846p= 0.6199

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
spouse formal private -0.523 0.071 - -0.591 0.112 - -0.264 -0.251 -
(0.409) (0.132) - (0.355) (0.151) - (0.893) (0.256) -
spouse informal pri. 0.115 - 0.003 - 0.331 -
(0.170) - (0.258) - (0.181) -
household formal pri. 0.217 -0.127 - 0.305 -0.181 - 0.264 0.27 -
(0.287) (0.136) - (0.395) (0.156) - (0.803) (0.241) -
household informal pri. -0.365 -0.12 - -0.163 -0.172 - -1.535 -0.012 -
(0.301) (0.094) - (0.216) (0.116) - (1.404) (0.191) -
joint significance F=0.65 F=0.95 - F=1.25 F=1.08 - F= 0.75 F= 1.22 -
p= 0.5894 p=0.4371 - p=0.3164 p=0.3677 - p= 0.5665p= 0.3149 -


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.112*** 0.049***

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.057*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.099*** 0.051*** 0.065*** 0.112*** 0.048***

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.035* 0.057** 0.068*** 0.043***

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.035* 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.043***

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.063*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.099*** 0.052*** 0.075*** 0.111*** 0.049***

















(46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54)
years of schooling 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.065*** 0.045** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.112*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.151*** 0.169*** -0.388 0.155* 0.167*** -0.175 0.134* 0.171*** 0.379
(0.043) (0.024) (0.179) (0.068) (0.032) - (0.062) (0.037) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.051*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.087*** 0.051*** 0.061** 0.106*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.055** 0.119*** 0.055*** 0.054* 0.121*** 0.046 0.050 0.112*** 0.056** 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.025) (0.009) (0.027) (0.032) (0.012) (0.017)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.067 0.176*** 0.121 0.045 0.174*** 0.121 0.177 0.162*** -
(0.047) (0.033) - (0.049) (0.044) - (0.128) (0.033) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.057*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.052***0.099*** 0.051*** 0.065***0.112*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.153*** 0.170*** -0.414 0.163* 0.168*** -0.174 0.132* 0.171*** 0.370
(0.043) (0.023) (0.203) (0.070) (0.031) - (0.061) (0.036) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.048*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.049***0.087*** 0.051*** 0.058** 0.106*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.050* 0.119*** 0.055*** 0.052* 0.121*** 0.047 0.043 0.112*** 0.055** 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.025) (0.009) (0.028) (0.033) (0.012) (0.017)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.063 0.176*** 0.222 0.027 0.176*** 0.121 0.187 0.161*** -
(0.048) (0.033) - (0.051) (0.044) - (0.115) (0.033) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.048***0.056*** 0.035* 0.057** 0.068*** 0.043***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.144** 0.155*** -0.364 0.145 0.158** -0.169 0.121 0.140* 0.372
(0.053) (0.037) - (0.085) (0.048) - (0.072) (0.066) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.038*** 0.047***0.049*** 0.030* 0.053* 0.062*** 0.044***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.031 0.068*** 0.056** 0.034 0.065*** 0.071 0.020 0.069*** 0.040
(0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012) (0.036) (0.035) (0.018) (0.021)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.004 0.070 0.121 -0.057 0.032 0.121 1.439 0.103 -
(0.056) (0.044) - (0.063) (0.050) - (1.047) (0.068) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.050***0.058*** 0.035* 0.059***0.070*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.145** 0.157*** -0.253 0.149 0.158*** -0.176 0.125 0.144* 0.378
(0.051) (0.037) - (0.083) (0.047) - (0.071) (0.067) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.046*** 0.054*** 0.038*** 0.048***0.050*** 0.029* 0.055** 0.064*** 0.044***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.033 0.070*** 0.055** 0.037 0.067*** 0.070 0.021 0.072*** 0.039
(0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012) (0.035) (0.034) (0.017) (0.021)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.003 0.075 0.121 -0.057 0.038 0.121 1.533 0.108 -
(0.055) (0.043) - (0.061) (0.050) - (0.939) (0.067) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.063*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 0.057***0.099*** 0.052*** 0.075***0.111*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.151*** 0.169*** -0.351 0.150* 0.165*** -0.199 0.137* 0.170*** 0.733
(0.043) (0.024) (0.236) (0.068) (0.032) - (0.060) (0.037) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.057*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.054***0.087*** 0.051*** 0.071***0.104*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.061** 0.119*** 0.062*** 0.067** 0.121*** 0.052* 0.053 0.111*** 0.062***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.009) (0.024) (0.031) (0.012) (0.016)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.076 0.175*** 0.121 0.052 0.172*** 0.121 0.923 0.160*** -
(0.046) (0.033) - (0.044) (0.044) - (0.694) (0.031) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.050***0.065*** 0.045** 0.065***0.067*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.130* 0.152*** 0.795 0.066 0.155** -0.126 0.137 0.153* 0.475
(0.052) (0.036) - (0.089) (0.046) - (0.085) (0.066) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.042*** 0.048***0.060*** 0.036* 0.064** 0.064*** 0.044***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.039* 0.072*** 0.061** 0.042 0.077*** 0.070* 0.026 0.060** 0.050*
(0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.035) (0.035) (0.018) (0.023)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.016 0.082 0.121 -0.042 0.040 0.121 0.839 0.124 -
(0.053) (0.045) - (0.063) (0.052) - (1.237) (0.079) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.185***0.196***0.124*** 0.146***0.192***0.121*** 0.275***0.198***0.125***

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.189***0.196***0.125*** 0.148***0.192***0.122*** 0.280***0.198***0.126***

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.181***0.251***0.168*** 0.145***0.242*** 0.143** 0.271** 0.253***0.187***

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.179***0.245***0.163*** 0.145***0.237*** 0.141** 0.269** 0.245***0.180***

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.180***0.197***0.125*** 0.146***0.193***0.125*** 0.253***0.197***0.125***

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.173***0.271***0.169*** 0.150***0.264*** 0.145** 0.252***0.263***0.196***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.031) (0.041) (0.025) (0.049) (0.073) (0.040) (0.047)





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.185***0.196***0.124*** 0.146***0.192***0.121*** 0.275***0.198***0.125***
(0.037) (0.009) (0.018) (0.038) (0.011) (0.030) (0.081) (0.016) -0.022

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.290** 0.270*** -0.377 0.179 0.248*** -0.175 0.433* 0.307*** 0.379
(0.107) (0.040) (0.237) (0.128) (0.050) - (0.177) (0.071) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.205***0.184***0.117*** 0.131** 0.179***0.111*** 0.400* 0.194***0.118***
(0.055) (0.011) (0.020) (0.051) (0.013) (0.032) (0.171) (0.022) -0.025

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.143* 0.227***0.157*** 0.204* 0.237*** 0.189* -0.004 0.200*** 0.138** 
(0.061) (0.019) (0.039) (0.083) (0.024) (0.085) (0.102) (0.032) -0.043

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.157 0.280*** - 0.115 0.271*** - 0.205 0.274*** -
(0.086) (0.057) - (0.098) (0.074) - (0.198) (0.076) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.189***0.196***0.125*** 0.148***0.192***0.122*** 0.280***0.198***0.126***
(0.039) (0.009) (0.018) (0.040) (0.011) (0.031) (0.085) (0.016) (0.022)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.296** 0.266*** -0.358 0.185 0.245*** -0.174 0.449* 0.303*** 0.370
(0.111) (0.039) (0.225) (0.132) (0.048) - (0.193) (0.069) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.208***0.183***0.118*** 0.130* 0.178***0.112*** 0.407* 0.194***0.120***
(0.059) (0.011) (0.020) (0.055) (0.013) (0.033) (0.177) (0.022) (0.025)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.148* 0.227***0.158*** 0.218* 0.237*** 0.188* -0.020 0.200*** 0.138** 
(0.066) (0.019) (0.040) (0.090) (0.024) (0.084) (0.117) (0.032) (0.044)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.160 0.280*** - 0.113 0.271*** - 0.216 0.273*** -
(0.084) (0.057) - (0.098) (0.073) - (0.190) (0.077) -












Table 8.19  2SLS Estimation with Durbin-McFadden Variant 1 Selection Correction by Sector, 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.181***0.251***0.168*** 0.145***0.242*** 0.143** 0.271** 0.253***0.187***
(0.040) (0.020) (0.031) (0.044) (0.024) (0.049) (0.089) (0.039) (0.043)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.313* 0.492*** -0.364 0.135 0.389* -0.169 0.551 0.785* 0.372
(0.149) (0.142) - (0.166) (0.166) - (0.300) (0.340) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.196***0.230***0.157*** 0.121* 0.230*** 0.119* 0.404* 0.222***0.188***
(0.058) (0.025) (0.035) (0.055) (0.029) (0.053) (0.185) (0.050) (0.050)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.135 0.342*** 0.210** 0.227* 0.338*** 0.229 -0.047 0.338** 0.177*
(0.071) (0.059) (0.066) (0.105) (0.070) (0.121) (0.120) (0.106) (0.086)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.179 0.412 0.000 0.116 0.292 0.000 1.443 0.634 -
(0.129) (0.327) - (0.148) (0.306) - (1.239) (0.677) -












Table 8.20  2SLS Estimation with Durbin-McFadden Variant 2 Selection Correction by Sector, 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.179***0.245***0.163*** 0.145***0.237*** 0.141** 0.269** 0.245***0.180***
(0.040) (0.019) (0.030) (0.043) (0.023) (0.049) (0.088) (0.037) (0.041)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.316* 0.473*** -0.253 0.153 0.379* -0.176 0.546 0.750* 0.378
(0.145) (0.131) (.) (0.161) (0.156) (.) (0.293) (0.315) (.)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.194***0.223***0.153*** 0.121* 0.223*** 0.117* 0.399* 0.212***0.182***
(0.057) (0.023) (0.034) (0.054) (0.028) (0.052) (0.181) (0.046) (0.048)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.133 0.331*** 0.208** 0.225* 0.328*** 0.236 -0.047 0.326** 0.172*
(0.070) (0.055) (0.065) (0.104) (0.066) (0.123) (0.118) (0.099) (0.083)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.174 0.402 - 0.109 0.294 - 1.760 0.625 -
(0.120) (0.311) - (0.146) (0.304) - (1.210) (0.681) -





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.180***0.197***0.125*** 0.146***0.193***0.125*** 0.253***0.197***0.125***
(0.034) (0.009) (0.018) (0.037) (0.011) (0.032) (0.067) (0.016) (0.022)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.294* 0.271*** -1.078 0.169 0.247*** -0.199 0.463* 0.306*** 0.733
(0.114) (0.040) (2.329) (0.125) (0.050) - (0.208) (0.072) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.199***0.184***0.118*** 0.131** 0.179*** 0.116** 0.337** 0.191***0.119***
(0.048) (0.012) (0.020) (0.049) (0.013) (0.035) (0.113) (0.023) (0.025)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.143* 0.227***0.154*** 0.194* 0.238*** 0.201* -0.001 0.199*** 0.138** 
(0.058) (0.019) (0.038) (0.075) (0.024) (0.091) (0.094) (0.032) (0.043)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.175 0.280*** 0.000 0.125 0.271*** 0.000 1.946 0.269*** -
(0.102) (0.057) - (0.092) (0.075) - (2.715) (0.074) -






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.173***0.271***0.169*** 0.150***0.264*** 0.145** 0.252***0.263***0.196***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.031) (0.041) (0.025) (0.049) (0.073) (0.040) (0.047)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.330 0.486*** 0.795 0.055 0.347* -0.126 0.579 0.777* 0.475
(0.173) (0.143) - (0.224) (0.144) - (0.307) (0.350) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.184***0.255***0.160*** 0.130* 0.258*** 0.125* 0.378* 0.232***0.207***
(0.048) (0.026) (0.035) (0.053) (0.031) (0.052) (0.147) (0.051) (0.060)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.135* 0.375*** 0.206** 0.216* 0.371*** 0.250 -0.030 0.343** 0.188*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.094) (0.076) (0.139) (0.087) (0.116) (0.087)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.198 0.408 - 0.085 0.306 - -0.129 0.630 -
(0.179) (0.306) - (0.159) (0.326) - (1.868) (0.648) -












Table 8.23  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction by Sector, Gender, Using 
the Workers in the Informal Sector and/or Workers without Written Contract as the Definition of 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
years of schooling 0.144*** 3.234 0.256***0.216*** 0.128** 0.217 0.247***0.222*** 0.186* -0.816 0.248***0.220***
(0.039) (13.250) (0.024) (0.032) (0.044) (0.300) (0.029) (0.047) (0.074) (1.644) (0.041) (0.046)























(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
years of schooling 0.298* -0.119 0.421** 0.671 - - 0.347* 0.064 0.788 0.000 0.786 0.520
(0.146) (.) (0.140) (1.159) - - (0.156) (0.915) (0.421) - (0.488) (0.386)























(25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.158** -0.564 0.232***0.206*** 0.134* -0.147 0.229***0.200*** 0.205* -0.248 0.224***0.216***
(0.051) (0.729) (0.028) (0.037) (0.058) (0.440) (0.035) (0.050) (0.098) (0.216) (0.053) (0.057)























(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)
years of schooling 0.072 0.580 0.361***0.250*** 0.118 2.455 0.347*** 0.320* -0.054 1.305 0.348** 0.215*
(0.069) (0.403) (0.072) (0.065) (0.089) (1.084) (0.082) (0.144) (0.174) - (0.122) (0.086)























(49) (50\) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60)
years of schooling 0.730 0.072 0.382 0.109 -0.748 0.077 0.397 -0.234 4.445** - 0.396 -1.045
(1.290) - (0.298) (0.197) (1.546) - (0.338) (0.216) (0.059) - (0.648) -












Table 8.24  Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction by Sector, Gender and Race, 
Using the Workers in the Informal Sector and/or without Any of the Written Contract, Medical 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.184***0.266*** 0.199*** 0.152** 0.251*** 0.208*** 0.271** 0.272*** 0.195***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.032) (0.047) (0.030) (0.049) (0.091) (0.044) (0.045)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.304* 0.503*** 0.290 0.131 0.395* 1.829 0.508 0.832* 0.257
(0.149) (0.149) (0.218) (0.175) (0.160) (2.623) (0.268) (0.346) (0.298)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.201** 0.237*** 0.196*** 0.124* 0.232*** 0.189*** 0.419* 0.240*** 0.201***
(0.061) (0.029) (0.038) (0.058) (0.035) (0.053) (0.202) (0.054) (0.058)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.139 0.373*** 0.231*** 0.249* 0.357*** 0.295* -0.058 0.377** 0.192*
(0.077) (0.075) (0.064) (0.117) (0.086) (0.137) (0.122) (0.138) (0.084)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.169 0.582 0.122 0.135 0.429 0.025* 1.395 0.611 0.111
(0.117) (0.606) (0.139) (0.155) (0.434) (0.001) (1.064) (1.016) -












Table 8.25  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction by Sector, Gender, Using 
“Without Any of the Written Contract, Medical Aid/Health Insurance, and Pension/Retirement 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.186***0.267***0.198*** 0.153***0.252***0.196*** 0.271** 0.276***0.202***
(0.041) (0.024) (0.037) (0.045) (0.029) (0.052) (0.084) (0.044) (0.060)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.291* 0.491*** 0.135 0.131 0.383** -0.326 0.469 0.827* -1.091
(0.145) (0.141) (1.294) (0.188) (0.145) (4.651) (0.237) (0.346) -

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.204***0.242***0.197*** 0.130* 0.235*** 0.184** 0.413* 0.250*** 0.218** 
(0.057) (0.030) (0.045) (0.053) (0.036) (0.056) (0.177) (0.056) (0.082)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.143 0.361*** 0.212** 0.247* 0.345*** 0.267 -0.037 0.373** 0.174*
(0.075) (0.067) (0.069) (0.115) (0.074) (0.144) (0.109) (0.131) (0.082)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.169 0.601 0.221 0.125 0.468 -0.117 1.465 0.658 0.119
(0.114) (0.632) (0.316) (0.137) (0.456) - (1.127) (1.057) -












Table 8.26  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction with District, Industry, 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.181*** 0.251*** 0.168*** 0.145***0.242*** 0.143** 0.271** 0.253*** 0.187***
(0.040) (0.020) (0.031) (0.044) (0.024) (0.049) (0.089) (0.039) (0.043)
N 1312 3963 1140 792 2805 454 520 1158 686
Total















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.182*** 0.233*** 0.140*** 0.137** 0.226*** 0.101* 0.245** 0.230*** 0.157** 
(0.044) (0.021) (0.035) (0.047) (0.025) (0.049) (0.086) (0.039) (0.051)
N 1312 3963 1140 792 2805 454 520 1158 686
Total

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.185*** 0.223*** 0.131*** 0.137** 0.203*** 0.069 0.253* 0.247*** 0.154** 
(0.048) (0.026) (0.035) (0.050) (0.030) (0.053) (0.100) (0.051) (0.049)
N 1311 3961 1140 791 2804 454 520 1157 686
Total

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.166** 0.204*** 0.113** 0.117* 0.186*** 0.043 0.227* 0.224*** 0.147** 
(0.052) (0.026) (0.035) (0.054) (0.030) (0.054) (0.114) (0.052) (0.049)











Table 8.27  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction with District Dummies 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.182*** 0.233*** 0.140*** 0.137** 0.226*** 0.101* 0.245** 0.230*** 0.157** 
(0.044) (0.021) (0.035) (0.047) (0.025) (0.049) (0.086) (0.039) (0.051)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.173 0.418** 0.159 0.113 0.320* 0.123 0.021 0.798* 0.372
(0.151) (0.143) (.) (0.276) (0.158) (.) (0.150) (0.396) (.)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.199** 0.209*** 0.133*** 0.109 0.203*** 0.101 0.358* 0.204*** 0.156** 
(0.065) (0.026) (0.040) (0.062) (0.031) (0.055) (0.168) (0.053) (0.059)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.146 0.355*** 0.182* 0.227 0.372*** 0.137 -0.002 0.339** 0.157
(0.077) (0.072) (0.080) (0.120) (0.090) (0.127) (0.138) (0.128) (0.117)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 0.639 0.561 - 0.615 0.261 - 2.346 1.009 -
(1.031) (0.553) - (1.588) (0.278) - (.) (1.192) -












Table 8.28  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction with District and 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.185*** 0.223*** 0.131*** 0.137** 0.203*** 0.069 0.253* 0.247*** 0.154** 
(0.048) (0.026) (0.035) (0.050) (0.030) (0.053) (0.100) (0.051) (0.049)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.067 0.460** -0.145 0.072 0.327* 0.123 0.024 0.793* 0.372
(0.117) (0.146) (.) (0.202) (0.146) (.) (0.177) (0.359) (.)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.200** 0.198*** 0.125** 0.105 0.175*** 0.088 0.352 0.243*** 0.142*
(0.071) (0.033) (0.041) (0.066) (0.037) (0.058) (0.191) (0.070) (0.055)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.157 0.368*** 0.136 0.231 0.362** -0.098 -0.009 0.352 0.149
(0.084) (0.107) (0.079) (0.127) (0.121) (0.149) (0.207) (0.216) (0.114)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling 4.997 0.519 - 1.706 0.303 - 2.346 0.848 -
(45.016) (0.464) - (3.504) (0.338) - (.) (0.828) -











Table 8.29  2SLS Estimation with DMF Variant 1 Selection Correction with District, Industry, 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.166** 0.204*** 0.113** 0.117* 0.186*** 0.043 0.227* 0.224*** 0.147** 
(0.052) (0.026) (0.035) (0.054) (0.030) (0.054) (0.114) (0.052) (0.049)

















(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
years of schooling 0.061 0.412** -0.093 -0.114 0.314* 0.123 -0.053 0.849* 0.372
(0.132) (0.145) (.) (0.213) (0.158) (.) (0.214) (0.405) (.)

















(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
years of schooling 0.181* 0.179*** 0.100* 0.092 0.164*** 0.049 0.389 0.217** 0.142*
(0.076) (0.032) (0.039) (0.071) (0.036) (0.055) (0.254) (0.071) (0.058)

















(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
years of schooling 0.126 0.327** 0.128 0.159 0.307** -0.071 -0.034 0.317 0.148
(0.095) (0.105) (0.079) (0.160) (0.113) (0.168) (0.207) (0.207) (0.119)

















(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
years of schooling -3.233 0.627 - -1.756 0.511 - 0.637 0.989 -
(15.727) (0.542) - (0.674) (0.525) - (.) (0.905) -












Table 8.30  Blinder-Oaxaca Wage Decomposition: Relative Contribution of Years of Schooling 




  Due to endowments 0.502 0.416 0.563
(0.045) (0.049) (0.092)
  Due to coefficients -0.416 -0.615 0.172
(0.274) (0.273) (0.680)
  Interaction -0.115 -0.154 0.046
(0.076) (0.070) (0.181)
  N  1272/3960 776/2803 496/1157
Public/informal private 
  Due to endowments 0.783 0.533 1.113
(0.155) (0.195) (0.269)
  Due to coefficients 0.135 0.166 0.651
(0.345) (0.419) (0.725)
  Interaction 0.100 0.106 0.595
(0.256) (0.267) (0.662)
  N 1272/1177 776/468 496/709
Formal private/informal private
  Due to endowments 0.299 0.217 0.442
(0.054) (0.081) (0.092)
  Due to coefficients 0.540 0.625 0.510
(0.164) (0.259) (0.246)
  Interaction 0.207 0.207 0.269
(0.064) (0.088) (0.130)






Table 8.31  Blinder-Oaxaca Wage Decomposition: Relative Contribution of Years of Schooling 
to the Earnings Differential in 2SLS with Heckman Selection Correction, by Race 
Total Male Female Total Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public/formal private
  Due to endowments 0.232 0.106 0.528 0.562 0.452 0.643
0.096 0.114 0.237 0.063 0.065 0.144
  Due to coefficients -1.026 -1.583 -3.198 -0.278 -0.641 0.822
1.406 1.797 2.871 0.354 0.351 0.980
  Interaction -0.054 -0.045 -0.235 -0.091 -0.179 0.266
0.077 0.069 0.223 0.116 0.100 0.317
  Total -0.848 -1.522 -2.904 0.193 -0.368 1.731
  N 125/383 62/212  63/171 833/2376 512/1781 321/595
Public/informal private 
  Due to endowments - - - 0.742 0.487 1.115
- - - 0.174 0.210 0.320
  Due to coefficients - - - 0.312 0.177 1.586
- - - 0.471 0.514 1.358
  Interaction - - - 0.224 0.115 1.395
- - - 0.338 0.333 1.196
  Total - - - 1.278 0.779 4.096
  N - - - 833/882 512/355 321/527
Formal private/informal private
  Due to endowments - - - 0.236 0.186 0.366
- - - 0.053 0.078 0.097
  Due to coefficients - - - 0.469 0.567 0.419
- - - 0.195 0.274 0.313
  Interaction - - - 0.146 0.173 0.184
- - - 0.062 0.086 0.138
  Total - - - 0.851 0.925 0.969









Table 8.31 (continued) 
Total Male Female Total Male Female
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Public/formal private
  Due to endowments 0.551 0.522 0.520 0.376 0.334 0.523
0.100 0.116 0.186 0.187 0.218 0.338
  Due to coefficients -0.819 -0.687 -1.361 -2.481 -3.553 -4.606
0.480 0.502 1.504 1.831 2.021 2.184
  Interaction -0.257 -0.216 -0.406 -0.257 -0.319 -0.625
0.153 0.161 0.454 0.209 0.239 0.404
  Total -0.525 -0.381 -1.247 -2.363 -3.538 -4.708
  N 271/1035 172/700 99/335  43/166 30/110 13/56
Public/informal private 
  Due to endowments 0.593 0.274 0.744 - - -
0.258 0.321 0.408 - - -
  Due to coefficients -0.088 0.594 -1.407 - - -
0.581 0.807 1.651 - - -
  Interaction -0.063 0.326 -1.263 - - -
0.415 0.445 1.485 - - -
  Total 0.441 1.194 -1.926 - - -
  N 271/277 172/102 99/175 - - -
Formal private/informal private
  Due to endowments 0.227 0.092 0.349 - - -
0.086 0.117 0.131 - - -
  Due to coefficients 0.725 1.061 0.439 - - -
0.339 0.650 0.426 - - -
  Interaction 0.224 0.206 0.201 - - -
0.109 0.144 0.196 - - -
  Total 1.176 1.360 0.988 - - -






Table 8.32  Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
10%
yschool 0.158 0.066 0.052 0.213 0.164 0.137 0.227 0.321 0.214
(0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
25%
yschool 0.139 0.075 0.036 0.177 0.185 0.141 0.172 0.296 0.193
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
50%
yschool 0.138 0.091 0.048 0.167 0.204 0.129 0.189 0.272 0.164
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
75%
yschool 0.138 0.105 0.041 0.162 0.193 0.109 0.173 0.253 0.181
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
90%
yschool 0.128 0.116 0.052 0.168 0.191 0.102 0.170 0.220 0.132
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.030 0.049 0.015 0.051 0.041 0.039 0.058 0.076 0.082
OLS/IV/IV+selection
yschool 0.134 0.095 0.044 0.170 0.195 0.123 0.181 0.251 0.168
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.037) (0.019) (0.031)
selection correction DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1
N 2728 9553 3054 1312 3963 1140 1312 3963 1140  





















yschool 0.227 0.321 0.214 0.334 0.319 0.126 0.230 0.288 0.192
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
25%
yschool 0.172 0.296 0.193 0.116 0.316 0.128 0.274 0.223 0.235
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012)
50%
yschool 0.189 0.272 0.164 0.109 0.280 0.173 0.231 0.241 0.182
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
75%
yschool 0.173 0.253 0.181 0.104 0.248 0.140 0.338 0.221 0.185
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011)
90%
yschool 0.170 0.220 0.132 0.117 0.191 0.166 0.316 0.261 0.134
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.058 0.101 0.082 0.229 0.128 0.047 0.108 0.067 0.101
2sls+selection
yschool 0.181 0.251 0.168 0.145 0.242 0.142 0.271 0.253 0.189
(0.037) (0.019) (0.031) (0.038) (0.022) (0.052) (0.087) (0.037) (0.043)
selection correction DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1
N 1312 3963 1140 792 2805 454 520 1158 686
Total Male Female
 





















yschool 0.179 0.602 - 0.099 0.597 - 0.249 1.436 -
(0.054) (0.046) - (0.104) (0.068) - (0.072) (0.113) -
25%
yschool 0.083 0.598 - 0.005 0.401 - 0.668 1.072 -
(0.042) (0.036) - (0.077) (0.046) - (0.072) (0.067) -
50%
yschool 0.159 0.546 - 0.146 0.243 - 0.915 1.150 -
(0.039) (0.031) - (0.067) (0.039) - (0.082) (0.066) -
75%
yschool 0.202 0.551 - 0.190 0.397 - 0.750 1.288 -
(0.043) (0.035) - (0.075) (0.046) - (0.076) (0.077) -
90%
yschool 0.377 0.486 - 0.193 0.659 - 0.834 0.539 -
(0.058) (0.042) - (0.096) (0.071) - (0.118) (0.057) -
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.294 0.116 - 0.188 0.257 - 0.667 0.750 -
2sls+selection
yschool 0.313 0.492 -0.685 0.135 0.389 -0.169 0.551 0.785 0.372
(0.138) (0.115) - (0.164) (0.139) - (0.265) (0.285) -
selection correction DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1
N 127 383 11 63 212 6 64 171 5
Total Male Female
 





















yschool 0.199 0.235 0.158 0.087 0.308 0.166 0.225 0.128 0.250
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018)
25%
yschool 0.153 0.270 0.173 0.086 0.302 0.096 0.338 0.093 0.245
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014)
50%
yschool 0.189 0.245 0.159 0.059 0.264 0.140 0.396 0.237 0.208
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
75%
yschool 0.186 0.251 0.144 0.087 0.240 0.136 0.536 0.234 0.178
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013)
90%
yschool 0.188 0.214 0.140 0.047 0.190 0.095 0.549 0.241 0.117
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.032) (0.018) (0.015)
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.046 0.056 0.033 0.041 0.118 0.070 0.171 0.148 0.133
2sls+selection
yschool 0.196 0.230 0.157 0.121 0.230 0.118 0.404 0.222 0.189
(0.054) (0.023) (0.036) (0.053) (0.027) (0.055) (0.172) (0.051) (0.049)
selection correction DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1
N 865 2377 853 524 1782 345 341 595 508
Total Male Female
 





















yschool 0.316 0.572 0.225 0.559 0.468 0.332 -0.071 0.543 0.144
(0.034) (0.025) (0.023) (0.062) (0.027) (0.047) (0.054) (0.039) (0.027)
25%
yschool 0.158 0.493 0.243 0.376 0.496 0.457 0.162 0.412 0.218
(0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.036) (0.021) (0.041) (0.041) (0.024) (0.023)
50%
yschool 0.010 0.419 0.178 0.269 0.432 0.200 -0.030 0.356 0.145
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.027) (0.017) (0.026) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019)
75%
yschool 0.103 0.368 0.189 0.166 0.378 0.309 -0.139 0.286 0.312
(0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.027) (0.018) (0.034) (0.040) (0.020) (0.028)
90%
yschool 0.109 0.250 0.356 0.167 0.243 0.373 -0.446 0.256 0.083
(0.027) (0.015) (0.030) (0.036) (0.018) (0.047) (0.076) (0.025) (0.025)
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.306 0.322 0.178 0.393 0.253 0.256 0.608 0.287 0.229
2sls+selection
yschool 0.135 0.342 0.198 0.227 0.338 0.241 -0.047 0.338 0.182
(0.056) (0.054) (0.065) (0.081) (0.067) (0.140) (0.121) (0.092) (0.088)
selection correction DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1
N 276 1035 272 174 700 100 102 335 172
Total Male Female
 





















yschool -0.019 0.928 - 0.112 -0.111 - - 0.582 -
(0.093) (0.090) - (0.070) (0.060) - - (0.097) -
25%
yschool 0.126 0.330 - 0.083 0.023 - - 0.474 -
(0.067) (0.038) - (0.050) (0.042) - - (0.067) -
50%
yschool 0.258 0.095 - -0.024 0.112 - - 0.519 -
(0.064) (0.030) - (0.040) (0.040) - - (0.062) -
75%
yschool 0.023 0.294 - 0.049 0.681 - - 0.524 -
(0.067) (0.036) - (0.052) (0.073) - - (0.066) -
90%
yschool 0.085 -0.627 - 0.037 -0.326 - - 0.705 -
(0.093) (0.075) - (0.087) (0.070) - - (0.116) -
Difference between
the highest and the lowest 0.277 1.555 - 0.136 0.792 - - 0.231 -
2sls+selection
yschool 0.179 0.412 - 0.116 0.292 - 1.443 0.634 -
(0.164) (0.341) - (0.169) (0.365) - (0.909) (0.544) -
selection correction DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1 DMF v1DMF v1 DMF v1
N 44 168 4 31 111 3 13 57 N/A
Total Male Female
 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-6 years of schooling (primary) 0.038** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.019 0.058*** 0.035*  0.057* 0.046*** 0.024*  
(0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010)
7-9 years of schooling (lower sec.) 0.020 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.039 0.063*** 0.066*  0.022 0.086*** 0.082***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.017) (0.028) (0.012) (0.029) (0.044) (0.016) (0.021)
10-12 years of schooling (upper sec.) 0.182*** 0.104*** 0.089*** 0.165*** 0.086*** 0.111** 0.228*** 0.131*** 0.064*  
(0.021) (0.010) (0.023) (0.026) (0.012) (0.041) (0.033) (0.016) (0.029)
13+ (higher) 0.141*** 0.352*** 0.430*** 0.206*** 0.333*** 0.382*  0.107*** 0.391*** 0.451***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.102) (0.037) (0.034) (0.159) (0.030) (0.052) (0.134)
N 2728 9553 3054 1320 6109 1170 1408 3444 1884
Total Male Female
 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-6 years of schooling (primary) . -0.136 -1.940 . -0.214 . . -0.266 .
. (0.107) (0.767) . (0.162) . . (0.767) .
7-9 years of schooling (lower sec.) 0.275 0.377* 0.814 0.393* 0.617* -0.971 -0.485 0.285 0.415
(0.205) (0.160) (0.310) (0.192) (0.280) (.) (0.354) (0.224) (.)
10-12 years of schooling (upper sec.) 0.151* 0.108** -0.893* 0.166 0.089 -1.191 0.166 0.113 0.014
(0.069) (0.041) (0.186) (0.091) (0.057) (.) (0.135) (0.060) (.)
13+ (higher) 0.217** 0.304*** 0.554 0.180 0.257** 0.292 0.182 0.330** 0.000
(0.078) (0.067) (0.532) (0.115) (0.080) (.) (0.103) (0.121) (.)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-6 years of schooling (primary) 0.034* 0.057*** 0.023** 0.020 0.061*** 0.026 0.047 0.046*** 0.018
(0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011)
7-9 years of schooling (lower sec.) 0.021 0.068***0.085*** 0.047 0.058*** 0.074* 0.034 0.090***0.088***
(0.030) (0.012) (0.019) (0.034) (0.014) (0.033) (0.053) (0.020) (0.024)
10-12 years of schooling (upper sec.) 0.171***0.109***0.101*** 0.143***0.087*** 0.115* 0.235***0.138*** 0.083** 
(0.026) (0.012) (0.026) (0.035) (0.015) (0.045) (0.041) (0.019) (0.031)
13+ (higher) 0.134***0.469*** 0.460** 0.228***0.429*** 0.454* 0.091** 0.571*** 0.473** 
(0.028) (0.037) (0.142) (0.044) (0.042) (0.217) (0.033) (0.066) (0.161)


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-6 years of schooling (primary) 0.062* 0.054*** 0.061** 0.033 0.054*** 0.070 0.094* 0.043 0.054*
(0.027) (0.011) (0.021) (0.037) (0.013) (0.037) (0.038) (0.024) (0.025)
7-9 years of schooling (lower sec.) -0.014 0.089*** 0.043 0.014 0.081*** 0.041 -0.002 0.109*** 0.030
(0.046) (0.018) (0.041) (0.055) (0.024) (0.069) (0.080) (0.026) (0.053)
10-12 years of schooling (upper sec.) 0.237***0.113*** 0.044 0.275*** 0.094** 0.116 0.217***0.131*** -0.052
(0.042) (0.022) (0.060) (0.060) (0.029) (0.098) (0.063) (0.034) (0.075)
13+ (higher) 0.297***0.402***-0.357*  0.270* 0.449** -0.191 0.259*** 0.366** 0.000
(0.066) (0.092) (0.158) (0.133) (0.137) (0.294) (0.075) (0.127) (.)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-6 years of schooling (primary) . -0.014 . . -0.242** . . 0.199* .
. (0.074) . . (0.073) . . (0.083) .
7-9 years of schooling (lower sec.) 0.029 0.038 -0.019 0.246 0.167 -0.328 0.000 -0.268 .
(0.284) (0.101) (.) (0.145) (0.123) (.) (.) (0.168) .
10-12 years of schooling (upper sec.) 0.090 0.067 0.016 -0.010 0.023 0.382 2.600 0.145 .
(0.126) (0.043) (.) (0.102) (0.048) (.) (1.400) (0.083) .
13+ (higher) -0.020 0.219** . -0.037 0.139 . -0.323 0.175 .
(0.087) (0.079) . (0.094) (0.083) . (0.377) (0.159) .









Figure 8.1. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private in Different Models 1, Total 










































































































Figure 8.2. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private in Different Models 1, Whites 






















































































































Figure 8.3. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private in Different Models 1, Blacks 


































































































































Figure 8.4. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private in Different Models 1, Coloreds 












































































































Figure 8.5. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 1, Asians 























































































































Figure 8.6. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 2, All Races 


















































































































Figure 8.7. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 2, Whites 
























































































































Figure 8.8. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 2, Blacks 





















































































































Figure 8.9. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 2, Coloreds 
































































































































Figure 8.10. The Marginal Return to Schooling in the Public, Formal Private and Informal Private in Different Models 2, Asians 







































































































































































































Figure 8.12. Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector and Gender,  




















































































Figure 8.13.Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector for Whites,  


















































































Figure 8.14. Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector for Blacks,  















































































Figure 8.15. Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector for Colored, Using 

















































































Figure 8.16. Marginal Return to Schooling at Different Quantiles by Sector for Asians, Using 





















































































9. RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECT OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING  
ON INFORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
 
This chapter presents the results of the estimation of the effects of increased years of 
schooling on the probability of being employed in the public, formal private, and informal 
private sectors. The estimates of a multinomial logit choice model with four categories (public, 
formal private, informal private, and out of labor force/unemployed) based on equation 6.21 in 
Chapter 6 are shown first. Then, the results are presented for a probit choice model with different 
combinations of two sector categories (public vs. formal private, public vs. informal private, and 
formal private vs. informal private) based on equation 6.20 in Chapter 6. The probit estimation 
was conducted for the total sample and for married people separately. In addition, the 
instrumental variable probit model was conducted to control for endogeneity of education.  
In general, greater schooling had a positive effect on the probability of employment in 
the public and formal private sectors and a negative effect on employment in the informal private 
sector relative to other sectors of employment. Also the analysis here suggests that educated 
people who cannot find a job in the public or formal sector possibly choose to be unemployed or 
out of labor force. More schooling substantially raises the probability of working in the formal 
private and public sectors relative to being unemployed/out of labor force, but not as much in the 
informal sector. Being more educated does not results in greater employment probability in the 
informal private sector, relative to being unemployed/out of labor force, especially for women.  
9.1. Results of the Multinomial Logit Choice Model  




sector categories (public, formal private, and informal private) and out of labor force/ 
unemployed category. This model did not control for the endogeneity of schooling since the 
instrumental variable multinomial choice model does not have a well-developed method yet. The 
endogeneity of schooling was controlled in the next model, discussed in the next section. The 
analysis was conducted with the out of labor force/unemployed as a base category and the 
marginal effects are calculated based on the estimate. The marginal effects were usually 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The coefficients were statistically significant at the 
0.1% level except for the ones in the informal private sector which is either statistically 
significant at the 5% level or insignificant.  
The results show that workers with more schooling were more likely to work in the 
public and formal private sectors (relative to all other options)40. However, they also show that 
workers with greater schooling were less likely to be working in the informal private sector. With 
an additional year of schooling, workers were 0.5% points more likely to work in the public 
sector, 2.6% points more likely to work in the formal private sector, but 0.7% points less likely to 
work in the informal private sector relative to being unemployed/out of the labor force, and 2.5% 
points less likely to be out of labor force or unemployed. 
In addition, estimates of the education coefficients in the multinomial logit choice model 
by race and gender are shown in Table 9.2. The coefficients were also statistically significant at 
either the 0.1%, 1% or 10% level, with a few exceptions. The results indicate that workers with 
more schooling were more likely to work in the public and formal private sectors when 
compared to being unemployed/out of the labor force, but less likely to work in the informal 
                                                 
40 A marginal effect of schooling in a sector means the increase in the probability of being in the sector given 




sector relative to being unemployed/out of the labor force across race groups.  
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show the coefficients in the multinomial logit choice model for all 
races, by race and gender. For total sample, the coefficient of schooling is 0.41 for the public, 
0.14 for the formal private, 0.01 for the informal private, which means that an additional 
schooling greatly increases the probabilities of working in the public and formal private sectors 
compared to being unemployed and out of labor force, while it slightly increases the probability 
of working in the informal private sector compared to being unemployed and out of labor force. 
The coefficient of schooling in the informal private sector is even smaller and statistically 
insignificant for female, Whites, and Asians. This suggests that a substantial number of people 
who could not find a job in the public or formal private sector possibly choose to be unemployed 
or out of labor force instead of working in the informal sector.  
9.2. Results of the Probit Choice Model  
Next, the estimates of the probit model are presented. The findings show that workers 
with more schooling were more likely to work in the public and formal private sectors relative to 
the informal private sector. This was true across gender and race, except for White males. Also 
the effect of schooling on employment in the formal private sector relative to the employment in 
the informal sector, was much stronger for females than males, except for Whites and Asians. 
9.3. Results of the Instrumental Variable Probit Model 
The instrumental variable probit model was used because education could also be 
endogenous in determining employment probabilities.  
9.3.1. Test for the instrument 
Table 9.3 shows the Wald statistics to test for the exogeneity of years of schooling in the 




formal private sector, on the likelihood of working in the public sector versus the informal 
private sector, and on the likelihood of working in the formal private sector versus the informal 
private sector. The Wald statistics tested the null hypothesis that years of schooling was an 
exogenous variable. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the instrumental variable selected earlier, 
spouse schooling, would be used. 
Regarding the model comparing the public and formal private sectors, the Wald statistics 
shows that one can reject the null hypothesis that years of schooling is exogenous in the 
estimation involving the total sample, female sample, White male sample, and Black female 
sample at the 10% (or lower %) significance level. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
for other sub-samples including the male sample. 
The Wald statistics of the model comparing the public and informal private sectors shows 
that one can reject the null hypothesis that years of schooling is exogenous for the total sample, 
female sample, total Black sample, and total Colored sample at the 10% (or less %) level. 
However, one cannot reject the null hypothesis for the other samples. 
In the estimation comparing the formal private and informal private sectors, one can 
reject the null hypothesis that years of schooling is exogenous for the total sample, the female 
sample, total Black sample, Black female sample, total Colored sample, and female Colored 
sample. However, one cannot reject the null hypothesis for the other samples.   
9.3.2. Results 
Table 9.4 shows the marginal effects of years of schooling on public sector employment 
relative to the formal sector employment estimated by probit and IV probit. Given the variation 
in exogeneity tests reported in the previous section, some of the samples should use just the 




The IV probit coefficients are highlighted.  
Table 9.5 reports the marginal effects of years of schooling on public sector employment 
relative to the informal sector employment. The results were very similar across different 
samples and also statistically significant in general (mostly at the 0.1% level). The overall 
finding is that more education increases the probability of working in the public sector versus 
working in the informal sector. The impact of education was larger for females across race 
groups and for Whites. In the IV probit model, an additional year of schooling increased the 
likelihood of working in the public sector versus working in the informal private sector by 7.1% 
points for total, 4.8% points for males, and 9.2% points for females.  
The marginal effects of years of schooling on formal private sector employment relative 
to informal sector employment are shown in Table 9.6. The results shown are generally 
statistically significant. The marginal effects become larger in the IV probit compared to the 
ordinary probit for married people, but they were similar between the probit model for the total 
sample and the IV probit. Again, additional schooling increased the likelihood of working in the 
formal private sector, compared to working in the informal private sector. The effect of schooling 
was stronger for females. An additional year of schooling increased the probability of working in 
the formal private sector, compared to the informal private sector, by 1.5% points for total, 0.9% 
points for males, and 5.6% points for females in the IV probit model.  
9.4. Robustness Check  
To further confirm the robustness of the results on the probability of working in the 
formal private sector versus working in the informal private sector, several additional estimations 
were conducted. First, the definition of the informal sector was changed, as was also done in the 




district dummies were added to the model. In sum, the coefficients are robust across different 
models shown below.  
Table 9.7 shows marginal effects of years of schooling on the likelihood of working in 
the formal sector versus working in the informal sector estimated by probit and IV probit model 
using the workers in the informal sector and/or workers without written contract as the definition 
of the informal sector. The results confirm the findings in the previous model. It even increased 
the number of statistically significant marginal effects such as marginal effects for Black males 
in the IV probit and Colored total in the probit model. Also the marginal effects of years of 
schooling on the employment in the formal sector increased. 
Table 9.8 presents the coefficients of the probit and IV probit sector choice model using 
the workers in the informal sector and/or without any of the written contract, medical aid/health 
insurance, and pension/retirement fund as the definition of the informal sector. Again the patterns 
of results are similar to those discussed earlier.  
Table 9.9 presents the estimated coefficients of the model using the definition of informal 
employment as: workers without any of the written contract, medical aid/health insurance, and 
pension/retirement fund. Again, the findings are similar to previous models.  
Table 9.10 displays the probit/IV probit estimations with district dummies. The 
coefficients are very similar to the original models.  
9.5. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the effect of schooling on the likelihood of working in the 
informal sector compared to being in other options. It also examined the likelihood of being 
employed in the informal sector compared to one of the other two sectors of employment.  




informal sector when compared to the formal and public sectors. These findings were consistent 
in the models with and without controlling for the endogeneity of education. Moreover, these 
findings were robust across the models with different set of variables and different definitions for 
informal sector 
The dissertation used a multinomial logit model to estimate the likelihoods of working in 
the public, formal private, informal private sectors, and being unemployed/out of labor force. 
The results found that an additional year of schooling was associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of working in the public sector relative to all other options by 0.5%, an increase in the 
likelihood of working in the formal private sector by 2.6%, and a decrease in the likelihood of 
working in the informal private sector relative to all other options by 0.7% for the total sample. 
The trends were similar for the male and female samples in general. Also the coefficients in the 
analysis imply that a lot of educated people who cannot find a job in the public or formal sector 
possibly choose to be unemployed or out of labor force.  
The results just discussed appear to suggest that schooling does not generally have a 
strong role in producing an improved likelihood of employment for workers in the informal 
sector, at least when compared to the private and public sectors. The fact that increased just 
slightly raises the probability of working in the informal sector relative to the probability of 
being unemployed or out of the labor force imply that more-educated workers prefer to wait for a 
higher-paying job in the formal private or public sectors (remaining unemployed or just waiting 
outside the labor force) instead of taking a job in the informal sector. This suggests a relatively 
weak informal sector in terms of providing rewarding job opportunities for skilled workers. The 






Table 9.1  Estimations of the Multinomial Logit Sector Choice Model (Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private), Marginal 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
years of schooling 0.0054*** 0.026*** -0.0067*** -0.025*** 0.0047*** 0.023*** -0.0079*** -0.020*** 0.0058*** 0.040*** -0.0053*** -0.041***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
N 63785 29453 34332
 




Table 9.2  Estimations of the Multinomial Logit Sector Choice Model (Public, Formal Private, and Informal Private), Marginal 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
years of schooling 0.016*** 0.029*** -0.014** -0.032*** 0.0090** 0.042*** -0.016* -0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.002 -0.062***




























(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
years of schooling 0.0048*** 0.025*** -0.0090*** -0.021*** 0.0054** 0.017*** -0.0081* -0.014*** 0.002 0.021*** -0.0046* -0.019***




































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
years of schooling 0.015*** 0.026*** -0.0040** -0.037*** 0.0099*** 0.017*** 0.001 -0.028*** -0.048*** 0.016*** 0.040*** -0.0082**




























(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
years of schooling 0.024*** 0.065*** -0.016* -0.072*** 0.024** 0.055*** -0.008 -0.071*** 0.007 0.092*** -0.010 -0.090***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
N 1361 691 670
4091 47138804
 



























(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11)
years of schooling  0.410***  0.142***  0.011* 0.307***  0.110***  0.016* 0.524*** 0.176*** 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
N 63785 29453 34332
 
































(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11)
years of schooling 0.324*** 0.237*** 0.042 0.222*** 0.200*** -0.015 0.436*** 0.265*** 0.111



















(13) (14) (15) (17) (18) (19) (21) (22) (23)
years of schooling 0.444*** 0.135*** 0.011* 0.333*** 0.108*** 0.012 0.566*** 0.164*** 0.007
































(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11)
years of schooling 0.406*** 0.160*** 0.059*** 0.325*** 0.104*** 0.087*** 0.482*** 0.209*** 0.018



















(13) (14) (15) (17) (18) (19) (21) (22) (23)
years of schooling 0.659*** 0.367*** 0.117 0.537*** 0.306*** 0.093 0.832*** 0.408*** 0.067
(0.064) (0.038) (0.067) (0.081) (0.054) (0.082) (0.114) (0.060) (0.129)
N 1361 691 670
8804 4091 4713
 





Table 9.5  Test of Exogeneity of Schooling 
All Races
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Wald test of exogeneity 7.83 1.23 16.82 12.17 1.89 6.38 36.56 0.99 60.63
p=0.0051 p=0.2666 p=0.0000 p= 0.0005 p=0.1691 p=0.0115 p=0.0000 p=0.3195 p=0.0000
N 8474 5636 2838 4852 2546 2306 8983 5607 3376
Whites
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Wald test of exogeneity 0.66 3.42 0.00 0.21 0.74 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.37
p=0.4150 p=0.0644 p=0.9528 p=0.6500 p= 0.3889 p= 0.8184 p= 0.7208 p=0.7717 p=0.5456
N 1773 1033 740 420 217 203 1517 912 605
Blacks
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
Wald test of exogeneity 0.00 0.52 4.31 6.40 1.71 2.27 8.84 0.09 18.12
0.961 0.470 0.038 p= 0.0114 p=0.1914 p=0.1317 p=0.0029 p=0.7624 p=0.0000
N 4437 3116 1321 3499 1818 1681 3473 1895 1569
Colored
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
Wald test of exogeneity 1.07 0.71 0.00 3.54 1.24 0.72 3.40 0.46 11.42
p=0.3002  p=0.3994 p=0.9635 p=0.0598 p=0.2664 p=0.3946 p=0.0651 p= 0.4968 p= 0.0007
N 1835 1194 641 830 - 394 1815 - 717
Asians
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
Wald test of exogeneity 1.86 1.28 0.32 0.09 0.26 - 0.33 0.10 0.22
p=0.1721 p= 0.2573 p=0.5741 p=0.7670 p=0.6093 - p=0.5686 p=0.7521 p=0.6367
N 429 1194 136 98 71 - 408 285 102
Public vs Formal Private
Public vs Formal Private
Public vs Formal Private
Public vs Formal Private
Public vs Formal Private
Public vs Informal Private
Public vs Informal Private
Public vs Informal Private
Public vs Informal Private
Public vs Informal Private
Formal vs Informal Private
Formal vs Informal Private
Formal vs Informal Private
Formal vs Informal Private







Table 9.6. Estimations of Probit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, Public vs. 
Formal Private 
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.041*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.054*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
N 17786 10645 7106 9774 6478 3296 8474 5636 2838
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.013*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.011** 0.002 0.037*** 0.007 -0.010 0.036*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
N 2386 1349 1036 1813 1051 760 1773 1033 740
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.018*** 0.017** 0.034** 0.018** 0.018*** 0.021 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
N 11324 6901 4397 5601 3893 1708 4437 3116 1321
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.052*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
N 3440 1976 1456 1905 1219 685 1835 1194 641
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.039*** 0.036** 0.037* 0.044*** 0.035** 0.120** 0.017 0.023*** 0.085
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.017) (0.006) (0.060)
N 612 396 209 441 298 137 429 1194 136  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Only the IV probit estimations in 





Table 9.7  Estimations of the Provit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Public vs. Informal Private 
All Races
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.074*** 0.049*** 0.094*** 0.067*** 0.049*** 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.048*** 0.092***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
N 11272 4999 6233 5829 2876 2953 4852 2546 2306
Whites
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.026* 0.049*** 0.060** 0.045* 0.047* 0.044 0.058*
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029)
N 570 296 274 423 216 207 420 217 203
Blacks
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.047*** 0.032*** 0.046* 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.019 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.062***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
N 9095 3911 5147 4415 2130 2285 3499 1818 1681
Colored
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.065*** 0.049*** 0.082*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.082*** 0.071***  0.052*** 0.077***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) -0.011 (0.014)
N 1438 675 753 871 444 423 830 436 394
Asians
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.12*** 0.092** 0.50*  0.14*** 0.12*** 0.14  0.13*  0.10 -
(0.027) (0.028) (0.200) (0.031) (0.036) (2007.7) (0.058) (0.067) -
N 151 101 40 104 74 20 98 71 -
Probit
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Probit (married people) IV Probit
Probit
Probit (married people) IV Probit






Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Only the IV probit estimations in 





Table 9.8. Estimations of the Provit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Formal Private vs. Informal Private 
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.0072***0.0075*** 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.0086*** 0.056***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
N 20428 11491 8937 10520 6466 4054 8983 5607 3376
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.016*** 0.030*** 0.0036 0.010** 0.016** 0.0031 0.014* 0.021*  0.011
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014)
N 2054 1209 845 1545 928 617 1517 912 605
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.012*** 0.0015 0.036***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
N 14291 7971 6320 6647 4114 2533 3473 1895 1569
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.012*** 0.0015 0.036*** 0.0094** 0.0014 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.00013 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.025) (0.011)
N 3473 1895 1569 1895 1116 762 1815 1096 717
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.039** 0.038** 0.037 0.041*** 0.041** 0.064 0.041*** 0.041** 0.031
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.038) (0.012) (0.013) (0.081)
N 578 389 165 408 285 102 408 285 102
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Only the IV probit estimations in 





Table 9.9. Estimations of the Probit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Formal Private vs. Informal Private, Using the Workers in the Informal Sector and/or Workers 
without Written Contract as the Definition of the Informal Sector  
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.065***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
N 20428 11491 8937 10520 6466 4054 8983 5607 3376
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.016* 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.016 0.022* 0.034** 0.019
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
N 2062 1209 849 1553 928 621 1524 912 609
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.045***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
N 14291 7971 6320 6647 4114 2533 6647 4114 1929
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.048*** 0.021*** 0.008 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.04 0.075***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.012)
N 3481 1906 1569 1895 1122 762 1815 1098 717
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.042*** 0.041** 0.047* 0.035** 0.034* 0.065 0.031 0.024 0.079
(0.012) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.044) (0.027) (0.029) (0.074)
N 578 389 188 408 285 121 391 270 121  





Table 9.10. Estimations of the Probit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Formal Private vs. Informal Private, Using the Workers in the Informal Sector and/or without 
Any of the Written Contract, Medical Aid/Health Insurance, and Pension/Retirement Fund as the 
Definition of the Informal Sector 
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.025***0.025***0.038*** 0.016***0.014***0.045*** 0.033***0.025***0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
N 20428 11491 8937 10520 6466 4054 8983 5607 3376
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.022***0.038*** 0.012* 0.016***0.022*** 0.013 0.020** 0.031** 0.019
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017)
N 2062 1209 849 1553 928 621 1524 912 609
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.036***0.029***0.038*** 0.031***0.025***0.038*** 0.031***0.025***0.047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
N 14291 7971 6320 6647 4114 2533 6647 4114 1929
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.027***0.017***0.049*** 0.021*** 0.009* 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.044* 0.084***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.012)
N 3477 1903 1569 1895 1122 762 1815 1098 717
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.048*** 0.040** 0.080** 0.041** 0.032* 0.137* 0.036 0.029 0.129
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014) (0.060) (0.025) (0.025) (0.106)
N 578 389 188 408 285 121 391 270 121
 





Table 9.11. Estimations of the Probit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Formal Private vs. Informal Private, Using “Without Any of the Written Contract, Medical 
Aid/Health Insurance, and Pension/Retirement Fund” as the Definition of the Informal 
Employment 
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.045***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
N 16034 9302 6732 8061 5159 2902 6962 4422 2540
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.011** 0.018* 0.013* 0.011* 0.015* 0.011 0.009 0.019* 0.004
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.021)
N 1604 909 692 1168 681 484 1146 670 474
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.027* 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
N 10735 6338 4397 4828 3231 1597 4828 3231 1299
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.009* 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.061** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.012)
N 3217 1742 1470 1732 1021 706 1657 995 662
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.035** 0.027 0.073* 0.02 0.012 0.136** 0.026 0.019 -
(0.013) (0.018) (0.030) (0.011) (0.013) (0.052) (0.019) (0.025) -
N 462 217 164 316 135 88 308 124 -  





Table 9.12. Estimations of the Probit and IV Probit Sector Choice Model, Marginal Effects, 
Formal Private vs. Informal Private, With District Dummies 
All Races Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.007** 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.009** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009)
N 20428 11491 8937 10520 6466 4054 8983 5607 3376
Whites Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.018 0.036* 0.000 0.014 0.027 0.000 - - -
(0.012) (0.018) 0.000 (0.012) (0.023) 0.000 - - -
N 1884 1030 578 1260 596 393 - - -
Blacks Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.031** - - -
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) - - -
N 14291 7971 6320 6647 4104 2533 - - -
Colored Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.008 0.001 0.026 0.008 0.000 0.034* - - -
(0.004) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.015) - - -
N 3408 1854 1506 1830 1074 722 - - -
Asians Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
years of schooling 0.040 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.063* 0.064 - - -
(0.024) 0.000 (0.041) (0.002) (0.030) (0.092) - - -
N 484 308 126 321 218 66 - - -  








10. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, QUALIFICATIONS,  
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This dissertation has examined the impact of education on earnings and employment in 
the public and private formal and informal sectors in South Africa, using the Labor Force Survey 
of September, 2007. The key research questions in this dissertation were: (1) To what extent does 
education affect the earnings of workers in the informal sector and how does the effect of 
education on earnings differ between the informal and formal private sector workers? and (2) To 
what extent does education affect the probability of formal and informal sector employment?  
The returns to schooling were estimated using a variety of econometric methods intended 
to take into account possible endogeneity bias in the analysis of education, sample selection bias 
in the allocation of workers among various sectors of employment, including out of labor 
force/unemployed, and heterogeneity in rates of return to education. The most comprehensive 
model was the two-stage least squares model with multinomial two-step selection corrections to 
control for both endogeneity of schooling and sector sample selection bias. The quantile 
regression and piecewise linear spline function were applied to deal with the heterogeneity of 
returns to schooling. Moreover, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method was conducted to 
explore the contribution of returns to schooling and educational endowments to wage 
differentials between sectors. To analyze the effects of schooling on the different sectors of 
employment, multinomial logit and probit models were estimated. The instrumental variable 





In short, even after controlling for both endogeneity of education and sectoral sample 
selection bias, the return to schooling in the formal private sector was found to be much higher 
than that in the informal private sector. In fact, the rate of return to schooling was generally 
found to be the lowest in the informal private sector across race and gender groups. After 
controlling for the endogeneity of schooling and both sectoral and labor force participation 
sample selection bias using the 2SLS method with Durbin and Mcfadden selection correction, 
the marginal return to schooling in the informal sector was found to be equal to 16.8% for the 
overall sample studied, 14.3% for males and 18.7% for females, while that in the public sector 
was estimated to be equal to 18.1% for the total sample, 14.5% for males and 27.1% for females 
and that in the formal private sector was 25.1% for the total sample, 24.2% for males, and 
25.35% for females. Also, the marginal return to schooling in the informal sector was slightly 
lower than the average for Black males, while being higher than the average for the Colored 
population.  
Although not directly related to the focus of this dissertation, which is the comparative 
analysis of the formal and informal sectors, there was an interesting pattern observed in the rates 
of return to education in the public and formal private sectors, when disaggregated by gender. 
For males, the marginal return to schooling in the public sector was lower than that in the formal 
private sector, and this result remains true across race groups. By contrast, for females, the 
marginal return to schooling in the public sector was higher than that in the formal private sector.  
The estimation using quantile regressions shows that conditional distributions of earnings 
given years of schooling were significantly different between the formal private and informal 





of schooling and sample selection bias. The conditional distributions of earnings given years of 
schooling were similar between the public and informal private sector.  
The estimates of the piecewise spline function suggest convex marginal returns to 
education: schooling has a greater proportional impact on earnings as the level of education 
increases. This is especially true for the formal private and informal private sectors. The marginal 
returns to primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and higher education in the informal 
private sector were 2.8%, 7.9%, 9.2%, and 40.8%, respectively. It is interesting to see that 
although rates of return to education were generally found to be lower in the informal sector, 
there is a significant exception: the marginal returns to higher education were the highest in the 
informal sector. 
The results in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition show that the most significant factor in 
explaining wage differentials between the formal and informal sectors was not the differences in 
characteristics between the formal and informal sector, specially the higher levels of schooling of 
workers in the formal sector. Instead, it was the difference in the rewards offered to education 
and other characteristics of workers in the formal and informal sectors that explained the wage 
gaps between them. Education, for instance, is much more highly rewarded in the formal sector 
than in the informal sector, as was just discussed. The implications of this result are discussed 
below. At the same time, the dissertation also found that differences in average schooling tended 
to contribute much more to explaining wage differentials between the public and informal private 
sectors. 
The study also found that increased schooling had a very small effect on the probability 





contrast, the effect of increased schooling on working in the formal private and public sector 
–relative to unemployment/out of the labor force or relative to working in the informal sector– 
was positive. Also, the findings were consistent in the models with and without controlling for 
the endogeneity of education. These findings were robust across the models with different set of 
variables and different definitions for the informal sector. The interpretation of this result is 
examined below. 
 
10.1. Interpretation and Policy Recommendations 
The results just discussed appear to suggest that schooling does not generally have a 
strong role in producing improved labor market outcomes for workers in the informal sector, at 
least when compared to the private and public sectors. Therefore, putting everything together, the 
analysis supports the dual or segmented labor market view of the informal sector.  
The fact that increased schooling does not substantially affect the probability of working 
in the informal sector relative to being unemployed or out of the labor force, implies that 
more-educated workers prefer to wait for a higher-paying job in the formal private or public 
sectors (remaining unemployed or just waiting outside the labor force) instead of taking a job in 
the informal sector. This suggests a relatively weak informal sector in terms of providing 
rewarding job opportunities for skilled workers.  
The result showing lower rates of return to education in the informal sector, when 
compared to other sectors, also seems to indicate that employment in the informal sector consists 
of marginal, unskilled jobs where increased schooling does not produce greater earnings and 





more-schooled workers.  
It is likely that the workers that enter the informal sector (even those with higher levels of 
schooling) do so because they do not have access to the formal and public sectors, which are 
sheltered in a number of ways. One of the forces preventing access to the formal or public sectors 
may be linked to race. Blacks and Coloreds workers are much more likely to work in the informal 
private sector. This may be connected to racial discrimination in employment, geography and 
location, or differences in the quality of schooling. Another factor limiting employment in the 
formal sector may be trade unions, which are a powerful force in the formal private sector in 
South Africa. Many point out that the formal private sector labor market is distorted because of 
strong trade unions. 
The government has expressed concern with the size of the informal sector and the fact 
that it is associated with poverty and low income. In terms of policy implications, there are two 
sets of possible policies that could be used to correct the difficulties faced by workers in the 
informal sector. First, the analysis on rates of return to education could be taken to imply that 
informal sector firms have relatively low productivity and lack technological dynamism. Insofar 
as moving from the informal to the formal sector may allow informal sector firms to upgrade their 
technology and to have access to public infrastructure and to public programs supporting private 
sector development, such a shift may raise wages and growth in the informal sector and in the 
overall South African economy. Therefore, efforts to provide incentives to informal sector firms to 
become formal may pay off in the form of greater productivity, for both the firms themselves as 
well as the government. The government could remove excessively complicated regulations on the 





should consider drastically reforming labor market policies and regulations in South Africa. 
There is one set of results in the dissertation that do suggest that some of the employers in 
the informal sector may be avoiding the costs of onerous regulatory controls in the formal sector 
(including the penalties imposed by public sector corruption). This is the high rate of return that 
was observed in the informal sector for workers with a higher education degree, which exceeded 
that in the formal sector as well as in the public sector. This suggests that highly-skilled 
professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.) may be operating out of the informal sector in order to avoid 
the difficulties and costs of dealing with the government bureaucracy.  
Another policy implication is that the government should provide training and non-formal 
schooling for workers in the informal sector to complement the low quality of education they may 
have attained so that they will be become more productive. Assuming that improving the quality 
of schooling received by low-income families is a very long-run policy change, a more immediate 
solution for improving the earnings of informal workers is to provide them with greater training 
opportunities. Many of the workers in this sector have very low levels of schooling and their 
literacy skills may be very basic. 
10.2. Qualifications and Implications for Future Studies 
Conducting this research revealed some concerns about data and methodologies. First, it 
is possible that workers underreport their earnings and this could be more prevalent in a certain 
sector. Kuepie et al. (2009) suggest that measurement errors might appear in reported earnings, 
especially for non-salaried workers in the informal sector. Second, there could be measurement 
errors in reported years of schooling as well. Third, it is possible that some workers with specific 





included in the survey questionnaire. Although the dissertation carried out some analysis 
examining the role of taxes in explaining differences in pay across sectors, future analysis should 
consider this issue with data that provide before-tax and after-tax information. Fourth, the 
validity of the instrument used to estimate the return to schooling is not completely confirmed. 
Future studies should analyze the validity of the instrument as well as look for better 
identification strategies. Finally, although it is out of the scope of this study, the issue of wages 
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Table A.1  Definitions of Variables Used in the Estimations 
Variable Type of variable Description
public dummy 1 if working in the public sector, 0 otherwise
private, formal dummy 1 if working in the formal private sector, 0 otherwise
private, informal dummy 1 if working in the informal private sector, 0 otherwise
sector2 categorical 1 if unmployed/out of labor force, 2 if working in the public 
sector, 3 if working in the formal private sector, and 4 if 
working in the informal private sector (this variable is used 
especially for the choice model)
log hourly wage (lhwage) continuous Log of hourly wage. Hourly wage is calculated based on 
total salary of main occupation, salary period for the 
reported salary, and hours worked last week. 
years of schooling continuous Years of schooling attained. It is constructed based on 
grade, certificates, diplomas, bachelors and higher degrees 
completed. (see Table A.2 for more details)
spouse years of schooling continuous Years of schooling attained by spouse
age continuous Age
experience continuous Experience in the current main occupation
female dummy 1 if female, and 0 if male
married dummy 1 if married, 0 otherwise
white dummy 1 if White, 0 otherwise
black dummy 1 if Black, 0 otherwise
colored dummy 1 if Colored, 0 otherwise
asian dummy 1 if Asian, 0 otherwise
permanent dummy 1 if a worker has a permanent status at work, 0 otherwise
fixed dummy 1 if a worker has a fixed period contract, 0 otherwise
temporary dummy 1 if a worker has a temporary job, 0 otherwise
casual dummy 1 if a worker has a casual job, 0 otherwise
seasonal dummy 1 if a worker has a seasonal job, 0 otherwise
trade union dummy 1 if a respondent is a member of trade union, 0 otherwise
inverse dependecy ratio continuous The number of working individuals devided by the number 
of household members.
training dummy 1 if a respondent has been trained in skills that can be used 
for work, 0 otherwise
government job creation 
program
dummy 1 if a respondent work in any government job creation 





Table A.1 (continued) 
Variable Type of variable Description
district set of dummies In South Africa there are 53 district councils (DCs) which 
consist of forty-seven (47) non-metropolitan areas and six 
(6) metropolitan areas. 
industry set of dummies Types of industry included are (1) agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing, (2) mining and quarrying, (3) 
manufacturing, (4) electricity, gas and water supply, (5) 
construction, (6) wholesale and retail trade (7) transport, 
storage and communication, (8) financial intermediation, 
insurance, real estate and business services, (9) community, 
social and personal services, (10) private households, and 
(11) 3xterior organisations and foreign government. 
"Unspecified" is categorized as a missing value.
occupation set of dummies Types of occupation included are (1) legislators, senior 
officials and managers, (2) professionals, (3) technical and 
associate professionals, (4) clerks, (5) service workers and 
shop and market sales workers, (6) skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers, (7) craft and related trades workers, (8) 
plant and machine operators and assemblers, (9) elementary 
occupation, and (10) domestic workers. "Unspecified" is 
categorized as a missing value.
language set of dummies Kinds of languages included are (1) Afrikaans, (2) English, 
(3) Isindebele / South Ndebele / North Ndebele, (4) 
Isixhosa / Xhosa, (5) Isizulu / Zulu, (6) Sepedi / Northern 
Sotho, (7) Sesotho / Southern Sotho / Sotho, (8) Setswana / 
Tswana, (9) Siswati / Swazi, (10) Tshivenda / Venda, (11) 
Xitsonga / Tsonga, and (12) Other. "Unspecified" is 
categorized as a missing value.
spouse public sector dummy 1 if spouse is working in the public sector, 0 otherwise.
spouse formal private sector dummy 1 if spouse is working in the formal private sector, 0 other 
wise.
spouse informal private 
sector
dummy 1 if spouse is working in the informal private sector, 0 
otherwise.
househoud public sector dummy 1 if at least one of the household members are working in 
the public sector, 0 otherwise.
household formal private 
sector
dummy 1 if at least one of the household members are working in 
the formal private sector sector, 0 otherwise.
household informal private 
sector
dummy 1 if at least one of the household members are working in 





















Certificate with Grade 12 13
Diploma with Grade 12(not associate degree) 14
Bachelors Degree 15
Bacherlors Degree with Diploma 16
Honors Degree 17
Master's Degree and Doctorate 19  





















/out of labor 
force 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
age 0.007*** 0.084*** 0.002*** -0.093***
(0.001) (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
age squared/100 -0.007*** -0.100*** -0.001** 0.109***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
female* -0.003** -0.285*** 0.026*** 0.262***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
primary* 0.001 0.064*** -0.004 -0.060***
(0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.011)
lower secondary* 0.008* 0.103*** -0.013*** -0.099***
(0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.011)
upper secondary* 0.040*** 0.216*** -0.034*** -0.222***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012)
certificates and 0.320*** 0.005 -0.042*** -0.283***
associate degree* (0.025) (0.026) (0.004) (0.011)
bachelors and above* 0.341*** -0.004 -0.044*** -0.292***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.004) (0.011)
Black 0.015*** -0.380*** 0.036*** 0.329***
(0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
Colored 0.038*** -0.232*** 0.003 0.191***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013)
Asian -0.002 -0.236*** -0.01 0.248***
(0.003) (0.019) (0.006) (0.020)
inverse dependency ratio 0.040*** 1.112*** 0.092*** -1.244***
(0.004) (0.025) (0.009) (0.027)
spouse formal private sector* -0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
spouse informal private sector* -0.011*** -0.111*** 0.010*** 0.111***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015)
household formal private sector* -0.016*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
household informal private sector* 0.005*** -0.011 0.041*** -0.036***



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.181*** 0.251*** 0.168*** 0.145*** 0.242*** 0.143** 0.271** 0.253*** 0.187***
(0.040) (0.020) (0.031) (0.043) (0.024) (0.049) (0.089) (0.039) (0.043)
experience 0.002 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.009 0.046*** 0.04 -0.003 0.012 0.035*  
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
experience^2 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.253***-0.323***-0.250***
(0.052) (0.035) (0.054)
permanent 0.542*** 0.202*** 0.068 0.667*** 0.198*** 0.03 0.408*** 0.204*** 0.095
(0.080) (0.031) (0.044) (0.115) (0.039) (0.075) (0.115) (0.053) (0.056)
trade union 0.268*** 0.213*** 0.242 0.221** 0.271*** 0.085 0.224* 0.077 0.31
(0.055) (0.031) (0.125) (0.072) (0.038) (0.216) (0.101) (0.051) (0.169)
Black -0.208* -0.633***-1.295*** -0.402**-0.578***-1.762*** 0.021 -0.709***-0.892*  
(0.093) (0.064) (0.342) (0.126) (0.086) (0.521) (0.147) (0.100) (0.428)
Colored -0.076 -0.367***-1.036** -0.238 -0.377***-1.532** 0.234 -0.294* -0.585
(0.118) (0.077) (0.338) (0.150) (0.101) (0.513) (0.222) (0.136) (0.435)
Asian -0.088 -0.299*** -0.043 -0.134 -0.250** -0.637 -0.067 -0.331*** 1.007*  
(0.115) (0.065) (0.472) (0.121) (0.090) (0.619) (0.273) (0.095) (0.431)
trnsp0 0.389** 0.330** -0.047 0.348 0.371* -0.096 0.564* 0.490* -0.113
(0.139) (0.112) (0.198) (0.181) (0.148) (0.384) (0.240) (0.212) (0.230)
trnsp1 1.399*** 2.038*** 1.493*** 1.301 1.224* 2.582** 
(0.281) (0.599) (0.344) (0.880) (0.529) (0.892)
trnsp2 0.189 -0.274 0.276 -0.336 0.271 -0.401
(0.182) (0.268) (0.249) (0.608) (0.325) (0.303)
trnsp3 -0.239 -0.354* -0.378 -0.173               -0.225 -0.331               
(0.307) (0.171) (0.380) (0.211)               (0.550) (0.282)               
lnp1 -0.086 -0.04                -0.245                
(0.081) (0.094)                (0.179)                
lnp2 -0.226*** -0.284**               -0.250**               
(0.059) (0.088)               (0.096)               
lnp3 0.001 0.031 0.052
(0.077) (0.126) (0.096)
constant 0.445 -0.111 1.269** 1.004 -0.161 1.839*  -1.16 -0.156 0.529
(0.744) (0.269) (0.489) (0.849) (0.330) (0.844) (1.555) (0.485) (0.620)
R squared 0.415 0.277 0.058 0.386 0.266 0.174 0.437 0.368 .   
N 1312 3963 1140 792 2805 454 520 1158 686
Total Male Female
 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.313* 0.492*** -0.364 0.135 0.389* -0.169 0.551 0.785* 0.372
(0.149) (0.142) (.) (0.166) (0.166) (.) (0.300) (0.340) (.)
experience 0.052 0.057* -0.030 0.054 0.078 0.163 0.063 0.064 0.071
(0.028) (0.029) (.) (0.065) (0.050) (.) (0.038) (0.047) (.)
experience^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (.) (0.001) (0.001) (.) (0.001) (0.001) (.)
female -0.411** -0.513** -0.300
(0.145) (0.176) (.)
permanent 0.657** -0.126 0.739 1.422*** -0.317 0.000 0.410* 0.1 0.000
(0.208) (0.274) (.) (0.248) (0.416) (.) (0.191) (0.347) (.)
trade union 0.174 0.293** 1.832 -0.055 0.256 3.061 0.163 0.314* 0.000
(0.141) (0.097) (.) (0.233) (0.141) (.) (0.195) (0.150) (.)
trnsp0 0.756 1.531* -0.035 1.766 1.53 0.000 1.071 2.315 0.000
(1.089) (0.681) (.) (2.083) (0.916) (.) (1.406) (1.424) (.)
trnsp1 4.703* -0.609 3.765 0.000 7.996 0.000
(1.823) (.) (2.605) (.) (4.122) (.)
trnsp2 1.196 4.843 3.023 0.000 0.737 0.000
(1.469) (.) (2.092) (.) (2.940) (.)
trnsp3 -1.534 -2.072 -0.197 -2.14 -3.768 -2.195
(1.552) (1.384) (2.030) (2.005) (3.041) (1.822)
lnp1 -0.293 -0.173 -0.507
(0.242) (0.271) (0.505)
lnp2 -2.193* -2.019 -3.549
(0.926) (1.510) (1.921)
lnp3 -1.198 -0.308 -0.451
(.) (.) (.)
constant -1.413 -2.509 8.008 2.42 -1.396 4.872 -6.013 -6.63 -3.751
(2.796) (1.725) (.) (4.231) (2.143) (.) (4.667) (4.524) (.)
R squared 0.291 0.003 1 0.43 0.139 1 . . 1
N 127 383 11 63 212 6 64 171 5
Total Male Female
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. Selection terms are 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.196*** 0.230*** 0.157*** 0.121* 0.230*** 0.119* 0.404* 0.222*** 0.188***
(0.058) (0.025) (0.035) (0.055) (0.029) (0.053) (0.185) (0.050) (0.050)
experience -0.001 0.043*** 0.047*** -0.001 0.060*** 0.05 0.023 0.016 0.037*  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017)
experience^2 0.001** 0.000 -0.000*  0.000 -0.000** -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.197**-0.352***-0.244***
(0.071) (0.046) (0.065)
permanent 0.522*** 0.189*** 0.028 0.713*** 0.175*** -0.063 0.332* 0.222** 0.093
(0.097) (0.037) (0.050) (0.133) (0.045) (0.087) (0.165) (0.071) (0.063)
trade union 0.226** 0.264*** 0.315*  0.200* 0.327*** 0.217 0.070 0.073 0.369
(0.073) (0.040) (0.146) (0.092) (0.048) (0.238) (0.182) (0.073) (0.210)
trnsp0 0.267 0.550*** 0.170 0.224 0.582** 0.373 0.664 0.614 -0.200
(0.180) (0.146) (0.259) (0.222) (0.184) (0.405) (0.372) (0.342) (0.307)
trnsp1 1.566*** 2.252** 1.876*** 1.266 0.872 3.064** 
(0.390) (0.745) (0.475) (1.098) (0.809) (1.093)
trnsp2 -0.129 -0.147 -0.158 0.056 0.375 -0.549
(0.222) (0.331) (0.279) (0.612) (0.513) (0.375)
trnsp3 -0.347 0.102               -0.285 0.235 -0.617 0.232               
(0.361) (0.177)               (0.405) (0.223) (0.825) (0.328)               
lnp1 -0.092                0.029 -0.518               
(0.130)                (0.135) (0.398)               
lnp2 -0.240***              -0.296** -0.237               
(0.072)               (0.107) (0.122)               
lnp3 -0.069 -0.138 0.122
(0.106) (0.149) (0.138)
constant -0.197 -0.369 0.083 0.807 -0.494 0.355 -3.497 -0.366 -0.363
(0.998) (0.278) (0.372) (0.992) (0.341) (0.727) (3.187) (0.506) (0.490)
R squared 0.367 0.125 - 0.364 0.105 0.064 0.248 0.209 -
N 865 2377 853 524 1782 345 341 595 508
Total Male Female
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. Selection terms are 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.135 0.342*** 0.210** 0.227* 0.338*** 0.229 -0.047 0.338** 0.177*
(0.071) (0.059) (0.066) (0.105) (0.070) (0.121) (0.120) (0.106) (0.086)
experience 0.022 0.059*** 0.024 0.078* 0.071*** 0.007 0.005 0.037 0.024
(0.021) (0.015) (0.026) (0.036) (0.019) (0.045) (0.032) (0.022) (0.036)
experience^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
female -0.238* -0.309*** -0.193 0.236 0.329** 0.156 0.527* 0.164 0.044
(0.109) (0.084) (0.107) (0.277) (0.108) (0.177) (0.248) (0.107) (0.123)
permanent 0.488** 0.240*** 0.117 0.600*** 0.194* -0.12 0.594** -0.058 -0.126
(0.179) (0.072) (0.095) (0.177) (0.087) (0.629) (0.202) (0.124) (0.264)
trade union 0.466*** 0.117 -0.100
(0.120) (0.071) (0.264)
trnsp0 0.570 -0.106 -1.487** 0.611 -0.282 -2.680* 0.204 0.506 -1.032*
(0.361) (0.303) (0.505) (0.485) (0.434) (1.174) (0.779) (0.503) (0.508)
trnsp1 2.293** 1.642 2.156* 1.911 2.812 0.822
(0.795) (1.249) (0.959) (1.955) (1.547) (1.725)
trnsp2 0.480 -2.451** 1.376 -4.771* -0.853 -1.800*
(0.495) (0.841) (0.820) (1.912) (0.880) (0.760)
trnsp3 0.488 -1.121*               -0.656 -0.923 1.742* -0.978
(0.720) (0.555)               (1.376) (0.711) (0.721) (0.770)
lnp1 -0.035                -0.366 0.507
(0.195)                (0.296) (0.428)
lnp2 -0.313               -0.41 -0.373
(0.207)               (0.326) (0.302)
lnp3 0.363*  0.680* 0.161
(0.173) (0.324) (0.172)
constant 1.057 -1.952** -1.441 -0.73 -2.248* -2.813 3.389 -1.507 -1.195
(1.140) (0.705) (0.970) (1.869) (0.912) (2.031) (1.749) (1.103) (1.076)
R squared 0.515 . .   0.294 . 0.07 0.663 . .
N 276 1035 272 174 700 100 102 335 172
Total Male Female
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. Selection terms are 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
years of schooling 0.179 0.412 0.116 0.292 1.443 0.634
(0.129) (0.327) (0.148) (0.306) (1.239) (0.677)
experience -0.052 0.027 -0.067 0.014 -0.449 0.014
(0.043) (0.041) (0.070) (0.042) (0.408) (0.091)
experience^2 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.012 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
female -0.541 -0.583*
(0.421) (0.284)
permanent 0.722*** 0.218 0.650*** 0.28 0 0.125
(0.177) (0.156) (0.163) (0.199) (.) (0.261)
trade union -0.088 0.038 -0.038 -0.078 -0.228 0.499
(0.310) (0.112) (0.408) (0.155) (0.791) (0.303)
trnsp0 -0.106 0.871 0.482 1.295 -13.873 0.436
(1.109) (0.659) (0.992) (0.936) (13.768) (1.767)
trnsp1 1.451 0.7 2.494
(2.741) (2.671) (6.114)
trnsp2 -0.847 -0.266 -28.241
(1.437) (1.533) (24.875)
trnsp3 0.052 -2.731 -0.209 -1.729 -12.932 -5.058
(2.757) (3.191) (3.233) (4.637) (15.806) (4.279)
lnp1 0.166 0.208 2.183
(0.189) (0.309) (1.937)
lnp2 -0.442 -0.672 -0.159
(0.460) (0.557) (1.709)
lnp3
constant 0.936 -2.325 2.628 -0.72 -35.221 -5.903
(2.809) (4.120) (3.259) (3.937) (34.587) (8.722)
R squared 0.413 0.074 0.574 0.203 0.635 .
N 44 168 4 31 111 3 13 57
Total Male Female
 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. Selection terms are 






Table A.9  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Formal Private, All Races 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.041*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.054*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
female* 0.035***                0.049***                0.040***               
(0.004)                (0.007)                (0.007)               
age 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
age^2/100 -0.007***-0.009*** -0.009*  -0.012***-0.011*** -0.018*  -0.014***-0.014*** -0.017*  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Black* 0.077*** 0.083*** 0.107** 0.095*** 0.100*** 0.101 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.220***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.040) (0.025) (0.028) (0.068) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Colored* 0.090*** 0.105*** 0.139*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.164*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.132***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) (0.017) (0.034) (0.012) (0.014) (0.030)
Asian* 0.038** 0.049** 0.063 0.031* 0.050** -0.002 0.003 0.019 -0.041
(0.012) (0.016) (0.038) (0.015) (0.018) (0.052) (0.012) (0.014) (0.035)
married* 0.002 -0.007 0.061***                
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016)                
inverse dependecy -0.030***-0.037***-0.058*** -0.037***-0.038*** -0.058*  -0.038***-0.039*** -0.057*  
 ratio (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.024)
training* 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022)
government job 0.113*** 0.095** 0.271*** 0.150*** 0.135* 0.315*** 0.179*** 0.142* 0.328***
 creation program* (0.023) (0.033) (0.048) (0.041) (0.053) (0.078) (0.049) (0.061) (0.087)
spouse -0.009 0.001 -0.061*** 0.010 0.026 -0.042 0.028 0.041 -0.027
 public sector* (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.052) (0.021) (0.025) (0.051)
spouse formal 0.004 0.027** -0.058*** -0.007 0.018 -0.113*** -0.010 0.013 -0.103***
 sector* (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024)
household 0.104*** 0.122*** 0.170*** 0.086*** 0.083** 0.143*  0.080** 0.072* 0.135
 public sector* (0.013) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.064) (0.027) (0.029) (0.071)
household -0.032***-0.034***-0.083*** -0.031***-0.026*** -0.075*  -0.028***-0.026*** -0.030
 formal sector* (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.007) (0.006) (0.031)
Pseudo R^2 0.185 0.148 0.221 0.170 0.135 0.233
N 17786 10645 7106 9774 6478 3296 8474 5636 2838  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 







Table A.10  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Formal Private, Whites 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.013*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.011** 0.002 0.037*** 0.007 -0.010 0.036*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
female* 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.081***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
age 0.037***0.049*** 0.030** 0.029***0.041*** 0.017 0.030***0.042*** 0.017
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
age^2/100 -0.039***-0.055*** -0.028* -0.031***-0.046*** -0.013 -0.032***-0.048*** -0.013
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016)
married* -0.043 -0.056 0.000                   
(0.025) (0.035) (0.053)                   
inverse dependecy 0.011 0.019 -0.014 0.007 0.005 -0.003 0.011 0.006 0.005
 ratio (0.023) (0.033) (0.040) (0.024) (0.034) (0.047) (0.025) (0.034) (0.050)
training* -0.012 -0.011 -0.026 -0.009 -0.017 -0.006 -0.010 -0.014 -0.020
(0.020) (0.027) (0.036) (0.020) (0.025) (0.045) (0.020) (0.025) (0.046)
government job 0.136 0.238 0.057 0.050 0.151 -0.079 0.087 0.230 -0.076
 creation program* (0.132) (0.192) (0.202) (0.117) (0.185) (0.181) (0.135) (0.221) (0.192)
spouse -0.046 -0.076 0.022 0.028 -0.011 0.218 0.056 0.022 0.194
 public sector* (0.038) (0.042) (0.103) (0.075) (0.072) (0.247) (0.088) (0.088) (0.248)
spouse formal 0.024 0.030 -0.016 -0.041 -0.027 -0.101 -0.054* -0.026 -0.154*
 sector* (0.035) (0.047) (0.061) (0.029) (0.036) (0.071) (0.028) (0.036) (0.068)
household 0.204***0.301*** 0.072 0.084 0.166 -0.071 0.051 0.121 -0.065
 public sector* (0.056) (0.075) (0.090) (0.085) (0.115) (0.155) (0.082) (0.112) (0.164)
household -0.072** -0.067* -0.095* -0.003 -0.004 0.011 0.013 -0.004 0.093
 formal sector* (0.023) (0.031) (0.042) (0.034) (0.039) (0.096) (0.038) (0.039) (0.118)
Pseudo R^2 0.077 0.079 0.091 0.057 0.053 0.079
N 2386 1349 1036 1813 1051 760 1773 1033 740  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.11  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Formal Private, Blacks 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.018*** 0.017** 0.034** 0.018** 0.018*** 0.021 0.028***0.021***0.057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
female* 0.055*** 0.076*** 0.096***
(0.014) (0.022) (0.017)
age 0.010** 0.011** 0.013* 0.012** 0.016* 0.009 0.025***0.024*** 0.033*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
age^2/100 -0.006* -0.008* -0.006 -0.009* -0.012* -0.005 -0.020***-0.020** -0.025
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016)
married* 0.007 -0.007 0.053*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.022)
inverse dependecy -0.045***-0.058** -0.059* -0.053** -0.078** -0.034 -0.110***-0.110***-0.147**
 ratio (0.013) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.053)
training* -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.012 0.015 0.01
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.047)
government job 0.129*** 0.118* 0.232*** 0.199** 0.244** 0.229 0.315*** 0.253* 0.445***
 creation program* (0.037) (0.051) (0.070) (0.064) (0.092) (0.130) (0.070) (0.100) (0.074)
spouse -0.016 0.005 -0.056* -0.003 0.049 -0.033 0.040 0.132 -0.156
 public sector* (0.010) (0.018) (0.027) (0.021) (0.050) (0.029) (0.054) (0.079) (0.092)
spouse formal 0.000 0.032 -0.044* -0.016 0.026 -0.037 -0.029 0.025 -0.189***
 sector* (0.009) (0.020) (0.022) (0.012) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.034) (0.050)
household 0.149***0.160***0.194*** 0.132** 0.136* 0.146 0.175** 0.095 0.376***
 public sector* (0.033) (0.043) (0.055) (0.050) (0.066) (0.096) (0.065) (0.070) (0.111)
household -0.044** -0.052** -0.065* -0.038* -0.057* -0.022 -0.056**-0.066*** 0.008
 formal sector* (0.014) (0.019) (0.030) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.072)
Pseudo R^2 0.223 0.174 0.254 0.210 0.160 0.276
N 11324 6901 4397 5601 3893 1708 4437 3116 1321  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.12  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Formal Private, Coloreds 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.025***0.020***0.032*** 0.025***0.013***0.052*** 0.032***0.023***0.050***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
female* 0.004 0.010 0.006
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022)
age 0.008* 0.014** -0.003 0.019** 0.013* 0.021 0.025** 0.022** 0.031
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021)
age^2/100 0.008* 0.014** -0.003 -0.016 -0.012 -0.011 -0.020* -0.018 -0.023
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026)
married* -0.008 -0.023 0.050
(0.015) (0.018) (0.034)
inverse dependecy -0.052** -0.092** 0.011 -0.065* -0.075** 0.016 -0.079* -0.115** (0.018)
 ratio (0.020) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.070) (0.036) (0.040) (0.079)
training* 0.061** 0.026 0.102** 0.037 0.014 0.083 0.027 0.016 0.053
(0.022) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026) (0.021) (0.064) (0.033) (0.036) (0.069)
government job 0.356** 0.181 0.524*** 0.097 -0.004 0.334 0.139 0.009 0.334
 creation program* (0.113) (0.140) (0.142) (0.165) (0.097) (0.279) (0.195) (0.192) (0.277)
spouse 0.033 0.036 0.001 0.061 0.042 0.141 0.066 0.051 0.162
 public sector* (0.032) (0.041) (0.047) (0.056) (0.048) (0.148) (0.068) (0.072) (0.165)
spouse formal 0.026 0.062 -0.044 0.021 0.030 -0.043 0.025 0.048 -0.044
 sector* (0.023) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.077) (0.038) (0.042) (0.091)
household 0.086** 0.126** 0.044 0.060 0.083 -0.075 0.082 0.147 -0.103
 public sector* (0.027) (0.041) (0.037) (0.051) (0.055) (0.109) (0.063) (0.078) (0.117)
household -0.073***-0.065***-0.087***-0.074*** -0.034* -0.177** -0.104***-0.073**-0.201***
 formal sector* (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) (0.059) (0.022) (0.024) (0.058)
Pseudo R^2 0.164 0.165 0.183 0.156 0.149 0.204
N 3440 1976 1456 1905 1219 685 1835 1194 641  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.13  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Formal Private, Asians 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.039*** 0.036** 0.037* 0.044*** 0.035** 0.121** 0.017 0.023*** 0.085
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.039) (0.017) (0.006) (0.060)
female* 0.000 -0.014 -0.018
(0.037) (0.043) (0.038)
age 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.045* 0.064** 0.032 0.032* 0.022** 0.016
(0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.062) (0.015) (0.009) (0.067)
age^2/100 -0.030 -0.023 -0.033 -0.052* -0.072** -0.049 -0.037* -0.018 -0.030
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.079) (0.018) (0.010) (0.088)
married* -0.014 -0.056 0.291*
(0.052) (0.072) (0.141)
inverse dependecy -0.009 0.029 -0.047 0.053 0.086 -0.105 0.045 -0.115** -0.064
 ratio (0.057) (0.083) (0.063) (0.071) (0.086) (0.207) (0.067) (0.040) (0.204)
training* -0.025 -0.034 -0.025 -0.028 -0.020 -0.128 -0.027 0.016 -0.134
(0.046) (0.063) (0.045) (0.052) (0.059) (0.164) (0.046) (0.036) (0.163)
government job 0.347 0.392 0.322 0.318 0.448 0.009
 creation program* (0.317) (0.303) (0.322) (0.320) (0.321) (0.192)
spouse 0.030 0.182 -0.079 0.020 0.228 -0.329* 0.085 0.051 -0.316
 public sector* (0.104) (0.188) (0.043) (0.121) (0.227) (0.151) (0.143) (0.072) (0.169)
spouse formal -0.038 0.141 -0.084 -0.023 0.155 -0.342* -0.006 0.048 -0.346*
 sector* (0.046) (0.115) (0.047) (0.062) (0.130) (0.151) (0.068) (0.042) (0.162)
household 0.102 0.095 0.160 0.118 0.041 0.494* 0.072 0.147 0.412
 public sector* (0.092) (0.118) (0.158) (0.133) (0.136) (0.205) (0.116) (0.078) (0.249)
household -0.035 -0.115 0.113 -0.045 -0.105* 0.503** -0.037 -0.073** 0.511**
 formal sector* (0.044) (0.059) (0.072) (0.055) (0.044) (0.183) (0.053) (0.024) (0.195)
Pseudo R^2 0.091 0.096 0.194 0.125 0.147 0.316
N 612 396 209 441 298 137 429 1194 136  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.14  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Informal Private, All 
Races 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.074***0.049***0.094*** 0.067***0.049***0.095*** 0.071***0.048***0.092***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
female* -0.099*** -0.176*** -0.174***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
age 0.034***0.041***0.020*** 0.039***0.055*** 0.028** 0.040***0.053*** 0.025*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
age^2/100 -0.030***-0.041*** -0.012 -0.036***-0.055*** -0.022 -0.037***-0.053*** -0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Black* -0.075 -0.003 -0.160* -0.079 0.041 -0.179* -0.131*** -0.061 -0.165***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.067) (0.059) (0.076) (0.087) (0.034) (0.043) (0.048)
Colored* 0.006 0.060 -0.071 -0.021 0.034 -0.050 0.013 0.063 -0.011
(0.030) (0.037) (0.046) (0.037) (0.050) (0.057) (0.038) (0.049) (0.055)
Asian* -0.019 0.007 0.009 -0.111 -0.044 -0.015 -0.073 -0.048 0.045
(0.056) (0.064) (0.099) (0.071) (0.088) (0.134) (0.062) (0.069) (0.126)
married* 0.025 0.076*** -0.037
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
inverse dependecy -0.088***-0.066**-0.096*** -0.091***-0.090** -0.105** -0.208***-0.207***-0.184***
 ratio (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.040) (0.031) (0.041) (0.045)
training* 0.079***0.087*** 0.052* 0.055* 0.079* 0.014 0.049 0.092** -0.035
(0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.032) (0.038) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039)
government job 0.383*** 0.157* 0.493*** 0.276*** 0.151 0.446*** 0.356*** 0.162 0.578***
 creation program* (0.031) (0.066) (0.042) (0.042) (0.091) (0.054) (0.050) (0.107) (0.050)
spouse -0.024 -0.059 0.042 0.095 0.058 0.132 0.149* 0.134 0.158
 public sector* (0.032) (0.037) (0.046) (0.049) (0.077) (0.075) (0.061) (0.084) (0.098)
spouse formal -0.004 0.078* -0.038 0.014 0.121* -0.079 0.030 0.110 -0.036
 sector* (0.025) (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.052) (0.051) (0.040) (0.057) (0.055)
household 0.309***0.350***0.281*** 0.200***0.244*** 0.202** 0.190*** 0.187* 0.211*
 public sector* (0.021) (0.033) (0.029) (0.039) (0.063) (0.066) (0.055) (0.076) (0.092)
household 0.035 0.070** 0.012 0.050 0.067 0.067 0.077* 0.101* 0.076
 formal sector* (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.044) (0.050) (0.037) (0.047) (0.058)
Pseudo R^2 0.312 0.263 0.378 0.304 0.223 0.412
N 11272 4999 6233 5829 2876 2953 4852 2546 2306  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 






Table A.15  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Informal Private, Whites 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.057***0.074*** 0.026* 0.049*** 0.060** 0.045* 0.047* 0.044 0.058*
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029)
female* 0.089 0.008 -0.001
(0.046) (0.049) (0.056)
age 0.048** 0.063* 0.009 0.036 0.040 0.023 0.039 0.043 0.027
(0.016) (0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.033) (0.025) (0.022) (0.037) (0.030)
age^2/100 -0.055** -0.075* -0.008 -0.039 -0.045 -0.021 -0.043 -0.048 -0.024
(0.019) (0.030) (0.015) (0.022) (0.037) (0.028) (0.025) (0.040) (0.034)
married* 0.021 0.170 -0.123
(0.065) (0.091) (0.082)
inverse dependecy -0.011 0.027 -0.036 -0.033 -0.030 -0.021 -0.056 -0.065 -0.038
 ratio (0.066) (0.104) (0.051) (0.073) (0.119) (0.095) (0.082) (0.127) (0.114)
training* -0.114 -0.065 -0.108 -0.071 0.017 -0.166 -0.077 0.022 -0.205
(0.060) (0.086) (0.070) (0.066) (0.094) (0.102) (0.071) (0.100) (0.109)
government job
 creation program*
spouse -0.360* -0.487*** 0.078 0.032 -0.706*** 0.200* 0.093 -0.659***0.265**
 public sector* (0.174) (0.098) (0.048) (0.178) (0.088) (0.084) (0.188) (0.062) (0.091)
spouse formal 0.058 0.108 0.058 0.053 0.111 -0.022 0.079 0.154 -0.022
 sector* (0.081) (0.133) (0.036) (0.086) (0.114) (0.186) (0.096) (0.118) (0.213)
household 0.315***0.513*** 0.036 0.146 0.294*** -0.340 0.153 0.341*** -0.355
 public sector* (0.065) (0.098) (0.082) (0.104) (0.088) (0.386) (0.145) (0.062) (0.368)
household 0.018 0.065 -0.063 0.037 0.030 0.088 0.057 0.030 0.131
 formal sector* (0.071) (0.105) (0.077) (0.084) (0.116) (0.134) (0.094) (0.127) (0.157)
Pseudo R^2 0.065 0.121 0.111 0.107 0.141 0.116
N 570 296 274 423 216 207 420 217 203  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.16  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Informal Private, Blacks 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.047***0.032*** 0.046* 0.051***0.044*** 0.019 0.064***0.042***0.062***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
female* -0.061*** -0.112*** -0.154***
(0.016) (0.032) (0.016)
age 0.023*** 0.027** 0.013* 0.032***0.052*** 0.006 0.040***0.051*** 0.017*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
age^2/100 -0.020***-0.026** -0.009 -0.029**-0.051*** -0.004 -0.037***-0.052*** -0.012
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
married* 0.018 0.051** -0.012
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
inverse dependecy -0.041** -0.028 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.015 -0.177***-0.176***-0.119***
 ratio (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.034) (0.043) (0.035)
training* 0.052** 0.059* 0.026 0.034 0.054 0.005 0.039 0.071* -0.014
(0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.011) (0.030) (0.036) (0.031)
government job 0.378*** 0.107 0.551*** 0.321*** 0.131 0.320 0.406*** 0.129 0.667***
 creation program* (0.055) (0.061) (0.081) (0.069) (0.096) (0.182) (0.064) (0.107) (0.068)
spouse -0.029 -0.030 -0.006 0.035 0.048 0.006 0.127 0.180 0.052
 public sector* (0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.050) (0.092) (0.020) (0.077) (0.112) (0.080)
spouse formal -0.016 0.036 -0.021 -0.010 0.102 -0.016 0.020 0.098 -0.023
 sector* (0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.032) (0.069) (0.019) (0.047) (0.072) (0.040)
household 0.269***0.289*** 0.211** 0.235*** 0.272** 0.088 0.201** 0.152 0.201*
 public sector* (0.041) (0.060) (0.067) (0.062) (0.088) (0.079) (0.074) (0.102) (0.100)
household 0.016 0.039 0.007 0.035 0.037 0.018 0.067 0.077 0.054
 formal sector* (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.032) (0.052) (0.023) (0.044) (0.058) (0.051)
Pseudo R^2 0.310 0.261 0.371 0.295 0.214 0.401
N 9095 3911 5147 4415 2130 2285 3499 1818 1681  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.17  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Informal Private, 
Coloreds 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.065***0.049***0.082*** 0.059***0.045***0.082*** 0.071***0.131***0.077***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.029) (0.014)
female* -0.126*** -0.216*** -0.192***
(0.031) (0.040) (0.039)
age 0.009 0.034* -0.023 0.024 0.051* 0.007 0.026 0.108 0.011
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) . (0.026)
age^2/100 -0.004 -0.035* 0.034 -0.021 -0.050 -0.004 -0.022 -0.099 -0.008
(0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021) (0.065) (0.031)
married* 0.019 0.060 -0.058
(0.040) (0.062) (0.057)
inverse dependecy -0.256***-0.325*** -0.155* -0.309***-0.429*** -0.226* -0.336***-0.998*** -0.253*
 ratio (0.053) (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.101) (0.108) (0.076) (0.270) (0.102)
training* 0.178*** 0.180* 0.192** 0.208*** 0.293** 0.214* 0.206** 0.728* 0.164
(0.047) (0.073) (0.067) (0.059) (0.102) (0.092) (0.073) (0.300) (0.115)
government job 0.146 0.029 0.354* -0.025 0.046 -0.027 0.029
 creation program* (0.118) (0.188) (0.142) (0.306) (0.324) (0.314) (0.302)
spouse 0.087 -0.038 0.267* 0.218** 0.146 0.350** 0.233* 0.319 0.339
 public sector* (0.078) (0.110) (0.110) (0.080) (0.144) (0.124) (0.106) (0.369) (0.225)
spouse formal 0.016 0.104 0.024 0.002 0.059 0.022 -0.007 0.118 0.012
 sector* (0.056) (0.083) (0.081) (0.073) (0.111) (0.117) (0.081) (0.277) (0.116)
household 0.244***0.262*** 0.252** 0.084 0.134 0.060 0.119 0.323 0.149
 public sector* (0.048) (0.066) (0.078) (0.089) (0.126) (0.178) (0.108) (0.323) (0.221)
household 0.036 0.102 -0.034 0.079 0.200* -0.044 0.097 0.453 -0.009
 formal sector* (0.040) (0.059) (0.056) (0.062) (0.092) (0.114) (0.074) (0.242) (0.109)
Pseudo R^2 0.252 0.203 0.329 0.292 0.210 0.399
N 1438 675 753 871 444 423 830 435 394  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 








Table A.18  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Public vs. Informal Private, Asians 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.119*** 0.092** 0.503* 0.138***0.122*** 0.143 0.125* 0.103 -0.001
(0.027) (0.028) (0.202) (0.031) (0.036) (2007.7) (0.058) (0.067) (22.55)
female* 0.031 -0.046 -0.045
(0.115) (0.157) (0.175)
age 0.041 0.012 -0.008 0.041 -0.014 0.092 0.028 -0.053 0.000
(0.041) (0.050) (0.129) (0.060) (0.078) (1316.6) (0.065) (0.088) (9.750)
age^2/100 -0.047 -0.014 0.048 -0.045 0.016 -0.134 -0.033 0.057 0.000
(0.051) (0.060) (0.175) (0.071) (0.090) (1923.6) (0.076) (0.100) (14.851)
married* 0.075 0.113 -0.105
(0.155) (0.200) (0.397)
inverse dependecy -0.116 -0.036 -0.493 0.446 0.402 -0.288 0.475 0.446 -0.007
 ratio (0.192) (0.225) (0.600) (0.318) (0.388) (4072.5) (0.393) (0.447) (206.1)
training* 0.090 0.215 -0.143 0.117 0.228 -0.998 0.102 0.234 0.000
(0.180) (0.232) (0.423) (0.179) (0.206) (32.776) (0.195) (0.189) (0.160)
government job
 creation program*
spouse 0.097 0.077 -0.619***-0.566*** -0.618***-0.609***
 public sector* (0.344) (0.390) (0.087) (0.090) (0.130) (0.141)
spouse formal -0.142 0.071 -0.555** -0.324 0.012 -0.998 -0.345 0.002 0.000
 sector* (0.188) (0.305) (0.197) (0.428) (0.546) (32.776) (0.460) (0.643) (0.160)
household 0.284 0.245 0.381***0.434*** 0.382** 0.391**
 public sector* (0.215) (0.265) (0.087) (0.090) (0.130) (0.141)
household 0.368** 0.266 0.357 0.334* 0.244 0.002 0.334* 0.252 1.000
 formal sector* (0.137) (0.216) (0.272) (0.131) (0.354) (32.590) (0.153) (0.335) (0.680)
Pseudo R^2 0.301 0.236 0.588 0.338 0.280 1.000
N 151 101 40 104 74 20 98 71 19  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 










Table A.19  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Formal vs. Informal Private, All 
Races 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.013***0.015***0.021*** 0.007***0.007***0.029*** 0.015***0.009***0.056***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
female* -0.152*** -0.208*** -0.256***                
(0.011) (0.020) (0.017)                
age 0.006***0.017*** 0.001 0.002 0.008** -0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
age^2/100 -0.009***-0.022*** -0.004 -0.003* -0.011*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.008* 0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
Black* -0.174***-0.155***-0.308*** -0.137***-0.107**-0.351*** -0.229***-0.205***-0.363***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.048) (0.027) (0.035) (0.063) (0.014) (0.020) (0.039)
Colored* -0.089***-0.074**-0.178*** -0.087***-0.086***-0.197*** -0.082***-0.080***-0.128**
(0.014) (0.023) (0.028) (0.015) (0.023) (0.039) (0.015) (0.023) (0.043)
Asian* -0.052* -0.055 -0.035 -0.050* -0.056 -0.001 -0.023 -0.038 0.093
(0.021) (0.038) (0.041) (0.020) (0.032) (0.068) (0.022) (0.031) (0.074)
married* 0.012** 0.073***-0.087***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.014)
inverse dependecy 0.046***0.091***0.043*** 0.026***0.049*** 0.028 -0.005 -0.006 0.002
 ratio (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016) (0.032)
training* 0.028***0.050*** 0.026* 0.015** 0.026** 0.017 0.014 0.029* -0.023
(0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.012) (0.035)
government job 0.042*** -0.070 0.095*** 0.006 -0.110 0.118** 0.003 -0.083 0.136
 creation program* (0.012) (0.050) (0.018) (0.017) (0.070) (0.038) (0.031) (0.078) (0.073)
spouse 0.010 -0.041 0.068*** 0.029** 0.007 0.121*** 0.051*** 0.030 0.189**
 public sector* (0.013) (0.035) (0.016) (0.010) (0.030) (0.037) (0.015) (0.032) (0.058)
spouse formal -0.024** -0.033 0.029** 0.014* 0.012 0.060* 0.028** 0.023 0.127***
 sector* (0.009) (0.021) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.025) (0.010) (0.017) (0.036)
household 0.018* 0.034 0.022 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.021
 public sector* (0.008) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.050) (0.025) (0.037) (0.082)
household 0.073***0.147***0.076*** 0.040***0.070***0.107*** 0.065***0.087*** 0.120**
 formal sector* (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.009) (0.013) (0.037)
Pseudo R^2 0.188 0.132 0.237 0.217 0.121 0.281
N 20428 11491 8937 10520 6466 4054 8983 5607 3376  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 






Table A.20  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Formal vs. Informal Private, Whites 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.016***0.030*** 0.004 0.010** 0.016** 0.003 0.014* 0.021* 0.010
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014)
female* 0.001 -0.034 -0.045
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024)
age -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
age^2/100 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.011 0.003
(0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
married* 0.042 0.123** -0.050
(0.024) (0.040) (0.035)
inverse dependecy -0.004 0.030 -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.027 -0.022 -0.019 -0.039
 ratio (0.026) (0.049) (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) (0.041) (0.026) (0.038) (0.052)
training* -0.028 -0.006 -0.035 -0.011 0.022 -0.083 -0.013 0.027 -0.104
(0.024) (0.041) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.054) (0.022) (0.024) (0.062)
government job
 creation program*
spouse -0.114 -0.808*** 0.023 0.026 -0.933*** 0.077 0.042 -0.915*** 0.107*
 public sector* (0.134) (0.046) (0.027) (0.043) (0.022) (0.045) (0.044) (0.018) (0.052)
spouse formal 0.010 0.023 0.024* 0.025 0.034 0.008 0.041 0.047 0.038
 sector* (0.031) (0.057) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.078) (0.022) (0.025) (0.087)
household 0.087** 0.192*** 0.015 0.005 0.066** -0.042 0.003 0.084*** -0.061
 public sector* (0.032) (0.046) (0.029) (0.056) (0.023) (0.135) (0.070) (0.018) (0.164)
household 0.054* 0.106** -0.002 0.023 0.023 0.053 0.027 0.030 0.059
 formal sector* (0.023) (0.039) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.052) (0.026) (0.030) (0.077)
Pseudo R^2 0.065 0.121 0.042 0.052 0.092 0.048
N 2054 1209 845 1545 928 617 1517 912 605  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.21  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Formal vs. Informal Private, Blacks 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.030***0.023***0.038*** 0.022***0.016***0.035*** 0.030***0.015***0.049***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
female* -0.258*** -0.402*** -0.403***               
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015)               
age 0.021***0.032*** 0.007 0.013** 0.027*** -0.001 0.009 0.019** -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
age^2/100 -0.029***-0.042***-0.014** -0.019***-0.035*** -0.001 -0.014* -0.027*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
married* 0.026* 0.114***-0.125***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
inverse dependecy 0.136***0.153***0.125*** 0.127***0.137*** 0.098** 0.028 -0.001 0.053
 ratio (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036)
training* 0.085***0.082***0.087*** 0.049* 0.046 0.065 0.026 0.035 0.019
(0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.039) (0.024) (0.029) (0.041)
government job 0.130*** -0.091 0.297*** 0.017 -0.244* 0.211* -0.002 -0.197 0.161
 creation program* (0.038) (0.061) (0.048) (0.059) (0.096) (0.086) (0.072) (0.115) (0.107)
spouse 0.013 -0.048 0.148** 0.100 0.020 0.195 0.146** 0.077 0.308*
 public sector* (0.037) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.087) (0.100) (0.053) (0.082) (0.136)
spouse formal -0.074*** -0.054 0.043 0.037 0.022 0.075 0.059* 0.049 0.142*
 sector* (0.021) (0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.042) (0.047) (0.030) (0.043) (0.059)
household 0.019 0.039 0.007 -0.021 -0.005 -0.034 -0.063 -0.023 -0.111
 public sector* (0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.081) (0.078) (0.071) (0.085) (0.079)
household 0.239***0.295***0.218*** 0.170***0.198***0.185*** 0.179***0.206*** 0.126*
 formal sector* (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.035) (0.048) (0.020) (0.023) (0.057)
Pseudo R^2 0.147 0.104 0.154 0.170 0.081 0.160
N 14291 7971 6320 6647 4114 2533 5252 3323 1929  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 









Table A.22  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Formal vs. Informal Private, 
Coloreds 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.012*** 0.001 0.036*** 0.009** 0.001 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.000 0.072***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.025) (0.011)
female* -0.148*** -0.240*** -0.285***               
(0.021) (0.039) (0.030)               
age -0.007* -0.004 -0.015 -0.009 -0.004 -0.021 -0.011 -0.028 -0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.038) (0.018)
age^2/100 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.017 0.010 0.018 0.014
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.043) (0.021)
married* 0.005 0.048* -0.120**
(0.015) (0.023) (0.040)
inverse dependecy -0.039* -0.012 -0.074 -0.051 -0.033 -0.126 -0.068 -0.204 -0.074
 ratio (0.020) (0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.037) (0.066) (0.036) (0.185) (0.077)
training* 0.031 0.061* -0.003 0.060* 0.084* 0.055 0.071* 0.581* -0.014
(0.020) (0.030) (0.050) (0.024) (0.036) (0.081) (0.033) (0.239) (0.099)
government job -0.143 -0.179 -0.070 -0.002 -0.127 -0.127 -0.006 -0.083
 creation program* (0.114) (0.169) (0.186) (0.123) (0.292) (0.168) (0.297)
spouse 0.022 -0.040 0.141** 0.064* 0.033 0.199* 0.094* 0.240 0.197
 public sector* (0.033) (0.068) (0.054) (0.031) (0.057) (0.095) (0.044) (0.339) (0.146)
spouse formal -0.003 0.000 0.096** 0.020 0.004 0.141* 0.027 0.042 0.186*
 sector* (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036) (0.060) (0.032) (0.181) (0.075)
household 0.043* 0.016 0.118** 0.002 -0.070 0.127 -0.007 -0.294 0.158
 public sector* (0.020) (0.035) (0.043) (0.041) (0.080) (0.098) (0.062) (0.286) (0.139)
household 0.080***0.105***0.109*** 0.073*** 0.090** 0.103 0.111***0.676*** 0.117
 formal sector* (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.034) (0.065) (0.022) (0.158) (0.085)
Pseudo R^2 0.113 0.073 0.186 0.135 0.083 0.169
N 3473 1895 1569 1895 1116 762 1815 1098 717  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 








Table A.23  Details of the Probit and IV Probit Estimation, Formal vs. Informal Private, Asians 
Probit Probit (married people) IV Probit
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
yschool 0.039** 0.038** 0.037 0.041*** 0.041** 0.064 0.026 0.030 0.031
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.081)
female* 0.025 0.006 0.011
(0.054) (0.059) (0.059)
age 0.001 -0.002 0.015 -0.012 -0.033 0.068 -0.016 -0.041* 0.072
(0.016) (0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.065) (0.019) (0.020) (0.077)
age^2/100 0.003 0.007 -0.015 0.018 0.040 -0.064 0.020 0.047* -0.075
(0.019) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027) (0.077) (0.022) (0.024) (0.094)
married* 0.044 0.058 -0.038
(0.064) (0.081) (0.131)
inverse dependecy -0.191* -0.189 -0.219 -0.038 -0.051 -0.048 -0.057 -0.078 -0.050
 ratio (0.081) (0.097) (0.150) (0.091) (0.106) (0.282) (0.103) (0.115) (0.341)
training* 0.060 0.093 -0.046 0.017 0.050 -0.128 0.021 0.050 -0.128
(0.070) (0.078) (0.154) (0.067) (0.067) (0.242) (0.069) (0.061) (0.255)
government job
 creation program*
spouse 0.005 -0.112 -0.850***-0.855*** -0.854***-0.878***               
 public sector* (0.198) (0.281) (0.091) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039)               
spouse formal -0.042 -0.037 -0.013 -0.134 -0.087 -0.766 -0.112 -0.072 -0.700** 
 sector* (0.108) (0.133) (0.175) (0.189) (0.177) (0.691) (0.188) (0.166) (0.219)
household 0.153* 0.138 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.122**               
 public sector* (0.075) (0.098) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039)               
household 0.177*** 0.188** 0.152 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.233 0.134*** 0.112** 0.300
 formal sector* (0.053) (0.066) (0.079) (0.034) (0.036) (0.143) (0.040) (0.038) (0.219)
Pseudo R^2 0.175 0.166 0.199 0.175 0.168 0.286
N 578 389 165 408 285 102 391 270 102  
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Language dummies are also 
included in the ordinary probit estimations. * after the name of the variable means that dy/dx is for discrete change 
of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
